Is Short-Term Debt a Substitute or a Complement to Good Governance?
Short-term debt exposes firms to credit supply shocks and liquidity risk. Short-term debt can also reduce potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders by exposing managers to more frequent monitoring by the market. This paper examines whether internal monitoring through independent b...
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| creator | Anginer, Deniz Demirguc-Kunt, Asli Tepe, Mete Simsir, Serif Aziz |
| description | Short-term debt exposes firms to credit
supply shocks and liquidity risk. Short-term debt can also
reduce potential agency conflicts between managers and
shareholders by exposing managers to more frequent
monitoring by the market. This paper examines whether
internal monitoring through independent boards and stronger
shareholder protections can substitute for external
monitoring through the use of short-term debt. The analysis
finds that the relationship between debt maturity and
governance depends on shareholder rights in a given country.
In countries with stronger investor protection, governance
and short-term debt act as substitutes. Instrumenting the
institutional environment with legal origin confirms the results. |
| format | Article |
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supply shocks and liquidity risk. Short-term debt can also
reduce potential agency conflicts between managers and
shareholders by exposing managers to more frequent
monitoring by the market. This paper examines whether
internal monitoring through independent boards and stronger
shareholder protections can substitute for external
monitoring through the use of short-term debt. The analysis
finds that the relationship between debt maturity and
governance depends on shareholder rights in a given country.
In countries with stronger investor protection, governance
and short-term debt act as substitutes. Instrumenting the
institutional environment with legal origin confirms the results.</description><language>eng</language><publisher>World Bank, Washington, DC</publisher><subject>AGENCY ISSUE ; BOARD INDEPENDENCE ; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ; INVESTOR PROTECTION ; LEGAL ORIGIN ; SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION ; SHORT-TERM DEBT</subject><creationdate>2019-09</creationdate><rights>CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>776,780,18961</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/32451$$EView_record_in_World_Bank$$FView_record_in_$$GWorld_Bank$$Hfree_for_read</linktorsrc></links><search><creatorcontrib>Anginer, Deniz</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Demirguc-Kunt, Asli</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tepe, Mete</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Simsir, Serif Aziz</creatorcontrib><title>Is Short-Term Debt a Substitute or a Complement to Good Governance?</title><description>Short-term debt exposes firms to credit
supply shocks and liquidity risk. Short-term debt can also
reduce potential agency conflicts between managers and
shareholders by exposing managers to more frequent
monitoring by the market. This paper examines whether
internal monitoring through independent boards and stronger
shareholder protections can substitute for external
monitoring through the use of short-term debt. The analysis
finds that the relationship between debt maturity and
governance depends on shareholder rights in a given country.
In countries with stronger investor protection, governance
and short-term debt act as substitutes. Instrumenting the
institutional environment with legal origin confirms the results.</description><subject>AGENCY ISSUE</subject><subject>BOARD INDEPENDENCE</subject><subject>CORPORATE GOVERNANCE</subject><subject>INVESTOR PROTECTION</subject><subject>LEGAL ORIGIN</subject><subject>SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION</subject><subject>SHORT-TERM DEBT</subject><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2019</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>VO9</sourceid><recordid>eNqdizsOgkAQQGksjHqHuQCJCBqsLNZvDT1ZZFTCMrOZHSTeXgpPYPNeXvHmkbkFKF4sGpcoPRyxVrBQDHXQVgdFYJnacO8d9kgKynBhbia8UcjSHQ_LaPawLuDq50WUnU-lucYji2tqS13FHqkjHh02TxT0HFpl-VTJep_vqnSTbZP0z-0LRW5CAg</recordid><startdate>201909</startdate><enddate>201909</enddate><creator>Anginer, Deniz</creator><creator>Demirguc-Kunt, Asli</creator><creator>Tepe, Mete</creator><creator>Simsir, Serif Aziz</creator><general>World Bank, Washington, DC</general><scope>VO9</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201909</creationdate><title>Is Short-Term Debt a Substitute or a Complement to Good Governance?</title><author>Anginer, Deniz ; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli ; Tepe, Mete ; Simsir, Serif Aziz</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-worldbank_openknowledgerepository_10986_324513</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2019</creationdate><topic>AGENCY ISSUE</topic><topic>BOARD INDEPENDENCE</topic><topic>CORPORATE GOVERNANCE</topic><topic>INVESTOR PROTECTION</topic><topic>LEGAL ORIGIN</topic><topic>SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION</topic><topic>SHORT-TERM DEBT</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Anginer, Deniz</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Demirguc-Kunt, Asli</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tepe, Mete</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Simsir, Serif Aziz</creatorcontrib><collection>Open Knowledge Repository</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Anginer, Deniz</au><au>Demirguc-Kunt, Asli</au><au>Tepe, Mete</au><au>Simsir, Serif Aziz</au><format>book</format><genre>document</genre><ristype>GEN</ristype><atitle>Is Short-Term Debt a Substitute or a Complement to Good Governance?</atitle><date>2019-09</date><risdate>2019</risdate><volume>9022</volume><abstract>Short-term debt exposes firms to credit
supply shocks and liquidity risk. Short-term debt can also
reduce potential agency conflicts between managers and
shareholders by exposing managers to more frequent
monitoring by the market. This paper examines whether
internal monitoring through independent boards and stronger
shareholder protections can substitute for external
monitoring through the use of short-term debt. The analysis
finds that the relationship between debt maturity and
governance depends on shareholder rights in a given country.
In countries with stronger investor protection, governance
and short-term debt act as substitutes. Instrumenting the
institutional environment with legal origin confirms the results.</abstract><pub>World Bank, Washington, DC</pub><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| subjects | AGENCY ISSUE BOARD INDEPENDENCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INVESTOR PROTECTION LEGAL ORIGIN SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION SHORT-TERM DEBT |
| title | Is Short-Term Debt a Substitute or a Complement to Good Governance? |
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