The Case of the Ukraine—Russia Undeclared War 2013/2014: Lessons for the EU’s Estimative Intelligence

IntroductionThe annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia in March 2014 was a strategic surprise for the EU of the most negative kind, not least as it was followed by Russia’s increasingly direct military interference in eastern Ukraine that sparked open warfare with thousands of people being ki...

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description IntroductionThe annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia in March 2014 was a strategic surprise for the EU of the most negative kind, not least as it was followed by Russia’s increasingly direct military interference in eastern Ukraine that sparked open warfare with thousands of people being killed. The events marked a fundamental reassessment for the EU of the threat Russia posed not just to its immediate neighbours, but also to current EU member states with substantial Russian minorities and a history of being occupied or controlled by the Soviet Union. For the wider EU, it removed the already rather minimal basis for cooperative relations with Russia as fundamental international laws and diplomatic norms were broken in the most blatant way and it raised concern over whether the EU’s approach to the region was still fit for purpose. When taken together with other Russian coercive and aggressive actions vis-à-vis some EU member states, it signalled for many observers nothing less than an undeclared new ‘cold war’. In contrast to the Georgian-Russian seven-day-war of 2008, the Ukraine-Russia conflict of 2014 triggered a number of post-mortem studies by governments or parliamentary committees, individual academics, think tanks and, of course, journalists to assess the performance of ‘the West’, the EU as a whole, or specific EU member states, and what lessons they should take away from this crisis. The overwhelming majority of these reviews focus on decisions and policies vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine. The question of intelligence is typically treated as part of the wider question of whether ‘the West’, ‘the EU’ or particular states should have been surprised by what happened and whether or not these actors bear some responsibility for causing these Russian actions. Those who are more critical of the EU’s policies vis-à-vis Ukraine and Russia also tend to claim that Russian military actions should not have come as a surprise. Other scholars claim that the EU at least played a causal role and should shoulder some responsibility for the crisis, while Richard Sakwa is even more critical of EU and NATO.
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Goodman ; Nikki Ikani ; Eva Michaels ; Christoph O. Meyer ; Aviva Guttmann ; Michaels, Eva ; Goodman, Michael S ; Guttmann, Aviva ; Meyer, Christoph ; Ikani, Nikki ; Meyer, Christoph</contributor><creatorcontrib>Meyer, Christoph O. ; Michael S. Goodman ; Nikki Ikani ; Eva Michaels ; Christoph O. Meyer ; Aviva Guttmann ; Michaels, Eva ; Goodman, Michael S ; Guttmann, Aviva ; Meyer, Christoph ; Ikani, Nikki ; Meyer, Christoph</creatorcontrib><description>IntroductionThe annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia in March 2014 was a strategic surprise for the EU of the most negative kind, not least as it was followed by Russia’s increasingly direct military interference in eastern Ukraine that sparked open warfare with thousands of people being killed. The events marked a fundamental reassessment for the EU of the threat Russia posed not just to its immediate neighbours, but also to current EU member states with substantial Russian minorities and a history of being occupied or controlled by the Soviet Union. For the wider EU, it removed the already rather minimal basis for cooperative relations with Russia as fundamental international laws and diplomatic norms were broken in the most blatant way and it raised concern over whether the EU’s approach to the region was still fit for purpose. When taken together with other Russian coercive and aggressive actions vis-à-vis some EU member states, it signalled for many observers nothing less than an undeclared new ‘cold war’. In contrast to the Georgian-Russian seven-day-war of 2008, the Ukraine-Russia conflict of 2014 triggered a number of post-mortem studies by governments or parliamentary committees, individual academics, think tanks and, of course, journalists to assess the performance of ‘the West’, the EU as a whole, or specific EU member states, and what lessons they should take away from this crisis. The overwhelming majority of these reviews focus on decisions and policies vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine. The question of intelligence is typically treated as part of the wider question of whether ‘the West’, ‘the EU’ or particular states should have been surprised by what happened and whether or not these actors bear some responsibility for causing these Russian actions. Those who are more critical of the EU’s policies vis-à-vis Ukraine and Russia also tend to claim that Russian military actions should not have come as a surprise. 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In contrast to the Georgian-Russian seven-day-war of 2008, the Ukraine-Russia conflict of 2014 triggered a number of post-mortem studies by governments or parliamentary committees, individual academics, think tanks and, of course, journalists to assess the performance of ‘the West’, the EU as a whole, or specific EU member states, and what lessons they should take away from this crisis. The overwhelming majority of these reviews focus on decisions and policies vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine. The question of intelligence is typically treated as part of the wider question of whether ‘the West’, ‘the EU’ or particular states should have been surprised by what happened and whether or not these actors bear some responsibility for causing these Russian actions. Those who are more critical of the EU’s policies vis-à-vis Ukraine and Russia also tend to claim that Russian military actions should not have come as a surprise. 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The events marked a fundamental reassessment for the EU of the threat Russia posed not just to its immediate neighbours, but also to current EU member states with substantial Russian minorities and a history of being occupied or controlled by the Soviet Union. For the wider EU, it removed the already rather minimal basis for cooperative relations with Russia as fundamental international laws and diplomatic norms were broken in the most blatant way and it raised concern over whether the EU’s approach to the region was still fit for purpose. When taken together with other Russian coercive and aggressive actions vis-à-vis some EU member states, it signalled for many observers nothing less than an undeclared new ‘cold war’. 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