Users, Structures, and Representation

Users, Structures, and Representation

This article defends a pragmatic and structuralist account of scientific representation of the kind recently proposed by Bas van Fraassen against criticisms of both the structuralist and the pragmatist plank of the account. I argue that the account appears to have the unacceptable consequence that t...

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Veröffentlicht in:The British journal for the philosophy of science 2015-06, Vol.66 (2), p.285-306
1. Verfasser: Frisch, Mathias
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Sprache:eng
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Philosophy of science
Pragmatism
Theory
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container_title The British journal for the philosophy of science
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creator Frisch, Mathias
description This article defends a pragmatic and structuralist account of scientific representation of the kind recently proposed by Bas van Fraassen against criticisms of both the structuralist and the pragmatist plank of the account. I argue that the account appears to have the unacceptable consequence that the domain of a theory is restricted to phenomena for which we actually have constructed a model—a worry arising from the account's pragmatism, which is exacerbated by its structuralism. Yet, the account has the resources, at least partially, to address the worry. What remains as implication is a strong anti-foundationalism.
doi_str_mv 10.1093/bjps/axt032
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subjects Philosophy of science
Pragmatism
Theory
title Users, Structures, and Representation
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