Freedom and moral sentiment Hume's way of naturalizing responsibility

Russell contends that it is the workings of moral sentiment, and not the concept of freedom, that is basic to Hume's account of moral responsibility. The compatibilist strategy that Hume pursues must be interpreted in terms of his detailed description of the circumstances in which people are fe...

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1. Verfasser: Russell, Paul 1955- (VerfasserIn)
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Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: New York [u.a.] Oxford Univ. Press 1995
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520 3 |a Russell contends that it is the workings of moral sentiment, and not the concept of freedom, that is basic to Hume's account of moral responsibility. The compatibilist strategy that Hume pursues must be interpreted in terms of his detailed description of the circumstances in which people are felt to be responsible. These naturalistic commitments are directly relevant to Hume's complex understanding of how freedom relates to responsibility. It is his view that we must not exaggerate the importance of voluntariness and control for moral responsibility. Hume's naturalism is also essential to his account of the relationship between responsibility and religion. Issues of moral responsibility, Hume maintains, can be understood only within the fabric of human feeling and human society. This perspective on responsibility is central to the philosopher's most basic objective: to secularize our understanding of moral life and practice 
520 |a The classical reading entirely overlooks Hume's naturalistic concerns and commitments. As Russell demonstrates, however, it is this very aspect that is fundamental to Hume's general strategy and that is of particular significance from a contemporary perspective. The contemporary relevance of Hume's naturalistic approach is examined with P. F. Strawson's influential contribution on this subject especially in view. Freedom and Moral Sentiment addresses issues of wide interest to students and scholars of philosophy, theology, legal theory, and the history of ideas 
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Datensatz im Suchindex

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spelling Russell, Paul 1955- Verfasser (DE-588)137583443 aut
Freedom and moral sentiment Hume's way of naturalizing responsibility Paul Russell
New York [u.a.] Oxford Univ. Press 1995
200 S.
txt rdacontent
n rdamedia
nc rdacarrier
Russell contends that it is the workings of moral sentiment, and not the concept of freedom, that is basic to Hume's account of moral responsibility. The compatibilist strategy that Hume pursues must be interpreted in terms of his detailed description of the circumstances in which people are felt to be responsible. These naturalistic commitments are directly relevant to Hume's complex understanding of how freedom relates to responsibility. It is his view that we must not exaggerate the importance of voluntariness and control for moral responsibility. Hume's naturalism is also essential to his account of the relationship between responsibility and religion. Issues of moral responsibility, Hume maintains, can be understood only within the fabric of human feeling and human society. This perspective on responsibility is central to the philosopher's most basic objective: to secularize our understanding of moral life and practice
The classical reading entirely overlooks Hume's naturalistic concerns and commitments. As Russell demonstrates, however, it is this very aspect that is fundamental to Hume's general strategy and that is of particular significance from a contemporary perspective. The contemporary relevance of Hume's naturalistic approach is examined with P. F. Strawson's influential contribution on this subject especially in view. Freedom and Moral Sentiment addresses issues of wide interest to students and scholars of philosophy, theology, legal theory, and the history of ideas
Hume, David <1711-1776> - Critique et interprétation ram
Hume, David <1711-1776> Ethics
Hume, David 1711-1776 (DE-588)118554735 gnd rswk-swf
Determinisme gtt
Libre arbitre et déterminisme ram
Responsabilité ram
Verantwoordelijkheid gtt
Vrije wil gtt
Free will and determinism
Responsibility
Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd rswk-swf
Verantwortung (DE-588)4062547-3 gnd rswk-swf
Freiheit (DE-588)4018326-9 gnd rswk-swf
Willensfreiheit (DE-588)4079320-5 gnd rswk-swf
Hume, David 1711-1776 (DE-588)118554735 p
Verantwortung (DE-588)4062547-3 s
Willensfreiheit (DE-588)4079320-5 s
DE-604
Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 s
Freiheit (DE-588)4018326-9 s
DE-188
spellingShingle Russell, Paul 1955-
Freedom and moral sentiment Hume's way of naturalizing responsibility
Hume, David <1711-1776> - Critique et interprétation ram
Hume, David <1711-1776> Ethics
Hume, David 1711-1776 (DE-588)118554735 gnd
Determinisme gtt
Libre arbitre et déterminisme ram
Responsabilité ram
Verantwoordelijkheid gtt
Vrije wil gtt
Free will and determinism
Responsibility
Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd
Verantwortung (DE-588)4062547-3 gnd
Freiheit (DE-588)4018326-9 gnd
Willensfreiheit (DE-588)4079320-5 gnd
subject_GND (DE-588)118554735
(DE-588)4015602-3
(DE-588)4062547-3
(DE-588)4018326-9
(DE-588)4079320-5
title Freedom and moral sentiment Hume's way of naturalizing responsibility
title_auth Freedom and moral sentiment Hume's way of naturalizing responsibility
title_exact_search Freedom and moral sentiment Hume's way of naturalizing responsibility
title_full Freedom and moral sentiment Hume's way of naturalizing responsibility Paul Russell
title_fullStr Freedom and moral sentiment Hume's way of naturalizing responsibility Paul Russell
title_full_unstemmed Freedom and moral sentiment Hume's way of naturalizing responsibility Paul Russell
title_short Freedom and moral sentiment
title_sort freedom and moral sentiment hume s way of naturalizing responsibility
title_sub Hume's way of naturalizing responsibility
topic Hume, David <1711-1776> - Critique et interprétation ram
Hume, David <1711-1776> Ethics
Hume, David 1711-1776 (DE-588)118554735 gnd
Determinisme gtt
Libre arbitre et déterminisme ram
Responsabilité ram
Verantwoordelijkheid gtt
Vrije wil gtt
Free will and determinism
Responsibility
Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd
Verantwortung (DE-588)4062547-3 gnd
Freiheit (DE-588)4018326-9 gnd
Willensfreiheit (DE-588)4079320-5 gnd
topic_facet Hume, David <1711-1776> - Critique et interprétation
Hume, David <1711-1776> Ethics
Hume, David 1711-1776
Determinisme
Libre arbitre et déterminisme
Responsabilité
Verantwoordelijkheid
Vrije wil
Free will and determinism
Responsibility
Ethik
Verantwortung
Freiheit
Willensfreiheit
work_keys_str_mv AT russellpaul freedomandmoralsentimenthumeswayofnaturalizingresponsibility