Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication

Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication

In a game with pre-play bilateral communication, messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements. We hypothesize that individuals’ inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor informal agreements....

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Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 2023-01, Vol.222, p.110931, Article 110931
Hauptverfasser: Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, Dufwenberg, Martin, Papa, Stefano, Passarelli, Francesco
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Economics
Guilt aversion
Informal agreements
Nationalekonomi
Promise-keeping
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Zusammenfassung:In a game with pre-play bilateral communication, messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements. We hypothesize that individuals’ inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor informal agreements. We report supporting results from an experiment.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110931