Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)

In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand an...

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Veröffentlicht in:Perspectives on psychological science 2017, Vol.12 (3), p.527-542
Hauptverfasser: Bouwmeester, S., Verkoeijen, P. P. J. L., Aczel, B., Barbosa, Fernando, Bègue, L., Branas-Garza, Pablo, Chmura, T. G. H., Cornelissen, Gert, Døssing, F. S., Espín, A. M., Evans, Anthony, Ferreira-Santos, Fernando, Fiedler, S., Flegr, Jaroslav, Ghaffari, M., Glöckner, Andreas, Goeschl, T., Guo, L., Hauser, O. P., Hernan-Gonzalez, R., Herrero, A., Horne, Zachary, Houdek, Petr, Johannesson, Magnus, Koppel, L., Kujal, P., Laine, T., Lohse, Johannes, Costa Martins, Eva, Mauro, Carlos, Mischkowski, D., Mukherjee, Sumitava, Myrseth, Kristian, Navarro-Martínez, D., Neal, T. M. S., Novakova, J., Pagà, R., Paiva, Tiago, Palfi, B., Piovesan, Marco, Rahal, Rima-Maria, Salomon, E., Srinivasan, Narayanan, Srivastava, A., Szaszi, B., Szollosi, Aba, Thor, K. Ø., Tinghög, Gustav, Trueblood, Jennifer, Van Bavel, J. J., van ‘t Veer, A. E., Västfjäll, Daniel, Warner, M., Wengström, E., Wills, J., Wollbrant, C. E.
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Sprache:eng
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