Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent

Can economic sanctions combat transnational terrorism effectively? Policy makers argue that sanctions can deter state sponsorship but are counterproductive against hosts of transnational terrorists. However, recent cases indicate that governments are often uncertain if foreign states are truly spons...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Journal of politics 2016-01, Vol.78 (1), p.249-264
Hauptverfasser:	Bapat, Navin A., De la Calle, Luis, Hinkkainen, Kaisa H., McLean, Elena V.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Incentives Information Sanctions Terrorism Terrorists Transnationalism Uncertainty
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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