Cooperation with a multiproduct corporation in a strategic managerial delegation
We consider an industry composed of a multiproduct corporation that adopts corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a strategic managerial delegation and examine the profit‐incentive to form a cooperative group. We find that competition is an equilibrium for any degree of substitutability and yields...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Managerial and decision economics 2020-01, Vol.41 (1), p.3-9 |
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| container_title | Managerial and decision economics |
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| creator | Garcia, Arturo Leal, Mariel Lee, Sang‐Ho |
| description | We consider an industry composed of a multiproduct corporation that adopts corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a strategic managerial delegation and examine the profit‐incentive to form a cooperative group. We find that competition is an equilibrium for any degree of substitutability and yields the highest CSR, which is increasing in the degree of substitutability. We also show that full cooperation is an equilibrium for lower substitutability but induces no CSR, whereas partial cooperation with one uniplant firm is an equilibrium for higher substitutability but yields lower CSR than that under competition. Therefore, cooperation might reduce strategic CSR activities, whereas competition will encourage higher CSR but yield lower industry profits. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1002/mde.3073 |
| format | Article |
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We find that competition is an equilibrium for any degree of substitutability and yields the highest CSR, which is increasing in the degree of substitutability. We also show that full cooperation is an equilibrium for lower substitutability but induces no CSR, whereas partial cooperation with one uniplant firm is an equilibrium for higher substitutability but yields lower CSR than that under competition. 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| source | Business Source Complete; Access via Wiley Online Library; Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index – 2020<img src="https://exlibris-pub.s3.amazonaws.com/fromwos-v2.jpg" /> |
| subjects | Business & Economics Cooperation Delegation Economic models Economics Equilibrium Management Pricing policies Profits Social responsibility Social Sciences |
| title | Cooperation with a multiproduct corporation in a strategic managerial delegation |
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