BLIND: A Complete Identity Protection Framework for End-Points (Transcript of Discussion)

BLIND: A Complete Identity Protection Framework for End-Points (Transcript of Discussion)

In the JFK paper we made the kind of throw away assertion, a very trivial assertion, that the reason that you can’t have identity protection for both parties in the presence of an active attack is that someone has to reveal their identity first, unless you know something about each other that’s secr...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Ylitalo, Jukka
Format: Buchkapitel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Communication Network
Information System
Large Population
Operating System
Problem Complexity
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 178
container_issue
container_start_page 177
container_title
container_volume
creator Ylitalo, Jukka
description In the JFK paper we made the kind of throw away assertion, a very trivial assertion, that the reason that you can’t have identity protection for both parties in the presence of an active attack is that someone has to reveal their identity first, unless you know something about each other that’s secret in advance. Assuming certificates and so on is themeans for identification, someone has to identify first, you can’t say, I’ll only tell you who I am if you tell me who you are. Now that was an assertion of a trivial fact rather than a proof. I’m wondering if you believe, under the assumptions we had, that that was true?
doi_str_mv 10.1007/11861386_19
format Book Chapter
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>springer</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_springer_books_10_1007_11861386_19</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>springer_books_10_1007_11861386_19</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-springer_books_10_1007_11861386_193</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqVjztPwzAURs1LIoVO_IE70iFwr50mMRv0oVZCqEMXJiukDjJt7cjXCPHvAQkk1k5n-M43HCGuCG8IsbolqktSdWlIH4mBGhdYoJalPBYZlUS5UoU-EUNd1X_bGE9FhgplrqtCnYsB8xsiykrLTDw_PC6fpndwD5Ow73c2WVhurE8ufcIqhmTb5IKHeWz29iPELXQhwsxv8lVwPjFcr2PjuY2uTxA6mDpu35m_L6NLcdY1O7bDX16I0Xy2nixy7qPzrzaalxC2bAjNT5j5F6YOcb8A-FNM-g</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Publisher</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>book_chapter</recordtype></control><display><type>book_chapter</type><title>BLIND: A Complete Identity Protection Framework for End-Points (Transcript of Discussion)</title><source>Springer Books</source><creator>Ylitalo, Jukka</creator><contributor>Roe, Michael ; Crispo, Bruno ; Malcolm, James A. ; Christianson, Bruce</contributor><creatorcontrib>Ylitalo, Jukka ; Roe, Michael ; Crispo, Bruno ; Malcolm, James A. ; Christianson, Bruce</creatorcontrib><description>In the JFK paper we made the kind of throw away assertion, a very trivial assertion, that the reason that you can’t have identity protection for both parties in the presence of an active attack is that someone has to reveal their identity first, unless you know something about each other that’s secret in advance. Assuming certificates and so on is themeans for identification, someone has to identify first, you can’t say, I’ll only tell you who I am if you tell me who you are. Now that was an assertion of a trivial fact rather than a proof. I’m wondering if you believe, under the assumptions we had, that that was true?</description><identifier>ISSN: 0302-9743</identifier><identifier>ISBN: 9783540409250</identifier><identifier>ISBN: 3540409254</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1611-3349</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 3540409262</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 9783540409267</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/11861386_19</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg</publisher><subject>Communication Network ; Information System ; Large Population ; Operating System ; Problem Complexity</subject><ispartof>Security Protocols, 2006, p.177-178</ispartof><rights>Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006</rights><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><relation>Lecture Notes in Computer Science</relation></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/11861386_19$$EPDF$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/10.1007/11861386_19$$EHTML$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>779,780,784,793,27925,38255,41442,42511</link.rule.ids></links><search><contributor>Roe, Michael</contributor><contributor>Crispo, Bruno</contributor><contributor>Malcolm, James A.</contributor><contributor>Christianson, Bruce</contributor><creatorcontrib>Ylitalo, Jukka</creatorcontrib><title>BLIND: A Complete Identity Protection Framework for End-Points (Transcript of Discussion)</title><title>Security Protocols</title><description>In the JFK paper we made the kind of throw away assertion, a very trivial assertion, that the reason that you can’t have identity protection for both parties in the presence of an active attack is that someone has to reveal their identity first, unless you know something about each other that’s secret in advance. Assuming certificates and so on is themeans for identification, someone has to identify first, you can’t say, I’ll only tell you who I am if you tell me who you are. Now that was an assertion of a trivial fact rather than a proof. I’m wondering if you believe, under the assumptions we had, that that was true?</description><subject>Communication Network</subject><subject>Information System</subject><subject>Large Population</subject><subject>Operating System</subject><subject>Problem Complexity</subject><issn>0302-9743</issn><issn>1611-3349</issn><isbn>9783540409250</isbn><isbn>3540409254</isbn><isbn>3540409262</isbn><isbn>9783540409267</isbn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>book_chapter</rsrctype><creationdate>2006</creationdate><recordtype>book_chapter</recordtype><sourceid/><recordid>eNqVjztPwzAURs1LIoVO_IE70iFwr50mMRv0oVZCqEMXJiukDjJt7cjXCPHvAQkk1k5n-M43HCGuCG8IsbolqktSdWlIH4mBGhdYoJalPBYZlUS5UoU-EUNd1X_bGE9FhgplrqtCnYsB8xsiykrLTDw_PC6fpndwD5Ow73c2WVhurE8ufcIqhmTb5IKHeWz29iPELXQhwsxv8lVwPjFcr2PjuY2uTxA6mDpu35m_L6NLcdY1O7bDX16I0Xy2nixy7qPzrzaalxC2bAjNT5j5F6YOcb8A-FNM-g</recordid><startdate>2006</startdate><enddate>2006</enddate><creator>Ylitalo, Jukka</creator><general>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</general><scope/></search><sort><creationdate>2006</creationdate><title>BLIND: A Complete Identity Protection Framework for End-Points (Transcript of Discussion)</title><author>Ylitalo, Jukka</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-springer_books_10_1007_11861386_193</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>book_chapters</rsrctype><prefilter>book_chapters</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2006</creationdate><topic>Communication Network</topic><topic>Information System</topic><topic>Large Population</topic><topic>Operating System</topic><topic>Problem Complexity</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Ylitalo, Jukka</creatorcontrib></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Ylitalo, Jukka</au><au>Roe, Michael</au><au>Crispo, Bruno</au><au>Malcolm, James A.</au><au>Christianson, Bruce</au><format>book</format><genre>bookitem</genre><ristype>CHAP</ristype><atitle>BLIND: A Complete Identity Protection Framework for End-Points (Transcript of Discussion)</atitle><btitle>Security Protocols</btitle><seriestitle>Lecture Notes in Computer Science</seriestitle><date>2006</date><risdate>2006</risdate><spage>177</spage><epage>178</epage><pages>177-178</pages><issn>0302-9743</issn><eissn>1611-3349</eissn><isbn>9783540409250</isbn><isbn>3540409254</isbn><eisbn>3540409262</eisbn><eisbn>9783540409267</eisbn><abstract>In the JFK paper we made the kind of throw away assertion, a very trivial assertion, that the reason that you can’t have identity protection for both parties in the presence of an active attack is that someone has to reveal their identity first, unless you know something about each other that’s secret in advance. Assuming certificates and so on is themeans for identification, someone has to identify first, you can’t say, I’ll only tell you who I am if you tell me who you are. Now that was an assertion of a trivial fact rather than a proof. I’m wondering if you believe, under the assumptions we had, that that was true?</abstract><cop>Berlin, Heidelberg</cop><pub>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</pub><doi>10.1007/11861386_19</doi></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0302-9743
ispartof Security Protocols, 2006, p.177-178
issn 0302-9743
1611-3349
language eng
recordid cdi_springer_books_10_1007_11861386_19
source Springer Books
subjects Communication Network
Information System
Large Population
Operating System
Problem Complexity
title BLIND: A Complete Identity Protection Framework for End-Points (Transcript of Discussion)
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-19T23%3A24%3A49IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-springer&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:book&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.atitle=BLIND:%20A%20Complete%20Identity%20Protection%20Framework%20for%20End-Points%20(Transcript%20of%20Discussion)&rft.btitle=Security%20Protocols&rft.au=Ylitalo,%20Jukka&rft.date=2006&rft.spage=177&rft.epage=178&rft.pages=177-178&rft.issn=0302-9743&rft.eissn=1611-3349&rft.isbn=9783540409250&rft.isbn_list=3540409254&rft_id=info:doi/10.1007/11861386_19&rft_dat=%3Cspringer%3Espringer_books_10_1007_11861386_19%3C/springer%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft.eisbn=3540409262&rft.eisbn_list=9783540409267&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true