Why Firms Avoid Cutting Wages : Survey Evidence from European Firms
Firms very rarely cut nominal wages, even in the face of considerable negative economic shocks. This paper uses a unique survey of fourteen European countries to ask firms directly about the incidence of wage cuts and to assess the relevance of a range of potential reasons for why the firms avoid cu...
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| creator | Du Caju, Philip Kosma, Theodora Lawless, Martina Messina, Julian Room, Tairi |
| description | Firms very rarely cut nominal wages,
even in the face of considerable negative economic shocks.
This paper uses a unique survey of fourteen European
countries to ask firms directly about the incidence of wage
cuts and to assess the relevance of a range of potential
reasons for why the firms avoid cutting wages. The paper
examines how firm characteristics and collective bargaining
institutions affect the relevance of each of the common
explanations put forward for the infrequency of wage cuts.
Concerns about the retention of productive staff and a
lowering of morale and effort were reported as key reasons
for downward wage rigidity across all countries and firm
types. Restrictions created by collective bargaining were
found to be an important consideration for firms in Western
European (EU-15) countries but were one of the lowest ranked
obstacles in the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe. |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>worldbank_VO9</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_worldbank_openknowledgerepository_10986_19349</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/19349</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-worldbank_openknowledgerepository_10986_193493</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqdy0EKwjAQQNFsXIh6h7mAYGkR605Ci3uFLkM00xjaZsokaentFfQErv7mv7WQzWuB2vEQ4DKRMyBTjM5baLTFAGe4JZ5wgWpyBv0ToWUaoEpMI2r_lVuxanUfcPfrRhR1dZfX_Uzcm4f2nfrcvvM092gsMo4UXCReVHYoT0eVlXlR5n-yN2L2QkI</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Publisher</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>book</recordtype></control><display><type>book</type><title>Why Firms Avoid Cutting Wages : Survey Evidence from European Firms</title><source>Open Knowledge Repository</source><creator>Du Caju, Philip ; Kosma, Theodora ; Lawless, Martina ; Messina, Julian ; Room, Tairi</creator><creatorcontrib>Du Caju, Philip ; Kosma, Theodora ; Lawless, Martina ; Messina, Julian ; Room, Tairi</creatorcontrib><description>Firms very rarely cut nominal wages,
even in the face of considerable negative economic shocks.
This paper uses a unique survey of fourteen European
countries to ask firms directly about the incidence of wage
cuts and to assess the relevance of a range of potential
reasons for why the firms avoid cutting wages. The paper
examines how firm characteristics and collective bargaining
institutions affect the relevance of each of the common
explanations put forward for the infrequency of wage cuts.
Concerns about the retention of productive staff and a
lowering of morale and effort were reported as key reasons
for downward wage rigidity across all countries and firm
types. Restrictions created by collective bargaining were
found to be an important consideration for firms in Western
European (EU-15) countries but were one of the lowest ranked
obstacles in the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe.</description><language>eng</language><publisher>World Bank Group, Washington, DC</publisher><subject>ADVERSE SELECTION ; AVERAGE WAGE ; BARGAINING INSTITUTIONS ; BARGAINING POWER ; BARGAINING SYSTEM ; BUSINESS CYCLE ; CLERKS ; COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT ; COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS ; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS ; COMPANY ; COMPETITIVE MARKETS ; DISMISSAL ; ECONOMIC SHOCKS ; EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS ; EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORIES ; EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORY ; EFFICIENCY WAGES ; EMPLOYEE ; EMPLOYEE TURNOVER ; EMPLOYERS ; EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ; EMPLOYMENT TURNOVER ; EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT ; EXISTING WORKFORCE ; EXPANSIONS ; EXPLICIT CONTRACTS ; FIRING ; FIRM LEVEL ; FIRM SIZE ; FIRM SURVEY ; FIRMS ; FOREIGN OWNERSHIP ; HIGH WAGES ; HIRING ; HUMAN CAPITAL ; HUMAN RESOURCES ; IMPLICIT CONTRACTS ; INCOME ; INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ; JOB EXPERIENCE ; JOBS ; LABOR CONTRACTS ; LABOR ECONOMICS ; LABOR FORCE ; LABOR MARKET ; LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY ; LABOR MARKET REFORM ; LABOR MARKET REFORMS ; LABOR MARKETS ; LABOR PRODUCTIVITY ; LABOR REGULATION ; LABOR RELATIONS ; LABOR TURNOVER ; LABOUR ; LABOUR COST ; LABOUR COSTS ; LABOUR FORCE ; LABOUR MARKET ; LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS ; LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPANTS ; LABOUR MARKET REFORM ; LABOUR MARKETS ; LABOUR REGULATION ; LABOUR REGULATIONS ; LABOUR RELATIONS ; LABOUR TURNOVER ; LABOUR UNIONS ; LAYOFFS ; LONG-TERM EMPLOYMENT ; MONITORING COSTS ; MOTIVATION ; NOMINAL WAGES ; POLITICAL ECONOMY ; PREVIOUS STUDIES ; PROBIT REGRESSIONS ; PRODUCT MARKET ; PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION ; PRODUCTION PROCESS ; REAL WAGE ; REAL WAGES ; RECRUITMENT ; REMUNERATION ; RETAIL TRADE ; RISING UNEMPLOYMENT ; SKILLED EMPLOYEES ; SKILLED WORKERS ; STAFF ; TEMPORARY WORKERS ; TOTAL EMPLOYMENT ; TRADE UNIONS ; TRAINING COST ; TRAINING COSTS ; UNDEREMPLOYMENT ; UNEMPLOYMENT ; UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ; UNION DENSITIES ; UNIONIZATION ; WAGE BARGAINING ; WAGE BARGAINING SYSTEMS ; WAGE BILL ; WAGE DETERMINATION ; WAGE DISPERSION ; WAGE FLEXIBILITY ; WAGE INCREASE ; WAGE LEVEL ; WAGE RIGIDITIES ; WAGE RIGIDITY ; WHITE COLLAR WORKERS ; WORKER ; WORKER MORALE ; WORKER PRODUCTIVITY ; WORKERS ; WORKING CONDITIONS</subject><creationdate>2014</creationdate><rights>CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><relation>Policy Research Working Paper</relation></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>307,780,784,787,18982</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/19349$$EView_record_in_World_Bank$$FView_record_in_$$GWorld_Bank$$Hfree_for_read</linktorsrc></links><search><creatorcontrib>Du Caju, Philip</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kosma, Theodora</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lawless, Martina</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Messina, Julian</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Room, Tairi</creatorcontrib><title>Why Firms Avoid Cutting Wages : Survey Evidence from European Firms</title><description>Firms very rarely cut nominal wages,
even in the face of considerable negative economic shocks.
This paper uses a unique survey of fourteen European
countries to ask firms directly about the incidence of wage
cuts and to assess the relevance of a range of potential
reasons for why the firms avoid cutting wages. The paper
examines how firm characteristics and collective bargaining
institutions affect the relevance of each of the common
explanations put forward for the infrequency of wage cuts.
Concerns about the retention of productive staff and a
lowering of morale and effort were reported as key reasons
for downward wage rigidity across all countries and firm
types. Restrictions created by collective bargaining were
found to be an important consideration for firms in Western
European (EU-15) countries but were one of the lowest ranked
obstacles in the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe.</description><subject>ADVERSE SELECTION</subject><subject>AVERAGE WAGE</subject><subject>BARGAINING INSTITUTIONS</subject><subject>BARGAINING POWER</subject><subject>BARGAINING SYSTEM</subject><subject>BUSINESS CYCLE</subject><subject>CLERKS</subject><subject>COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT</subject><subject>COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS</subject><subject>COLLECTIVE BARGAINING</subject><subject>COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS</subject><subject>COMPANY</subject><subject>COMPETITIVE MARKETS</subject><subject>DISMISSAL</subject><subject>ECONOMIC SHOCKS</subject><subject>EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS</subject><subject>EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORIES</subject><subject>EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORY</subject><subject>EFFICIENCY WAGES</subject><subject>EMPLOYEE</subject><subject>EMPLOYEE TURNOVER</subject><subject>EMPLOYERS</subject><subject>EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS</subject><subject>EMPLOYMENT TURNOVER</subject><subject>EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT</subject><subject>EXISTING WORKFORCE</subject><subject>EXPANSIONS</subject><subject>EXPLICIT CONTRACTS</subject><subject>FIRING</subject><subject>FIRM LEVEL</subject><subject>FIRM SIZE</subject><subject>FIRM SURVEY</subject><subject>FIRMS</subject><subject>FOREIGN OWNERSHIP</subject><subject>HIGH WAGES</subject><subject>HIRING</subject><subject>HUMAN CAPITAL</subject><subject>HUMAN RESOURCES</subject><subject>IMPLICIT CONTRACTS</subject><subject>INCOME</subject><subject>INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS</subject><subject>JOB EXPERIENCE</subject><subject>JOBS</subject><subject>LABOR CONTRACTS</subject><subject>LABOR ECONOMICS</subject><subject>LABOR FORCE</subject><subject>LABOR MARKET</subject><subject>LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY</subject><subject>LABOR MARKET REFORM</subject><subject>LABOR MARKET REFORMS</subject><subject>LABOR MARKETS</subject><subject>LABOR PRODUCTIVITY</subject><subject>LABOR REGULATION</subject><subject>LABOR RELATIONS</subject><subject>LABOR TURNOVER</subject><subject>LABOUR</subject><subject>LABOUR COST</subject><subject>LABOUR COSTS</subject><subject>LABOUR FORCE</subject><subject>LABOUR MARKET</subject><subject>LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS</subject><subject>LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPANTS</subject><subject>LABOUR MARKET REFORM</subject><subject>LABOUR MARKETS</subject><subject>LABOUR REGULATION</subject><subject>LABOUR REGULATIONS</subject><subject>LABOUR RELATIONS</subject><subject>LABOUR TURNOVER</subject><subject>LABOUR UNIONS</subject><subject>LAYOFFS</subject><subject>LONG-TERM EMPLOYMENT</subject><subject>MONITORING COSTS</subject><subject>MOTIVATION</subject><subject>NOMINAL WAGES</subject><subject>POLITICAL ECONOMY</subject><subject>PREVIOUS STUDIES</subject><subject>PROBIT REGRESSIONS</subject><subject>PRODUCT MARKET</subject><subject>PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION</subject><subject>PRODUCTION PROCESS</subject><subject>REAL WAGE</subject><subject>REAL WAGES</subject><subject>RECRUITMENT</subject><subject>REMUNERATION</subject><subject>RETAIL TRADE</subject><subject>RISING UNEMPLOYMENT</subject><subject>SKILLED EMPLOYEES</subject><subject>SKILLED WORKERS</subject><subject>STAFF</subject><subject>TEMPORARY WORKERS</subject><subject>TOTAL EMPLOYMENT</subject><subject>TRADE UNIONS</subject><subject>TRAINING COST</subject><subject>TRAINING COSTS</subject><subject>UNDEREMPLOYMENT</subject><subject>UNEMPLOYMENT</subject><subject>UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE</subject><subject>UNION DENSITIES</subject><subject>UNIONIZATION</subject><subject>WAGE BARGAINING</subject><subject>WAGE BARGAINING SYSTEMS</subject><subject>WAGE BILL</subject><subject>WAGE DETERMINATION</subject><subject>WAGE DISPERSION</subject><subject>WAGE FLEXIBILITY</subject><subject>WAGE INCREASE</subject><subject>WAGE LEVEL</subject><subject>WAGE RIGIDITIES</subject><subject>WAGE RIGIDITY</subject><subject>WHITE COLLAR WORKERS</subject><subject>WORKER</subject><subject>WORKER MORALE</subject><subject>WORKER PRODUCTIVITY</subject><subject>WORKERS</subject><subject>WORKING CONDITIONS</subject><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>book</rsrctype><creationdate>2014</creationdate><recordtype>book</recordtype><sourceid>VO9</sourceid><recordid>eNqdy0EKwjAQQNFsXIh6h7mAYGkR605Ci3uFLkM00xjaZsokaentFfQErv7mv7WQzWuB2vEQ4DKRMyBTjM5baLTFAGe4JZ5wgWpyBv0ToWUaoEpMI2r_lVuxanUfcPfrRhR1dZfX_Uzcm4f2nfrcvvM092gsMo4UXCReVHYoT0eVlXlR5n-yN2L2QkI</recordid><startdate>201407</startdate><enddate>201407</enddate><creator>Du Caju, Philip</creator><creator>Kosma, Theodora</creator><creator>Lawless, Martina</creator><creator>Messina, Julian</creator><creator>Room, Tairi</creator><general>World Bank Group, Washington, DC</general><scope>VO9</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201407</creationdate><title>Why Firms Avoid Cutting Wages : Survey Evidence from European Firms</title><author>Du Caju, Philip ; Kosma, Theodora ; Lawless, Martina ; Messina, Julian ; Room, Tairi</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-worldbank_openknowledgerepository_10986_193493</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>books</rsrctype><prefilter>books</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2014</creationdate><topic>ADVERSE SELECTION</topic><topic>AVERAGE WAGE</topic><topic>BARGAINING INSTITUTIONS</topic><topic>BARGAINING POWER</topic><topic>BARGAINING SYSTEM</topic><topic>BUSINESS CYCLE</topic><topic>CLERKS</topic><topic>COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT</topic><topic>COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS</topic><topic>COLLECTIVE BARGAINING</topic><topic>COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS</topic><topic>COMPANY</topic><topic>COMPETITIVE MARKETS</topic><topic>DISMISSAL</topic><topic>ECONOMIC SHOCKS</topic><topic>EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS</topic><topic>EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORIES</topic><topic>EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORY</topic><topic>EFFICIENCY WAGES</topic><topic>EMPLOYEE</topic><topic>EMPLOYEE TURNOVER</topic><topic>EMPLOYERS</topic><topic>EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS</topic><topic>EMPLOYMENT TURNOVER</topic><topic>EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT</topic><topic>EXISTING WORKFORCE</topic><topic>EXPANSIONS</topic><topic>EXPLICIT CONTRACTS</topic><topic>FIRING</topic><topic>FIRM LEVEL</topic><topic>FIRM SIZE</topic><topic>FIRM SURVEY</topic><topic>FIRMS</topic><topic>FOREIGN OWNERSHIP</topic><topic>HIGH WAGES</topic><topic>HIRING</topic><topic>HUMAN CAPITAL</topic><topic>HUMAN RESOURCES</topic><topic>IMPLICIT CONTRACTS</topic><topic>INCOME</topic><topic>INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS</topic><topic>JOB EXPERIENCE</topic><topic>JOBS</topic><topic>LABOR CONTRACTS</topic><topic>LABOR ECONOMICS</topic><topic>LABOR FORCE</topic><topic>LABOR MARKET</topic><topic>LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY</topic><topic>LABOR MARKET REFORM</topic><topic>LABOR MARKET REFORMS</topic><topic>LABOR MARKETS</topic><topic>LABOR PRODUCTIVITY</topic><topic>LABOR REGULATION</topic><topic>LABOR RELATIONS</topic><topic>LABOR TURNOVER</topic><topic>LABOUR</topic><topic>LABOUR COST</topic><topic>LABOUR COSTS</topic><topic>LABOUR FORCE</topic><topic>LABOUR MARKET</topic><topic>LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS</topic><topic>LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPANTS</topic><topic>LABOUR MARKET REFORM</topic><topic>LABOUR MARKETS</topic><topic>LABOUR REGULATION</topic><topic>LABOUR REGULATIONS</topic><topic>LABOUR RELATIONS</topic><topic>LABOUR TURNOVER</topic><topic>LABOUR UNIONS</topic><topic>LAYOFFS</topic><topic>LONG-TERM EMPLOYMENT</topic><topic>MONITORING COSTS</topic><topic>MOTIVATION</topic><topic>NOMINAL WAGES</topic><topic>POLITICAL ECONOMY</topic><topic>PREVIOUS STUDIES</topic><topic>PROBIT REGRESSIONS</topic><topic>PRODUCT MARKET</topic><topic>PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION</topic><topic>PRODUCTION PROCESS</topic><topic>REAL WAGE</topic><topic>REAL WAGES</topic><topic>RECRUITMENT</topic><topic>REMUNERATION</topic><topic>RETAIL TRADE</topic><topic>RISING UNEMPLOYMENT</topic><topic>SKILLED EMPLOYEES</topic><topic>SKILLED WORKERS</topic><topic>STAFF</topic><topic>TEMPORARY WORKERS</topic><topic>TOTAL EMPLOYMENT</topic><topic>TRADE UNIONS</topic><topic>TRAINING COST</topic><topic>TRAINING COSTS</topic><topic>UNDEREMPLOYMENT</topic><topic>UNEMPLOYMENT</topic><topic>UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE</topic><topic>UNION DENSITIES</topic><topic>UNIONIZATION</topic><topic>WAGE BARGAINING</topic><topic>WAGE BARGAINING SYSTEMS</topic><topic>WAGE BILL</topic><topic>WAGE DETERMINATION</topic><topic>WAGE DISPERSION</topic><topic>WAGE FLEXIBILITY</topic><topic>WAGE INCREASE</topic><topic>WAGE LEVEL</topic><topic>WAGE RIGIDITIES</topic><topic>WAGE RIGIDITY</topic><topic>WHITE COLLAR WORKERS</topic><topic>WORKER</topic><topic>WORKER MORALE</topic><topic>WORKER PRODUCTIVITY</topic><topic>WORKERS</topic><topic>WORKING CONDITIONS</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Du Caju, Philip</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kosma, Theodora</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lawless, Martina</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Messina, Julian</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Room, Tairi</creatorcontrib><collection>Open Knowledge Repository</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Du Caju, Philip</au><au>Kosma, Theodora</au><au>Lawless, Martina</au><au>Messina, Julian</au><au>Room, Tairi</au><format>book</format><genre>book</genre><ristype>BOOK</ristype><btitle>Why Firms Avoid Cutting Wages : Survey Evidence from European Firms</btitle><seriestitle>Policy Research Working Paper</seriestitle><date>2014-07</date><risdate>2014</risdate><volume>6976</volume><abstract>Firms very rarely cut nominal wages,
even in the face of considerable negative economic shocks.
This paper uses a unique survey of fourteen European
countries to ask firms directly about the incidence of wage
cuts and to assess the relevance of a range of potential
reasons for why the firms avoid cutting wages. The paper
examines how firm characteristics and collective bargaining
institutions affect the relevance of each of the common
explanations put forward for the infrequency of wage cuts.
Concerns about the retention of productive staff and a
lowering of morale and effort were reported as key reasons
for downward wage rigidity across all countries and firm
types. Restrictions created by collective bargaining were
found to be an important consideration for firms in Western
European (EU-15) countries but were one of the lowest ranked
obstacles in the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe.</abstract><pub>World Bank Group, Washington, DC</pub><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| subjects | ADVERSE SELECTION AVERAGE WAGE BARGAINING INSTITUTIONS BARGAINING POWER BARGAINING SYSTEM BUSINESS CYCLE CLERKS COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS COMPANY COMPETITIVE MARKETS DISMISSAL ECONOMIC SHOCKS EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORIES EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORY EFFICIENCY WAGES EMPLOYEE EMPLOYEE TURNOVER EMPLOYERS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS EMPLOYMENT TURNOVER EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT EXISTING WORKFORCE EXPANSIONS EXPLICIT CONTRACTS FIRING FIRM LEVEL FIRM SIZE FIRM SURVEY FIRMS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP HIGH WAGES HIRING HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN RESOURCES IMPLICIT CONTRACTS INCOME INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOB EXPERIENCE JOBS LABOR CONTRACTS LABOR ECONOMICS LABOR FORCE LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY LABOR MARKET REFORM LABOR MARKET REFORMS LABOR MARKETS LABOR PRODUCTIVITY LABOR REGULATION LABOR RELATIONS LABOR TURNOVER LABOUR LABOUR COST LABOUR COSTS LABOUR FORCE LABOUR MARKET LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPANTS LABOUR MARKET REFORM LABOUR MARKETS LABOUR REGULATION LABOUR REGULATIONS LABOUR RELATIONS LABOUR TURNOVER LABOUR UNIONS LAYOFFS LONG-TERM EMPLOYMENT MONITORING COSTS MOTIVATION NOMINAL WAGES POLITICAL ECONOMY PREVIOUS STUDIES PROBIT REGRESSIONS PRODUCT MARKET PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION PRODUCTION PROCESS REAL WAGE REAL WAGES RECRUITMENT REMUNERATION RETAIL TRADE RISING UNEMPLOYMENT SKILLED EMPLOYEES SKILLED WORKERS STAFF TEMPORARY WORKERS TOTAL EMPLOYMENT TRADE UNIONS TRAINING COST TRAINING COSTS UNDEREMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE UNION DENSITIES UNIONIZATION WAGE BARGAINING WAGE BARGAINING SYSTEMS WAGE BILL WAGE DETERMINATION WAGE DISPERSION WAGE FLEXIBILITY WAGE INCREASE WAGE LEVEL WAGE RIGIDITIES WAGE RIGIDITY WHITE COLLAR WORKERS WORKER WORKER MORALE WORKER PRODUCTIVITY WORKERS WORKING CONDITIONS |
| title | Why Firms Avoid Cutting Wages : Survey Evidence from European Firms |
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