Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare

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1. Verfasser: Lantto, Kari (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 1991
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spelling Lantto, Kari Verfasser aut
Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare Kari Lantto
1991
XI, 154 S. graph. Darst.
txt rdacontent
n rdamedia
nc rdacarrier
Stockholm, Univ., Diss., 1991
Krankenversicherung (DE-588)4032836-3 gnd rswk-swf
Ökonometrisches Modell (DE-588)4043212-9 gnd rswk-swf
Simulant (DE-588)4227910-0 gnd rswk-swf
Schweden (DE-588)4077258-5 gnd rswk-swf
(DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content
Schweden (DE-588)4077258-5 g
Krankenversicherung (DE-588)4032836-3 s
Simulant (DE-588)4227910-0 s
Ökonometrisches Modell (DE-588)4043212-9 s
DE-604
spellingShingle Lantto, Kari
Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare
Krankenversicherung (DE-588)4032836-3 gnd
Ökonometrisches Modell (DE-588)4043212-9 gnd
Simulant (DE-588)4227910-0 gnd
subject_GND (DE-588)4032836-3
(DE-588)4043212-9
(DE-588)4227910-0
(DE-588)4077258-5
(DE-588)4113937-9
title Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare
title_auth Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare
title_exact_search Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare
title_full Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare Kari Lantto
title_fullStr Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare Kari Lantto
title_full_unstemmed Optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare Kari Lantto
title_short Optimal deterrents to malingering
title_sort optimal deterrents to malingering the role of incentives attitudes and information costs in social insurance especially sickness benefit and welfare
title_sub the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare
topic Krankenversicherung (DE-588)4032836-3 gnd
Ökonometrisches Modell (DE-588)4043212-9 gnd
Simulant (DE-588)4227910-0 gnd
topic_facet Krankenversicherung
Ökonometrisches Modell
Simulant
Schweden
Hochschulschrift
work_keys_str_mv AT lanttokari optimaldeterrentstomalingeringtheroleofincentivesattitudesandinformationcostsinsocialinsuranceespeciallysicknessbenefitandwelfare