Is Short-Term Debt a Substitute or a Complement to Good Governance?

Short-term debt exposes firms to credit supply shocks and liquidity risk. Short-term debt can also reduce potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders by exposing managers to more frequent monitoring by the market. This paper examines whether internal monitoring through independent b...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Hauptverfasser:	Anginer, Deniz, Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Tepe, Mete, Simsir, Serif Aziz
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	AGENCY ISSUE BOARD INDEPENDENCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INVESTOR PROTECTION LEGAL ORIGIN SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION SHORT-TERM DEBT
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