Theory of Mind and diverse intelligences in 4‐year‐olds: Modelling associations of false beliefs with children’s numerate‐spatial, verbal, and social intelligence

Theory of Mind (ToM) and the structure of intelligence were investigated in 115 4‐year‐olds. Specifically, we asked whether children’s intelligence involves both general and specific aspects and whether standard ToM measures of false belief can serve as indicators of social intelligence. Psychometric intelligence and children’s domain‐specific understanding of number concepts and of mental states (false belief) were measured in the laboratory; communication and social skills were assessed through mothers’ report. A confirmatory factor analysis revealed poor fit for a one‐factor model, but good fit for a model with three correlated factors, suggesting that children’s intelligence involves both general and specific aspects. Numerate‐spatial and verbal intelligence were correlated (.70), and social intelligence correlated to a stronger degree with verbal (.66) than with numerate‐spatial intelligence (.37). Laboratory assessment of false belief and mothers’ reports about children’s social skills loaded on a single factor, pointing to real‐world consequences of ToM abilities. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? The structure of intelligence in 4‐year‐olds comprises domain‐general and domain‐specific dimensions. Some domain‐specific dimensions are numerate‐spatial, verbal, and social intelligence. What does this study add? Theory of Mind emerges as an aspect of children’s social intelligence. Social intelligence (including Theory of Mind) is related to children’s numerate‐spatial abilities.