Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
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1991
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080 | |a 364 | ||
080 | |a 368/369 | ||
100 | 1 | |a Lantto, Kari |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Optimal deterrents to malingering |b the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare |c Kari Lantto |
264 | 1 | |c 1991 | |
300 | |a XI, 154 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
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500 | |a Stockholm, Univ., Diss., 1991 | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Lantto, Kari |
author_facet | Lantto, Kari |
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author_sort | Lantto, Kari |
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geographic_facet | Schweden |
id | DE-604.BV009938420 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-12-23T13:45:32Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 917146901X |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-006584170 |
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owner_facet | DE-12 |
physical | XI, 154 S. graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 1991 |
publishDateSearch | 1991 |
publishDateSort | 1991 |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Lantto, Kari Verfasser aut Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare Kari Lantto 1991 XI, 154 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Stockholm, Univ., Diss., 1991 Krankenversicherung (DE-588)4032836-3 gnd rswk-swf Ökonometrisches Modell (DE-588)4043212-9 gnd rswk-swf Simulant (DE-588)4227910-0 gnd rswk-swf Schweden (DE-588)4077258-5 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Schweden (DE-588)4077258-5 g Krankenversicherung (DE-588)4032836-3 s Simulant (DE-588)4227910-0 s Ökonometrisches Modell (DE-588)4043212-9 s DE-604 |
spellingShingle | Lantto, Kari Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare Krankenversicherung (DE-588)4032836-3 gnd Ökonometrisches Modell (DE-588)4043212-9 gnd Simulant (DE-588)4227910-0 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4032836-3 (DE-588)4043212-9 (DE-588)4227910-0 (DE-588)4077258-5 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
title | Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare |
title_auth | Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare |
title_exact_search | Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare |
title_full | Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare Kari Lantto |
title_fullStr | Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare Kari Lantto |
title_full_unstemmed | Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare Kari Lantto |
title_short | Optimal deterrents to malingering |
title_sort | optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives attitudes and information costs in social insurance especially sickness benefit and welfare |
title_sub | the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare |
topic | Krankenversicherung (DE-588)4032836-3 gnd Ökonometrisches Modell (DE-588)4043212-9 gnd Simulant (DE-588)4227910-0 gnd |
topic_facet | Krankenversicherung Ökonometrisches Modell Simulant Schweden Hochschulschrift |
work_keys_str_mv | AT lanttokari optimaldeterrentstomalingeringtheroleofincentivesattitudesandinformationcostsinsocialinsuranceespeciallysicknessbenefitandwelfare |