An Introduction to Financial and Economic Modeling for Utility Regulators
The most effective regulators in developing countries are following remarkably similar approaches. The main common element across "best practice" countries is the use of relatively simple quantitative models of operators' behavior and constraints to measure the impact of regulatory de...
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| creator | Estache, Antonio Rodriguez Pardina, Martin Rodriguez, Jose Maria Sember, German |
| description | The most effective regulators in
developing countries are following remarkably similar
approaches. The main common element across "best
practice" countries is the use of relatively simple
quantitative models of operators' behavior and
constraints to measure the impact of regulatory decisions on
some key financial and economic indicators of concern to the
operators, the users, and the government. The authors
provide an introduction to the design and use of these
models. They draw on lessons from international experience
in industrial and developing countries in ordinary or
extraordinary revisions and in the context of contract
renegotiations. Simplifying somewhat, these models force
regulators to recognize that, in the long run, private
operators need to at least cover their opportunity cost of
capital, including the various types of risks specific to
the country, the sector, or the projects with which they are
involved. Because these variables change over time,
scheduled revisions are needed to allow for adjustments in
the key determinants of the rate of return of the operator.
These revisions are a recognition of the fact that all these
determinants-tariffs, subsidies, quality, investments, and
other service obligations-are interrelated and jointly
determine the rate of return. At every revision, the rules
of the game for the regulator are exactly the same: to
figure out the changes in the cost of capital and to adjust
the variables driving the rate of return to ensure that it
continues to be consistent with the cost of capital. If they
can draw on reasonable data, these models do everything any
financial model would do for the day-to-day management of a
company but take a longer term view and include an explicit
identification of the key regulatory instruments. They can
monitor the consistency between cash flow generated by the
business on the one hand and debt service and operational
expense needs on the other to address the main concerns of
the operators. They can also account for a large number of
key policy factors including access and affordability
concerns for various types of consumers. They generally
account for the sensitivity of operators and users to
various regulatory design options. |
| format | Book |
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developing countries are following remarkably similar
approaches. The main common element across "best
practice" countries is the use of relatively simple
quantitative models of operators' behavior and
constraints to measure the impact of regulatory decisions on
some key financial and economic indicators of concern to the
operators, the users, and the government. The authors
provide an introduction to the design and use of these
models. They draw on lessons from international experience
in industrial and developing countries in ordinary or
extraordinary revisions and in the context of contract
renegotiations. Simplifying somewhat, these models force
regulators to recognize that, in the long run, private
operators need to at least cover their opportunity cost of
capital, including the various types of risks specific to
the country, the sector, or the projects with which they are
involved. Because these variables change over time,
scheduled revisions are needed to allow for adjustments in
the key determinants of the rate of return of the operator.
These revisions are a recognition of the fact that all these
determinants-tariffs, subsidies, quality, investments, and
other service obligations-are interrelated and jointly
determine the rate of return. At every revision, the rules
of the game for the regulator are exactly the same: to
figure out the changes in the cost of capital and to adjust
the variables driving the rate of return to ensure that it
continues to be consistent with the cost of capital. If they
can draw on reasonable data, these models do everything any
financial model would do for the day-to-day management of a
company but take a longer term view and include an explicit
identification of the key regulatory instruments. They can
monitor the consistency between cash flow generated by the
business on the one hand and debt service and operational
expense needs on the other to address the main concerns of
the operators. They can also account for a large number of
key policy factors including access and affordability
concerns for various types of consumers. They generally
account for the sensitivity of operators and users to
various regulatory design options.</description><language>eng</language><publisher>World Bank, Washington, DC</publisher><subject>ACCOUNTABILITY ; ACCOUNTING ; ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS ; ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY ; ASSET VALUATION ; AVERAGE COSTS ; BALANCE SHEET ; BASKET OF GOODS ; BENCHMARKING ; BENCHMARKS ; BORROWING ; CASH FLOW ; CASH FLOWS ; COLLUSION ; CONSUMERS ; CONSUMPTION LEVELS ; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT ; CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS ; COST MINIMIZATION ; COST OF CAPITAL ; CREDIT MARKETS ; CROSS SUBSIDIES ; DEBT ; DEBT COVERAGE ; DEBT SERVICE ; DECISION MAKING ; DECISION VARIABLES ; DEPRECIATION ; DEVALUATION ; ECONOMETRIC MODELS ; ECONOMIC EFFECTS ; ECONOMIC MODELS ; ELECTRICITY ; EMPLOYMENT ; EQUILIBRIUM ; EXCHANGE RATE ; EXCHANGE RATES ; EXCHANGE RATES ACCOUNTABILITY ; EXTERNALITIES ; FINANCIAL MARKETS ; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE ; FINANCIAL STRUCTURE ; FORECASTS ; GDP ; INCOME ; INCOME LEVELS ; INFLATION ; INVESTMENTS ; LABOR MARKETS ; LEGISLATION ; LICENSES ; LONG RUN MARGINAL COST PRICING ; MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS ; MANDATES ; MARGINAL COST ; MARGINAL COST PRICING ; MARGINAL COSTS ; MARKET PRICES ; MONOPOLIES ; OPERATING COSTS ; OPPORTUNITY COST ; POLICY INSTRUMENTS ; PRESENT VALUE ; PRICE CONTROLS ; PRICE DISCRIMINATION ; PRICE LEVELS ; PRIVATE SECTOR ; PRIVATIZATION ; PRODUCT MARKETS ; PRODUCTIVITY ; PROFIT RATE ; PROFITABILITY ; PROVISION OF INFRASTRUCTURE ; PUBLIC ENTERPRISES ; PUBLIC HEARINGS ; PUBLIC SECTOR ; PUBLIC SERVICE ; PUBLIC SERVICES ; PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION ; QUALITY ; QUALITY STANDARDS ; RATE OF RETURN ; REGULATION ; REGULATORY ENVIRONMENTS ; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ; REGULATORY OBJECTIVES ; REGULATORY REGIMES ; RESOURCE ALLOCATION ; RISK PREMIUM ; SALES OF ASSETS ; SAVINGS ; SHADOW PRICES ; SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS ; SUBSIDIES ; TARIFFS ; TAX ; TAX SYSTEMS ; TELECOMMUNICATIONS ; TOTAL COSTS ; TRANSPARENCY ; UTILITIES ; WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX ; WILLINGNESS TO PAY</subject><creationdate>2003</creationdate><rights>CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><relation>Policy Research Working Paper</relation></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>307,780,784,787,18980</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/18275$$EView_record_in_World_Bank$$FView_record_in_$$GWorld_Bank$$Hfree_for_read</linktorsrc></links><search><creatorcontrib>Estache, Antonio</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rodriguez Pardina, Martin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rodriguez, Jose Maria</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sember, German</creatorcontrib><title>An Introduction to Financial and Economic Modeling for Utility Regulators</title><description>The most effective regulators in
developing countries are following remarkably similar
approaches. The main common element across "best
practice" countries is the use of relatively simple
quantitative models of operators' behavior and
constraints to measure the impact of regulatory decisions on
some key financial and economic indicators of concern to the
operators, the users, and the government. The authors
provide an introduction to the design and use of these
models. They draw on lessons from international experience
in industrial and developing countries in ordinary or
extraordinary revisions and in the context of contract
renegotiations. Simplifying somewhat, these models force
regulators to recognize that, in the long run, private
operators need to at least cover their opportunity cost of
capital, including the various types of risks specific to
the country, the sector, or the projects with which they are
involved. Because these variables change over time,
scheduled revisions are needed to allow for adjustments in
the key determinants of the rate of return of the operator.
These revisions are a recognition of the fact that all these
determinants-tariffs, subsidies, quality, investments, and
other service obligations-are interrelated and jointly
determine the rate of return. At every revision, the rules
of the game for the regulator are exactly the same: to
figure out the changes in the cost of capital and to adjust
the variables driving the rate of return to ensure that it
continues to be consistent with the cost of capital. If they
can draw on reasonable data, these models do everything any
financial model would do for the day-to-day management of a
company but take a longer term view and include an explicit
identification of the key regulatory instruments. They can
monitor the consistency between cash flow generated by the
business on the one hand and debt service and operational
expense needs on the other to address the main concerns of
the operators. They can also account for a large number of
key policy factors including access and affordability
concerns for various types of consumers. They generally
account for the sensitivity of operators and users to
various regulatory design options.</description><subject>ACCOUNTABILITY</subject><subject>ACCOUNTING</subject><subject>ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS</subject><subject>ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY</subject><subject>ASSET VALUATION</subject><subject>AVERAGE COSTS</subject><subject>BALANCE SHEET</subject><subject>BASKET OF GOODS</subject><subject>BENCHMARKING</subject><subject>BENCHMARKS</subject><subject>BORROWING</subject><subject>CASH FLOW</subject><subject>CASH FLOWS</subject><subject>COLLUSION</subject><subject>CONSUMERS</subject><subject>CONSUMPTION LEVELS</subject><subject>CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT</subject><subject>CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS</subject><subject>COST MINIMIZATION</subject><subject>COST OF CAPITAL</subject><subject>CREDIT MARKETS</subject><subject>CROSS SUBSIDIES</subject><subject>DEBT</subject><subject>DEBT COVERAGE</subject><subject>DEBT SERVICE</subject><subject>DECISION MAKING</subject><subject>DECISION VARIABLES</subject><subject>DEPRECIATION</subject><subject>DEVALUATION</subject><subject>ECONOMETRIC MODELS</subject><subject>ECONOMIC EFFECTS</subject><subject>ECONOMIC MODELS</subject><subject>ELECTRICITY</subject><subject>EMPLOYMENT</subject><subject>EQUILIBRIUM</subject><subject>EXCHANGE RATE</subject><subject>EXCHANGE RATES</subject><subject>EXCHANGE RATES ACCOUNTABILITY</subject><subject>EXTERNALITIES</subject><subject>FINANCIAL MARKETS</subject><subject>FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE</subject><subject>FINANCIAL STRUCTURE</subject><subject>FORECASTS</subject><subject>GDP</subject><subject>INCOME</subject><subject>INCOME LEVELS</subject><subject>INFLATION</subject><subject>INVESTMENTS</subject><subject>LABOR MARKETS</subject><subject>LEGISLATION</subject><subject>LICENSES</subject><subject>LONG RUN MARGINAL COST PRICING</subject><subject>MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS</subject><subject>MANDATES</subject><subject>MARGINAL COST</subject><subject>MARGINAL COST PRICING</subject><subject>MARGINAL COSTS</subject><subject>MARKET PRICES</subject><subject>MONOPOLIES</subject><subject>OPERATING COSTS</subject><subject>OPPORTUNITY COST</subject><subject>POLICY INSTRUMENTS</subject><subject>PRESENT VALUE</subject><subject>PRICE CONTROLS</subject><subject>PRICE DISCRIMINATION</subject><subject>PRICE LEVELS</subject><subject>PRIVATE SECTOR</subject><subject>PRIVATIZATION</subject><subject>PRODUCT MARKETS</subject><subject>PRODUCTIVITY</subject><subject>PROFIT RATE</subject><subject>PROFITABILITY</subject><subject>PROVISION OF INFRASTRUCTURE</subject><subject>PUBLIC ENTERPRISES</subject><subject>PUBLIC HEARINGS</subject><subject>PUBLIC SECTOR</subject><subject>PUBLIC SERVICE</subject><subject>PUBLIC SERVICES</subject><subject>PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION</subject><subject>QUALITY</subject><subject>QUALITY STANDARDS</subject><subject>RATE OF RETURN</subject><subject>REGULATION</subject><subject>REGULATORY ENVIRONMENTS</subject><subject>REGULATORY FRAMEWORK</subject><subject>REGULATORY OBJECTIVES</subject><subject>REGULATORY REGIMES</subject><subject>RESOURCE ALLOCATION</subject><subject>RISK PREMIUM</subject><subject>SALES OF ASSETS</subject><subject>SAVINGS</subject><subject>SHADOW PRICES</subject><subject>SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS</subject><subject>SUBSIDIES</subject><subject>TARIFFS</subject><subject>TAX</subject><subject>TAX SYSTEMS</subject><subject>TELECOMMUNICATIONS</subject><subject>TOTAL COSTS</subject><subject>TRANSPARENCY</subject><subject>UTILITIES</subject><subject>WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX</subject><subject>WILLINGNESS TO PAY</subject><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>book</rsrctype><creationdate>2003</creationdate><recordtype>book</recordtype><sourceid>VO9</sourceid><recordid>eNqdyzsOgkAQAFAaC6PeYS5gIv7A0hiIFDZGa7LuDpsJ4wxZlhBur4UnsHrVmyfVWaCSGNQNNpIKRIWSxIglw2DEQWFV9E0WbuqQSTw0GuAZiSlOcEc_sIka-mUyawz3uPq5SPZl8bhc16MGdi8jba0dSis6MjqPATvt6TunOt2c8mOd5tvssPuzfQCcC0VN</recordid><startdate>200303</startdate><enddate>200303</enddate><creator>Estache, Antonio</creator><creator>Rodriguez Pardina, Martin</creator><creator>Rodriguez, Jose Maria</creator><creator>Sember, German</creator><general>World Bank, Washington, DC</general><scope>VO9</scope></search><sort><creationdate>200303</creationdate><title>An Introduction to Financial and Economic Modeling for Utility Regulators</title><author>Estache, Antonio ; Rodriguez Pardina, Martin ; Rodriguez, Jose Maria ; Sember, German</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-worldbank_openknowledgerepository_10986_182753</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>books</rsrctype><prefilter>books</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2003</creationdate><topic>ACCOUNTABILITY</topic><topic>ACCOUNTING</topic><topic>ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS</topic><topic>ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY</topic><topic>ASSET VALUATION</topic><topic>AVERAGE COSTS</topic><topic>BALANCE SHEET</topic><topic>BASKET OF GOODS</topic><topic>BENCHMARKING</topic><topic>BENCHMARKS</topic><topic>BORROWING</topic><topic>CASH FLOW</topic><topic>CASH FLOWS</topic><topic>COLLUSION</topic><topic>CONSUMERS</topic><topic>CONSUMPTION LEVELS</topic><topic>CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT</topic><topic>CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS</topic><topic>COST MINIMIZATION</topic><topic>COST OF CAPITAL</topic><topic>CREDIT MARKETS</topic><topic>CROSS SUBSIDIES</topic><topic>DEBT</topic><topic>DEBT COVERAGE</topic><topic>DEBT SERVICE</topic><topic>DECISION MAKING</topic><topic>DECISION VARIABLES</topic><topic>DEPRECIATION</topic><topic>DEVALUATION</topic><topic>ECONOMETRIC MODELS</topic><topic>ECONOMIC EFFECTS</topic><topic>ECONOMIC MODELS</topic><topic>ELECTRICITY</topic><topic>EMPLOYMENT</topic><topic>EQUILIBRIUM</topic><topic>EXCHANGE RATE</topic><topic>EXCHANGE RATES</topic><topic>EXCHANGE RATES ACCOUNTABILITY</topic><topic>EXTERNALITIES</topic><topic>FINANCIAL MARKETS</topic><topic>FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE</topic><topic>FINANCIAL STRUCTURE</topic><topic>FORECASTS</topic><topic>GDP</topic><topic>INCOME</topic><topic>INCOME LEVELS</topic><topic>INFLATION</topic><topic>INVESTMENTS</topic><topic>LABOR MARKETS</topic><topic>LEGISLATION</topic><topic>LICENSES</topic><topic>LONG RUN MARGINAL COST PRICING</topic><topic>MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS</topic><topic>MANDATES</topic><topic>MARGINAL COST</topic><topic>MARGINAL COST PRICING</topic><topic>MARGINAL COSTS</topic><topic>MARKET PRICES</topic><topic>MONOPOLIES</topic><topic>OPERATING COSTS</topic><topic>OPPORTUNITY COST</topic><topic>POLICY INSTRUMENTS</topic><topic>PRESENT VALUE</topic><topic>PRICE CONTROLS</topic><topic>PRICE DISCRIMINATION</topic><topic>PRICE LEVELS</topic><topic>PRIVATE SECTOR</topic><topic>PRIVATIZATION</topic><topic>PRODUCT MARKETS</topic><topic>PRODUCTIVITY</topic><topic>PROFIT RATE</topic><topic>PROFITABILITY</topic><topic>PROVISION OF INFRASTRUCTURE</topic><topic>PUBLIC ENTERPRISES</topic><topic>PUBLIC HEARINGS</topic><topic>PUBLIC SECTOR</topic><topic>PUBLIC SERVICE</topic><topic>PUBLIC SERVICES</topic><topic>PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION</topic><topic>QUALITY</topic><topic>QUALITY STANDARDS</topic><topic>RATE OF RETURN</topic><topic>REGULATION</topic><topic>REGULATORY ENVIRONMENTS</topic><topic>REGULATORY FRAMEWORK</topic><topic>REGULATORY OBJECTIVES</topic><topic>REGULATORY REGIMES</topic><topic>RESOURCE ALLOCATION</topic><topic>RISK PREMIUM</topic><topic>SALES OF ASSETS</topic><topic>SAVINGS</topic><topic>SHADOW PRICES</topic><topic>SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS</topic><topic>SUBSIDIES</topic><topic>TARIFFS</topic><topic>TAX</topic><topic>TAX SYSTEMS</topic><topic>TELECOMMUNICATIONS</topic><topic>TOTAL COSTS</topic><topic>TRANSPARENCY</topic><topic>UTILITIES</topic><topic>WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX</topic><topic>WILLINGNESS TO PAY</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Estache, Antonio</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rodriguez Pardina, Martin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rodriguez, Jose Maria</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sember, German</creatorcontrib><collection>Open Knowledge Repository</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Estache, Antonio</au><au>Rodriguez Pardina, Martin</au><au>Rodriguez, Jose Maria</au><au>Sember, German</au><format>book</format><genre>book</genre><ristype>BOOK</ristype><btitle>An Introduction to Financial and Economic Modeling for Utility Regulators</btitle><seriestitle>Policy Research Working Paper</seriestitle><date>2003-03</date><risdate>2003</risdate><volume>3001</volume><abstract>The most effective regulators in
developing countries are following remarkably similar
approaches. The main common element across "best
practice" countries is the use of relatively simple
quantitative models of operators' behavior and
constraints to measure the impact of regulatory decisions on
some key financial and economic indicators of concern to the
operators, the users, and the government. The authors
provide an introduction to the design and use of these
models. They draw on lessons from international experience
in industrial and developing countries in ordinary or
extraordinary revisions and in the context of contract
renegotiations. Simplifying somewhat, these models force
regulators to recognize that, in the long run, private
operators need to at least cover their opportunity cost of
capital, including the various types of risks specific to
the country, the sector, or the projects with which they are
involved. Because these variables change over time,
scheduled revisions are needed to allow for adjustments in
the key determinants of the rate of return of the operator.
These revisions are a recognition of the fact that all these
determinants-tariffs, subsidies, quality, investments, and
other service obligations-are interrelated and jointly
determine the rate of return. At every revision, the rules
of the game for the regulator are exactly the same: to
figure out the changes in the cost of capital and to adjust
the variables driving the rate of return to ensure that it
continues to be consistent with the cost of capital. If they
can draw on reasonable data, these models do everything any
financial model would do for the day-to-day management of a
company but take a longer term view and include an explicit
identification of the key regulatory instruments. They can
monitor the consistency between cash flow generated by the
business on the one hand and debt service and operational
expense needs on the other to address the main concerns of
the operators. They can also account for a large number of
key policy factors including access and affordability
concerns for various types of consumers. They generally
account for the sensitivity of operators and users to
various regulatory design options.</abstract><pub>World Bank, Washington, DC</pub><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| subjects | ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY ASSET VALUATION AVERAGE COSTS BALANCE SHEET BASKET OF GOODS BENCHMARKING BENCHMARKS BORROWING CASH FLOW CASH FLOWS COLLUSION CONSUMERS CONSUMPTION LEVELS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS COST MINIMIZATION COST OF CAPITAL CREDIT MARKETS CROSS SUBSIDIES DEBT DEBT COVERAGE DEBT SERVICE DECISION MAKING DECISION VARIABLES DEPRECIATION DEVALUATION ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC MODELS ELECTRICITY EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATE EXCHANGE RATES EXCHANGE RATES ACCOUNTABILITY EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FORECASTS GDP INCOME INCOME LEVELS INFLATION INVESTMENTS LABOR MARKETS LEGISLATION LICENSES LONG RUN MARGINAL COST PRICING MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS MANDATES MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST PRICING MARGINAL COSTS MARKET PRICES MONOPOLIES OPERATING COSTS OPPORTUNITY COST POLICY INSTRUMENTS PRESENT VALUE PRICE CONTROLS PRICE DISCRIMINATION PRICE LEVELS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PRODUCT MARKETS PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT RATE PROFITABILITY PROVISION OF INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC ENTERPRISES PUBLIC HEARINGS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION QUALITY QUALITY STANDARDS RATE OF RETURN REGULATION REGULATORY ENVIRONMENTS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY OBJECTIVES REGULATORY REGIMES RESOURCE ALLOCATION RISK PREMIUM SALES OF ASSETS SAVINGS SHADOW PRICES SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS SUBSIDIES TARIFFS TAX TAX SYSTEMS TELECOMMUNICATIONS TOTAL COSTS TRANSPARENCY UTILITIES WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX WILLINGNESS TO PAY |
| title | An Introduction to Financial and Economic Modeling for Utility Regulators |
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