Who Bears the Cost of Russia’s Military Draft?

The authors use data from a large nationally representative survey in Russia to analyze the distributional and welfare implications of draft avoidance as a common response to Russia's highly unpopular conscription system. They develop a simple theoretical model that describes household complian...

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Hauptverfasser: Lokshin, Michael, Yemtsov, Ruslan
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Yemtsov, Ruslan
description The authors use data from a large nationally representative survey in Russia to analyze the distributional and welfare implications of draft avoidance as a common response to Russia's highly unpopular conscription system. They develop a simple theoretical model that describes household compliance decisions with respect to enlistment. The authors use several econometric techniques to estimate the effect of various household characteristics on the probability of serving in the army and the implications for household income. Their results indicate that the burden of conscription falls disproportionately on the poor. Poor, rural households, with a low level of education, are more likely to have sons who are enlisted than urban, wealthy, and better-educated families. The losses incurred by the poor are disproportionately large and exceed the statutory rates of personal income taxes.
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They develop a simple theoretical model that describes household compliance decisions with respect to enlistment. The authors use several econometric techniques to estimate the effect of various household characteristics on the probability of serving in the army and the implications for household income. Their results indicate that the burden of conscription falls disproportionately on the poor. Poor, rural households, with a low level of education, are more likely to have sons who are enlisted than urban, wealthy, and better-educated families. 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They develop a simple theoretical model that describes household compliance decisions with respect to enlistment. The authors use several econometric techniques to estimate the effect of various household characteristics on the probability of serving in the army and the implications for household income. Their results indicate that the burden of conscription falls disproportionately on the poor. Poor, rural households, with a low level of education, are more likely to have sons who are enlisted than urban, wealthy, and better-educated families. The losses incurred by the poor are disproportionately large and exceed the statutory rates of personal income taxes.</abstract><pub>World Bank, Washington, DC</pub><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
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subjects ADULTS
AGED
ARMED FORCES
ARMIES
ARMY
CAPITAL FORMATION
CITIES
CONFLICT
DEFENSE
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
DEFENSE INFORMATION
DEFENSE SPENDING
DEMOGRAPHICS
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
ECONOMIC EFFECTS
ECONOMIC STATISTICS
EDUCATION
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
EQUILIBRIUM
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
FAMILIES
FATHERS
FEMALES
GAME THEORY
GENDER
HEALTH
HEALTH CARE
HOUSEHOLDS
HOUSING
HOUSING CONDITIONS
HUMAN CAPITAL
INCOME
INCOME TAXES
INJURIES
INJURY
INTERVENTION
LABOR FORCE
MARGINAL UTILITY
MEDIA
MILITARY BASES
MILITARY DRAFT
MILITARY FORCES
MILITARY OFFICERS
MILITARY PERSONNEL
MILITARY RECRUITMENT
MILITARY REFORM
MILITARY SERVICE
MILITARY TRAINING
NUTRITION
OCCUPATIONS
OPPORTUNITY COST
OPTIMIZATION
PARENTS
POVERTY LINE
PRODUCTION FUNCTION
PROGNOSIS
PUBLIC POLICIES
QUOTAS
RESEARCH AGENDA
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
RURAL AREAS
SETTLEMENTS
SOCIAL CAPITAL
TOWNS
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
UNEMPLOYMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
URBAN AREAS
UTILITY FUNCTIONS
UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
VICTIMS
VILLAGES
WAGES
WAR
WEALTH
WELLBEING
WILLINGNESS TO PAY
WORKERS
YOUTH
title Who Bears the Cost of Russia’s Military Draft?
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