The rebel's dilemma
"Since the mid-1960s, theorists have elaborated over two dozen different solutions to the collective action problem. During much of this same period, students of conflict have explored many questions about protest and rebellion. The Rebel's Dilemma examines what happens when one brings the...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Ann Arbor
Univ. of Michigan Press
1995
|
Schriftenreihe: | Economics, cognition, and society
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
MARC
LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | BV010296240 | ||
003 | DE-604 | ||
005 | 19970410 | ||
007 | t | ||
008 | 950717s1995 |||| 00||| eng d | ||
020 | |a 0472105329 |9 0-472-10532-9 | ||
035 | |a (OCoLC)31076471 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV010296240 | ||
040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakddb | ||
041 | 0 | |a eng | |
049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-703 |a DE-473 |a DE-11 |a DE-188 | ||
050 | 0 | |a HM281 | |
082 | 0 | |a 302/.14 |2 20 | |
084 | |a MD 1100 |0 (DE-625)122492: |2 rvk | ||
084 | |a MR 5600 |0 (DE-625)123520: |2 rvk | ||
100 | 1 | |a Lichbach, Mark Irving |d 1951- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)124429726 |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a The rebel's dilemma |c Mark Irving Lichbach |
264 | 1 | |a Ann Arbor |b Univ. of Michigan Press |c 1995 | |
300 | |a XXII, 514 S. | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
490 | 0 | |a Economics, cognition, and society | |
520 | 1 | |a "Since the mid-1960s, theorists have elaborated over two dozen different solutions to the collective action problem. During much of this same period, students of conflict have explored many questions about protest and rebellion. The Rebel's Dilemma examines what happens when one brings the full richness of collective action theories to bear on the many complex problems of collective dissent." "The book develops a new typology of solutions to the collective action problem: market, community, contract, and hierarchy. It then uses the typology to explain how the Rebel's Dilemma (i.e., the problem applied to collective dissent) is overcome by rebels. In placing two dozen different sets of solutions into this typology, four themes are developed. First, the Rebel's Dilemma is not all that much of a dilemma. If the collective action problem can be solved in some two dozen ways, it cannot pose an insurmountable hurdle for potential dissidents. Second, both dissidents and regimes know that the Rebel's Dilemma can be overcome. While dissidents try to solve their collective action problem, the regime tries to intensify that problem. This struggle over solutions to the collective action problem is the political struggle between regimes and oppositions. Third, analysts must specify the conditions under which collective action is effective. Finally, the collective action approach makes a major contribution to conflict studies. By dissecting the causes and consequences of solutions to the Rebel's Dilemma, the approach offers a set of implications that are far richer than anything offered by its competitors."--BOOK JACKET. | |
650 | 7 | |a Collectieve acties |2 gtt | |
650 | 7 | |a Prisoners Dilemma Game |2 gtt | |
650 | 7 | |a Social choice |2 gtt | |
650 | 4 | |a Social action |x Decision making | |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Entscheidungsprozess |0 (DE-588)4121202-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Soziales Handeln |0 (DE-588)4055759-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
689 | 0 | 0 | |a Entscheidungsprozess |0 (DE-588)4121202-2 |D s |
689 | 0 | 1 | |a Soziales Handeln |0 (DE-588)4055759-5 |D s |
689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
856 | 4 | 2 | |m HBZ Datenaustausch |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=006850139&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-006850139 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
DE-473_call_number | 31/MD 1100 WU 6396 |
---|---|
DE-473_location | 3 |
DE-BY-UBG_katkey | 1329140 |
DE-BY-UBG_media_number | 013103601373 |
_version_ | 1811358484532297729 |
adam_text | Contents
Exhibits xxiii
Abbreviations xxiv
Part 1 Introduction
Chapter 1 The Problem Defined 3
1.1 An Example 3
1.2 The Deprived Actor Research Program 4
1.3 The Collective Action Research Program 5
1.4 The Reaction to Olson: Applied Students of
Collective Dissent 7
1.5 The Reaction to Olson: Pure Theorists of
Collective Action 11
Chapter 2 The Approach Adopted 15
2.1 The Improbability of Extensive Collective Dissent:
The Rebel s Dilemma 16
2.2 The Probability of Some Collective Dissent:
Solutions to the Rebel s Dilemma 19
2.3 Solutions as Politics: The Origins of
Collective Action 22
2.4 Solutions as Pathologies: The Outcomes of
Collective Action 28
2.5 Appraising Collective Action Theories of
Collective Dissent 30
Part 2 Solutions
Chapter 3 Market 35
3.1 Increase Benefits 36
3.2 Lower Costs 38
3.2.1 No Cost Collective Dissent 38
xviii The Rebel s Dilemma
3.2.2 Low Cost Collective Dissent 39
3.2.3 The Opportunity Costs of Collective Dissent 42
3.2.4 The Fixed Costs of Collective Dissent 45
3.2.5 Dissidents Minimize Costs 46
3.2.6 Entrepreneurs Minimize Costs 47
3.3 Increase Resources 48
3.4 Improve the Productivity of Tactics 50
3.4.1 The Production Function 50
3.4.2 Innovations in Technology 50
3.4.3 Targets 52
3.4.4 Tactics 53
3.4.5 Tactics: Collective Violence and Nonviolence 54 x
3.4.5.1 Why Collective Violence Is Used 55
3.4.5.2 When Collective Violence Is Used 59
3.5 Reduce the Supply of the Public Good 62
3.6 Increase the Probability of Winning 62
3.6.1 The Dissident s Calculus 64
3.6.2 Estimating the Probability of Winning 66
3.6.2.1 The Dissident Group s Victories 66
3.6.2.2 The State s Weakness 68
3.6.3 The Dissident Group s Strategy 74
3.6.4 The State s Strategy 78
3.6.5 The Competition between State
and Opposition 79
3.6.6 An Example: Military Coups 80
3.7 Increase the Probability of Making a Difference 82
3.7.1 The Dissident s Calculus 83
3.7.2 The Dissident Group s Strategy 84
3.8 Use Incomplete Information 86
3.8.1 The Dissident s Calculus 86
3.8.2 The Dissident Group s Public
Relations Calculus 88
3.8.2.1 Publicity 89
3.8.2.2 Illusions 91
3.8.2.3 Ideology 92
3.8.2.4 Symbols 93
3.8.3 The State s Public Relations Calculus 95
3.8.4 The State s and the Dissidents Struggle
to Control Information 95
3.9 Increase Risk Taking 96
3.10 Increase Team Competition between Enemies 99
3.10.1 The Enemies 99
Contents xix
3.10.1.1 Other Dissident Groups 99
3.10.1.2 States 101
3.10.1.3 Other States 102
3.10.2 The Origins of Countermobilization 102
3.10.3 The Consequences of Countermobilization 104
3.11 Restrict Exit 105
3.12 Change the Type of Public Good 107
3.12.1 Seek Public Bads 107
3.12.2 Seek Nonrival Public Goods 108
Chapter 4 Community 111
4.1 Common Knowledge: Overcome Mutual Ignorance 111
4.1.1 Simultaneous Choice: Increase
Mutual Expectations 111
4.1.2 Sequential Choice: Build a Bandwagon 114
4.1.2.1 The Temporal Diffusion of
Collective Dissent 116
4.1.2.2 The Spatial Diffusion of
Collective Dissent 118
4.2 Common Values: Overcome Pecuniary Self Interest 120
4.2.1 Process Orientation 121
4.2.2 Other Regardingness 124
Chapter 5 Contract 129
5.1 Types of Social Contracts 129
5.1.1 Self Government 129
5.1.2 Tit For Tat 133
5.1.3 Mutual Exchange 133
5.2 The Social Origins of Social Contracts 134
5.2.1 Longevity 36
5.2.2 Homogeneity 138
5.2.3 Preexisting Organization 141
5.2.3.1 Formal Organization 45
5.2.3.2 Informal Organization 146
5.2.3.3 Social Origins I48
5.2.3.4 Political Origins 149
5.2.4 Autonomy
5.2.5 Stability 157
5.2.6 Concentration 158
Chapter 6 Hierarchy 167
6.1 Locate Agents or Entrepreneurs 167
xx The Rebel s Dilemma
6.1.1 The Importance of Entrepreneurial Activity 167
6.1.2 The Origins of Entrepreneurial Activity 171
6.1.3 The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Activity 175
6.2 Locate Principals or Patrons 177
6.2.1 How Patrons Help Dissidents 177
6.2.2 Why Patrons Help Dissidents 178
6.2.3 Which Patrons Help Dissidents 180
6.2.3.1 The Military as an Ally 180
6.2.3.2 The State as an Ally 182
6.2.3.3 Nonstate Domestic Actors as Allies 188
6.2.3.4 External Actors as Allies 189
6.2.4 What If Patrons Help Dissidents 191
6.3 Reorganize 193
6.3.1 Become Clubbish: Form an Exclusionary Club 194
6.3.2 Become Effective: Shape an Efficacious Group 197
6.3.3 Become Decentralized: Create a
Federal Structure 200
6.4 Increase Team Competition among Allies 201
6.4.1 The Forms of Competition 201
6.4.2 The Causes of Competition 203
6.4.3 The Courses of Competition 206
6.4.4 The Consequences of Competition 208
6.5 Impose, Monitor, and Enforce Agreements 210
6.5.1 Impose Agreements 210
6.5.2 Monitor Defections 211
6.5.3 Administer Selective Incentives 215
6.5.3.1 The Argument: The Centrality of
Selective Incentives 216
6.5.3.2 The Evidence: Rebels Seek
Selective Incentives 217
6.5.3.3 The Causes: Politics 226
6.5.3.4 The Consequences: A Non Solution? 238
6.5.4 Administer Selective Disincentives 241
Part 3 Themes
Chapter 7 Solutions as Politics: The Origins of 247
Collective Action
7.1 The Reformist Cooperation between States
and Dissidents 247
7.1.1 Apolitical Production Functions 248
7.1.2 Political Games 251
Contents xxi
7.2 The Revolutionary Conflict between States
and Dissidents 253
7.2.1 The Revolutionary Coalition:
The Rebel s Dilemma 254
7.2.2 The Antirevolutionary Coalition:
The State s Dilemma 256
7.2.3 The Rebel s Dilemma and the
State s Dilemma 258
Chapter 8 Solutions as Pathologies: The Outcomes 261
of Collective Action
8.1 The Intended Consequences of
Dissident Organization 261
8.2 The Unintended Consequences of
Dissident Organization 263
8.2.1 The Iron Laws 263
8.2.2 The Universality of the Iron Laws 273
8.2.3 Overcoming the Iron Laws 274
8.2.4 The Lessons 274
Part 4 Appraisal
Chapter 9 Evaluating Collective Action Theories of 279
Collective Dissent
9.1 An Analytical Criterion: Intersolution Comparison 279
9.2 One Empirical Criterion: Predictability 281
9.2.1 The Complexity of the Rebel s Dilemma 282
9.2.2 The Weakness of Grievances 282
9.2.2.1 Neither Necessary nor Sufficient
for Collective Dissent 282
9.2.2.2 Preference Falsification 284
9.2.2.3 The Grievance Collective
Dissent Linkage 286
9.2.3 The Consequences for Evaluating
CA Theories 289
9.3 Two More Empirical Criteria: Lakatos and Popper 293
9.3.1 The Criteria 294
9.3.2 The Criteria Applied 298
9.3.2.1 Market 2
9.3.2.2 Community 309
9.3.2.3 Contract 3U
9.3.2.4 Hierarchy 315
xxii The Rebel s Dilemma
9.3.3 The Criteria s Results 320
9.4 Summary Evaluation 323
Chapter 10 Improving Collective Action Theories of 325
Collective Dissent
10.1 Deepen the Micro 325
10.2 Explore the Macro 330
10.2.1 A Theory of Civil Society: Groups 332
10.2.2 A Theory of the State: Politics 336
10.2.3 A Theory of State Society Linkages:
Domination and Legitimacy 337
Chapter 11 A Final Perspective 339
Notes 345
References 453
Author Index 495
Subject Index 505
Exhibits
1.1 Jane s Dilemma 5
2.1 Solutions to the Collective Action Problem 21
|
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Lichbach, Mark Irving 1951- |
author_GND | (DE-588)124429726 |
author_facet | Lichbach, Mark Irving 1951- |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Lichbach, Mark Irving 1951- |
author_variant | m i l mi mil |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV010296240 |
callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
callnumber-label | HM281 |
callnumber-raw | HM281 |
callnumber-search | HM281 |
callnumber-sort | HM 3281 |
callnumber-subject | HM - Sociology |
classification_rvk | MD 1100 MR 5600 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)31076471 (DE-599)BVBBV010296240 |
dewey-full | 302/.14 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 302 - Social interaction |
dewey-raw | 302/.14 |
dewey-search | 302/.14 |
dewey-sort | 3302 214 |
dewey-tens | 300 - Social sciences |
discipline | Soziologie Politologie |
format | Book |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03288nam a2200445 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV010296240</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">19970410 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">950717s1995 |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0472105329</subfield><subfield code="9">0-472-10532-9</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)31076471</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV010296240</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakddb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-11</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-188</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">HM281</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">302/.14</subfield><subfield code="2">20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MD 1100</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)122492:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MR 5600</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)123520:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Lichbach, Mark Irving</subfield><subfield code="d">1951-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)124429726</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The rebel's dilemma</subfield><subfield code="c">Mark Irving Lichbach</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Ann Arbor</subfield><subfield code="b">Univ. of Michigan Press</subfield><subfield code="c">1995</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XXII, 514 S.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Economics, cognition, and society</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"Since the mid-1960s, theorists have elaborated over two dozen different solutions to the collective action problem. During much of this same period, students of conflict have explored many questions about protest and rebellion. The Rebel's Dilemma examines what happens when one brings the full richness of collective action theories to bear on the many complex problems of collective dissent." "The book develops a new typology of solutions to the collective action problem: market, community, contract, and hierarchy. It then uses the typology to explain how the Rebel's Dilemma (i.e., the problem applied to collective dissent) is overcome by rebels. In placing two dozen different sets of solutions into this typology, four themes are developed. First, the Rebel's Dilemma is not all that much of a dilemma. If the collective action problem can be solved in some two dozen ways, it cannot pose an insurmountable hurdle for potential dissidents. Second, both dissidents and regimes know that the Rebel's Dilemma can be overcome. While dissidents try to solve their collective action problem, the regime tries to intensify that problem. This struggle over solutions to the collective action problem is the political struggle between regimes and oppositions. Third, analysts must specify the conditions under which collective action is effective. Finally, the collective action approach makes a major contribution to conflict studies. By dissecting the causes and consequences of solutions to the Rebel's Dilemma, the approach offers a set of implications that are far richer than anything offered by its competitors."--BOOK JACKET.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Collectieve acties</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Prisoners Dilemma Game</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Social choice</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Social action</subfield><subfield code="x">Decision making</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Entscheidungsprozess</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4121202-2</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Soziales Handeln</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4055759-5</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Entscheidungsprozess</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4121202-2</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Soziales Handeln</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4055759-5</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">HBZ Datenaustausch</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=006850139&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-006850139</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
id | DE-604.BV010296240 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-09-19T15:01:35Z |
indexdate | 2024-09-27T16:03:34Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 0472105329 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-006850139 |
oclc_num | 31076471 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-12 DE-703 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-11 DE-188 |
owner_facet | DE-12 DE-703 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-11 DE-188 |
physical | XXII, 514 S. |
publishDate | 1995 |
publishDateSearch | 1995 |
publishDateSort | 1995 |
publisher | Univ. of Michigan Press |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Economics, cognition, and society |
spellingShingle | Lichbach, Mark Irving 1951- The rebel's dilemma Collectieve acties gtt Prisoners Dilemma Game gtt Social choice gtt Social action Decision making Entscheidungsprozess (DE-588)4121202-2 gnd Soziales Handeln (DE-588)4055759-5 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4121202-2 (DE-588)4055759-5 |
title | The rebel's dilemma |
title_auth | The rebel's dilemma |
title_exact_search | The rebel's dilemma |
title_full | The rebel's dilemma Mark Irving Lichbach |
title_fullStr | The rebel's dilemma Mark Irving Lichbach |
title_full_unstemmed | The rebel's dilemma Mark Irving Lichbach |
title_short | The rebel's dilemma |
title_sort | the rebel s dilemma |
topic | Collectieve acties gtt Prisoners Dilemma Game gtt Social choice gtt Social action Decision making Entscheidungsprozess (DE-588)4121202-2 gnd Soziales Handeln (DE-588)4055759-5 gnd |
topic_facet | Collectieve acties Prisoners Dilemma Game Social choice Social action Decision making Entscheidungsprozess Soziales Handeln |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=006850139&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT lichbachmarkirving therebelsdilemma |