Antidumping and Safeguard Measures in the Political Economy of Liberalization : The Mexican Case

Mexico's creation and use of safeguard and antidumping processes to advance its liberalization illustrate three key points: (1) The country was able to use the instruments without losing political control. In a period of crisis that threatened congressional approval of critical steps in the lib...

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Hauptverfasser: de la Torre, Luz Elena Reyes, González, Jorge G
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González, Jorge G
description Mexico's creation and use of safeguard and antidumping processes to advance its liberalization illustrate three key points: (1) The country was able to use the instruments without losing political control. In a period of crisis that threatened congressional approval of critical steps in the liberalization-brought on by currency overvaluation and recession, along with unexpected demands from the United States in the North American Free Trade Agreement negotiations-the government applied a number of trade defense measures. Once the problems were addressed with adequate instruments the number of measures dropped drastically. The instruments had not been captured by protection-seeking interests; (2) The country adopted a liberalization-accepting measure of international norms. An important innovation that Mexico made operational was the use within World Trade Organization (WTO) rules of prevailing international prices as the measure of competition that industry was expected to meet. The WTO rules would also have allowed the use of other standards-as in traditional antidumping-using countries-that impose less discipline. Moreover, the Mexican standard was consistent with the government-industry understanding that though Mexican industry would be protected against extraordinary circumstances it would be expected to face up to international competition; (3) Political judgment and political courage are essential. While mastery of the technical elements of a safeguard or antidumping investigation is mandatory, sustaining liberalization depends in significant part on the political skills to know when to emphasize the technical elements, when to rely more on the discretion the government retains under the rules, and on the courage to do it.
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In a period of crisis that threatened congressional approval of critical steps in the liberalization-brought on by currency overvaluation and recession, along with unexpected demands from the United States in the North American Free Trade Agreement negotiations-the government applied a number of trade defense measures. Once the problems were addressed with adequate instruments the number of measures dropped drastically. The instruments had not been captured by protection-seeking interests; (2) The country adopted a liberalization-accepting measure of international norms. An important innovation that Mexico made operational was the use within World Trade Organization (WTO) rules of prevailing international prices as the measure of competition that industry was expected to meet. The WTO rules would also have allowed the use of other standards-as in traditional antidumping-using countries-that impose less discipline. Moreover, the Mexican standard was consistent with the government-industry understanding that though Mexican industry would be protected against extraordinary circumstances it would be expected to face up to international competition; (3) Political judgment and political courage are essential. While mastery of the technical elements of a safeguard or antidumping investigation is mandatory, sustaining liberalization depends in significant part on the political skills to know when to emphasize the technical elements, when to rely more on the discretion the government retains under the rules, and on the courage to do it.</description><language>eng</language><publisher>World Bank, Washington, DC</publisher><subject>ACCESS TO INFORMATION ; ANTIDUMPING ; ANTIDUMPING CASES ; ANTIDUMPING CODE ; ANTIDUMPING DUTIES ; ANTIDUMPING LAWS ; ANTIDUMPING MEASURES ; ANTIDUMPING POLICY ; AVERAGE TARIFF ; BILATERAL AGREEMENT ; BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ; BILATERAL PANELS ; BINATIONAL PANELS ; COMPETITIVENESS ; COUNTRY OF ORIGIN ; CURRENCY ; DEVALUATION ; DISPUTE SETTLEMENT ; DOMESTIC INDUSTRY ; DOMESTIC PRODUCERS ; ECONOMIC CRISIS ; ECONOMIC HISTORY ; ECONOMIC IMPACT ; ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION PROCESS ; EXCHANGE POLICY ; EXCHANGE RATE ; EXPORTERS ; EXTERNAL FINANCING ; FINANCIAL MARKETS ; FOREIGN CURRENCY ; FOREIGN DEBT ; FOREIGN INVESTMENT ; FOREIGN TRADE ; FOREIGN TRADE POLICY ; FREE TRADE ; FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS ; GDP ; GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES ; IMPACT OF TRADE ; IMPORTS ; INFLATION ; INFLATION RATES ; INTEREST RATE ; INTERMEDIATE GOODS ; INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION ; INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY ; INTERNATIONAL MARKET ; INTERNATIONAL PRICES ; INTERNATIONAL TRADE ; INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION ; INVESTMENT FLOWS ; LATIN AMERICAN ; LEGISLATION ; MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ; NAFTA ; NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT ; OPEN ECONOMIES ; OVERVALUATION ; POLITICAL ECONOMY ; PRICE DISCRIMINATION ; PROTECTION MEASURES ; PUBLIC HEARINGS ; RECIPROCITY ; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ; RESOURCE ALLOCATION ; SAFEGUARD ACTIONS ; SAFEGUARD MEASURES ; TARIFF BARRIER ; TARIFF LEVELS ; TARIFF PREFERENCES ; TARIFF STRUCTURES ; TRADE AGREEMENT ; TRADE BARRIERS ; TRADE LIBERALIZATION ; TRADE LIBERALIZATION EFFORTS ; TRADE LIBERALIZATION PROCESS ; TRADE NEGOTIATION ; TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ; TRADE PARTNERS ; TRADE POLICIES ; TRADE POLICY ; TRADE PRACTICES ; TRADE PROTECTION ; TRADE REPRESENTATIVES ; UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ; URUGUAY ROUND ; WORLD TRADE ; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ; WTO</subject><creationdate>2005</creationdate><rights>CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><relation>Policy Research Working Paper</relation></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>307,776,780,783,18961</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/8608$$EView_record_in_World_Bank$$FView_record_in_$$GWorld_Bank$$Hfree_for_read</linktorsrc></links><search><creatorcontrib>de la Torre, Luz Elena Reyes</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>González, Jorge G</creatorcontrib><title>Antidumping and Safeguard Measures in the Political Economy of Liberalization : The Mexican Case</title><description>Mexico's creation and use of safeguard and antidumping processes to advance its liberalization illustrate three key points: (1) The country was able to use the instruments without losing political control. 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While mastery of the technical elements of a safeguard or antidumping investigation is mandatory, sustaining liberalization depends in significant part on the political skills to know when to emphasize the technical elements, when to rely more on the discretion the government retains under the rules, and on the courage to do it.</description><subject>ACCESS TO INFORMATION</subject><subject>ANTIDUMPING</subject><subject>ANTIDUMPING CASES</subject><subject>ANTIDUMPING CODE</subject><subject>ANTIDUMPING DUTIES</subject><subject>ANTIDUMPING LAWS</subject><subject>ANTIDUMPING MEASURES</subject><subject>ANTIDUMPING POLICY</subject><subject>AVERAGE TARIFF</subject><subject>BILATERAL AGREEMENT</subject><subject>BILATERAL AGREEMENTS</subject><subject>BILATERAL PANELS</subject><subject>BINATIONAL PANELS</subject><subject>COMPETITIVENESS</subject><subject>COUNTRY OF ORIGIN</subject><subject>CURRENCY</subject><subject>DEVALUATION</subject><subject>DISPUTE SETTLEMENT</subject><subject>DOMESTIC INDUSTRY</subject><subject>DOMESTIC PRODUCERS</subject><subject>ECONOMIC CRISIS</subject><subject>ECONOMIC HISTORY</subject><subject>ECONOMIC IMPACT</subject><subject>ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION PROCESS</subject><subject>EXCHANGE POLICY</subject><subject>EXCHANGE RATE</subject><subject>EXPORTERS</subject><subject>EXTERNAL FINANCING</subject><subject>FINANCIAL MARKETS</subject><subject>FOREIGN CURRENCY</subject><subject>FOREIGN DEBT</subject><subject>FOREIGN INVESTMENT</subject><subject>FOREIGN TRADE</subject><subject>FOREIGN TRADE POLICY</subject><subject>FREE TRADE</subject><subject>FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS</subject><subject>GDP</subject><subject>GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES</subject><subject>IMPACT OF TRADE</subject><subject>IMPORTS</subject><subject>INFLATION</subject><subject>INFLATION RATES</subject><subject>INTEREST RATE</subject><subject>INTERMEDIATE GOODS</subject><subject>INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION</subject><subject>INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY</subject><subject>INTERNATIONAL MARKET</subject><subject>INTERNATIONAL PRICES</subject><subject>INTERNATIONAL TRADE</subject><subject>INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION</subject><subject>INVESTMENT FLOWS</subject><subject>LATIN AMERICAN</subject><subject>LEGISLATION</subject><subject>MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT</subject><subject>NAFTA</subject><subject>NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT</subject><subject>OPEN ECONOMIES</subject><subject>OVERVALUATION</subject><subject>POLITICAL ECONOMY</subject><subject>PRICE DISCRIMINATION</subject><subject>PROTECTION MEASURES</subject><subject>PUBLIC HEARINGS</subject><subject>RECIPROCITY</subject><subject>REGULATORY FRAMEWORK</subject><subject>RESOURCE ALLOCATION</subject><subject>SAFEGUARD ACTIONS</subject><subject>SAFEGUARD MEASURES</subject><subject>TARIFF BARRIER</subject><subject>TARIFF LEVELS</subject><subject>TARIFF PREFERENCES</subject><subject>TARIFF STRUCTURES</subject><subject>TRADE AGREEMENT</subject><subject>TRADE BARRIERS</subject><subject>TRADE LIBERALIZATION</subject><subject>TRADE LIBERALIZATION EFFORTS</subject><subject>TRADE LIBERALIZATION PROCESS</subject><subject>TRADE NEGOTIATION</subject><subject>TRADE NEGOTIATIONS</subject><subject>TRADE PARTNERS</subject><subject>TRADE POLICIES</subject><subject>TRADE POLICY</subject><subject>TRADE PRACTICES</subject><subject>TRADE PROTECTION</subject><subject>TRADE REPRESENTATIVES</subject><subject>UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES</subject><subject>URUGUAY ROUND</subject><subject>WORLD TRADE</subject><subject>WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION</subject><subject>WTO</subject><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>book</rsrctype><creationdate>2005</creationdate><recordtype>book</recordtype><sourceid>VO9</sourceid><recordid>eNqdy8EKgkAQgGEvHaJ6h3mBwBDEukUYHRKCutvojja0zsjuitnT16En6PRfvn8e3fcS2Axdz9ICioErNtQO6AwUhH5w5IEFwoPgopYD12ghr1W0m0AbOHNFDi2_MbAK7OD2lQW9vk7ggJ6W0axB62n16yJKjvntcFqP6qypUJ6l9iRP0dGSaclRr56DuqncxNssLbM0zpL_rg_NHEy8</recordid><startdate>200508</startdate><enddate>200508</enddate><creator>de la Torre, Luz Elena Reyes</creator><creator>González, Jorge G</creator><general>World Bank, Washington, DC</general><scope>VO9</scope></search><sort><creationdate>200508</creationdate><title>Antidumping and Safeguard Measures in the Political Economy of Liberalization : The Mexican Case</title><author>de la Torre, Luz Elena Reyes ; González, Jorge G</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-worldbank_openknowledgerepository_10986_86083</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>books</rsrctype><prefilter>books</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2005</creationdate><topic>ACCESS TO INFORMATION</topic><topic>ANTIDUMPING</topic><topic>ANTIDUMPING CASES</topic><topic>ANTIDUMPING CODE</topic><topic>ANTIDUMPING DUTIES</topic><topic>ANTIDUMPING LAWS</topic><topic>ANTIDUMPING MEASURES</topic><topic>ANTIDUMPING POLICY</topic><topic>AVERAGE TARIFF</topic><topic>BILATERAL AGREEMENT</topic><topic>BILATERAL AGREEMENTS</topic><topic>BILATERAL PANELS</topic><topic>BINATIONAL PANELS</topic><topic>COMPETITIVENESS</topic><topic>COUNTRY OF ORIGIN</topic><topic>CURRENCY</topic><topic>DEVALUATION</topic><topic>DISPUTE SETTLEMENT</topic><topic>DOMESTIC INDUSTRY</topic><topic>DOMESTIC PRODUCERS</topic><topic>ECONOMIC CRISIS</topic><topic>ECONOMIC HISTORY</topic><topic>ECONOMIC IMPACT</topic><topic>ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION PROCESS</topic><topic>EXCHANGE POLICY</topic><topic>EXCHANGE RATE</topic><topic>EXPORTERS</topic><topic>EXTERNAL FINANCING</topic><topic>FINANCIAL MARKETS</topic><topic>FOREIGN CURRENCY</topic><topic>FOREIGN DEBT</topic><topic>FOREIGN INVESTMENT</topic><topic>FOREIGN TRADE</topic><topic>FOREIGN TRADE POLICY</topic><topic>FREE TRADE</topic><topic>FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS</topic><topic>GDP</topic><topic>GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES</topic><topic>IMPACT OF TRADE</topic><topic>IMPORTS</topic><topic>INFLATION</topic><topic>INFLATION RATES</topic><topic>INTEREST RATE</topic><topic>INTERMEDIATE GOODS</topic><topic>INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION</topic><topic>INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY</topic><topic>INTERNATIONAL MARKET</topic><topic>INTERNATIONAL PRICES</topic><topic>INTERNATIONAL TRADE</topic><topic>INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION</topic><topic>INVESTMENT FLOWS</topic><topic>LATIN AMERICAN</topic><topic>LEGISLATION</topic><topic>MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT</topic><topic>NAFTA</topic><topic>NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT</topic><topic>OPEN ECONOMIES</topic><topic>OVERVALUATION</topic><topic>POLITICAL ECONOMY</topic><topic>PRICE DISCRIMINATION</topic><topic>PROTECTION MEASURES</topic><topic>PUBLIC HEARINGS</topic><topic>RECIPROCITY</topic><topic>REGULATORY FRAMEWORK</topic><topic>RESOURCE ALLOCATION</topic><topic>SAFEGUARD ACTIONS</topic><topic>SAFEGUARD MEASURES</topic><topic>TARIFF BARRIER</topic><topic>TARIFF LEVELS</topic><topic>TARIFF PREFERENCES</topic><topic>TARIFF STRUCTURES</topic><topic>TRADE AGREEMENT</topic><topic>TRADE BARRIERS</topic><topic>TRADE LIBERALIZATION</topic><topic>TRADE LIBERALIZATION EFFORTS</topic><topic>TRADE LIBERALIZATION PROCESS</topic><topic>TRADE NEGOTIATION</topic><topic>TRADE NEGOTIATIONS</topic><topic>TRADE PARTNERS</topic><topic>TRADE POLICIES</topic><topic>TRADE POLICY</topic><topic>TRADE PRACTICES</topic><topic>TRADE PROTECTION</topic><topic>TRADE REPRESENTATIVES</topic><topic>UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES</topic><topic>URUGUAY ROUND</topic><topic>WORLD TRADE</topic><topic>WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION</topic><topic>WTO</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>de la Torre, Luz Elena Reyes</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>González, Jorge G</creatorcontrib><collection>Open Knowledge Repository</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>de la Torre, Luz Elena Reyes</au><au>González, Jorge G</au><format>book</format><genre>book</genre><ristype>BOOK</ristype><btitle>Antidumping and Safeguard Measures in the Political Economy of Liberalization : The Mexican Case</btitle><seriestitle>Policy Research Working Paper</seriestitle><date>2005-08</date><risdate>2005</risdate><volume>3684</volume><abstract>Mexico's creation and use of safeguard and antidumping processes to advance its liberalization illustrate three key points: (1) The country was able to use the instruments without losing political control. In a period of crisis that threatened congressional approval of critical steps in the liberalization-brought on by currency overvaluation and recession, along with unexpected demands from the United States in the North American Free Trade Agreement negotiations-the government applied a number of trade defense measures. Once the problems were addressed with adequate instruments the number of measures dropped drastically. The instruments had not been captured by protection-seeking interests; (2) The country adopted a liberalization-accepting measure of international norms. An important innovation that Mexico made operational was the use within World Trade Organization (WTO) rules of prevailing international prices as the measure of competition that industry was expected to meet. The WTO rules would also have allowed the use of other standards-as in traditional antidumping-using countries-that impose less discipline. Moreover, the Mexican standard was consistent with the government-industry understanding that though Mexican industry would be protected against extraordinary circumstances it would be expected to face up to international competition; (3) Political judgment and political courage are essential. While mastery of the technical elements of a safeguard or antidumping investigation is mandatory, sustaining liberalization depends in significant part on the political skills to know when to emphasize the technical elements, when to rely more on the discretion the government retains under the rules, and on the courage to do it.</abstract><pub>World Bank, Washington, DC</pub><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
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subjects ACCESS TO INFORMATION
ANTIDUMPING
ANTIDUMPING CASES
ANTIDUMPING CODE
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES
ANTIDUMPING LAWS
ANTIDUMPING MEASURES
ANTIDUMPING POLICY
AVERAGE TARIFF
BILATERAL AGREEMENT
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
BILATERAL PANELS
BINATIONAL PANELS
COMPETITIVENESS
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
CURRENCY
DEVALUATION
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
DOMESTIC PRODUCERS
ECONOMIC CRISIS
ECONOMIC HISTORY
ECONOMIC IMPACT
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION PROCESS
EXCHANGE POLICY
EXCHANGE RATE
EXPORTERS
EXTERNAL FINANCING
FINANCIAL MARKETS
FOREIGN CURRENCY
FOREIGN DEBT
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
FOREIGN TRADE
FOREIGN TRADE POLICY
FREE TRADE
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
GDP
GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES
IMPACT OF TRADE
IMPORTS
INFLATION
INFLATION RATES
INTEREST RATE
INTERMEDIATE GOODS
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
INTERNATIONAL MARKET
INTERNATIONAL PRICES
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
INVESTMENT FLOWS
LATIN AMERICAN
LEGISLATION
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT
NAFTA
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
OPEN ECONOMIES
OVERVALUATION
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
PROTECTION MEASURES
PUBLIC HEARINGS
RECIPROCITY
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
SAFEGUARD ACTIONS
SAFEGUARD MEASURES
TARIFF BARRIER
TARIFF LEVELS
TARIFF PREFERENCES
TARIFF STRUCTURES
TRADE AGREEMENT
TRADE BARRIERS
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TRADE LIBERALIZATION EFFORTS
TRADE LIBERALIZATION PROCESS
TRADE NEGOTIATION
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
TRADE PARTNERS
TRADE POLICIES
TRADE POLICY
TRADE PRACTICES
TRADE PROTECTION
TRADE REPRESENTATIVES
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
URUGUAY ROUND
WORLD TRADE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
WTO
title Antidumping and Safeguard Measures in the Political Economy of Liberalization : The Mexican Case
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