Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like Ceos? Substitution Between Incentives and Resources Among School Administrators in China
Abstract Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China, we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia—as well...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of the European Economic Association 2020-02, Vol.18 (1), p.165-201 |
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| creator | Luo, Renfu Miller, Grant Rozelle, Scott Sylvia, Sean Vera-Hernández, Marcos |
| description | Abstract
Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China, we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia—as well as complementarity between incentives and orthogonally assigned discretionary resources. Large (but not small) incentives and unrestricted grants both reduced anemia, but incentives were more cost-effective. Although unrestricted grants and small incentives do not interact, grants fully crowd-out the effect of larger incentives. Our findings suggest that performance incentives can be effective in bureaucratic environments, but they are not complementary to discretionary resources. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1093/jeea/jvy047 |
| format | Article |
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Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China, we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia—as well as complementarity between incentives and orthogonally assigned discretionary resources. Large (but not small) incentives and unrestricted grants both reduced anemia, but incentives were more cost-effective. Although unrestricted grants and small incentives do not interact, grants fully crowd-out the effect of larger incentives. Our findings suggest that performance incentives can be effective in bureaucratic environments, but they are not complementary to discretionary resources.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1542-4766</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1542-4774</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvy047</identifier><identifier>PMID: 32161517</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>United States: Oxford University Press</publisher><subject>2011-2012 ; China ; Führungskräfte ; Krankheit ; Leistungsentgelt ; Schule ; Schüler</subject><ispartof>Journal of the European Economic Association, 2020-02, Vol.18 (1), p.165-201</ispartof><rights>The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of European Economic Association. 2020</rights><rights>The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of European Economic Association.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c502t-3bba4c4a8f39d75589cbec7c45dd37b5dd12edf61342003109c44c2be01ff70c3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c502t-3bba4c4a8f39d75589cbec7c45dd37b5dd12edf61342003109c44c2be01ff70c3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>230,314,780,784,885,1584,27924,27925</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32161517$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Luo, Renfu</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Miller, Grant</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rozelle, Scott</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sylvia, Sean</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Vera-Hernández, Marcos</creatorcontrib><title>Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like Ceos? Substitution Between Incentives and Resources Among School Administrators in China</title><title>Journal of the European Economic Association</title><addtitle>J Eur Econ Assoc</addtitle><description>Abstract
Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China, we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia—as well as complementarity between incentives and orthogonally assigned discretionary resources. Large (but not small) incentives and unrestricted grants both reduced anemia, but incentives were more cost-effective. Although unrestricted grants and small incentives do not interact, grants fully crowd-out the effect of larger incentives. Our findings suggest that performance incentives can be effective in bureaucratic environments, but they are not complementary to discretionary resources.</description><subject>2011-2012</subject><subject>China</subject><subject>Führungskräfte</subject><subject>Krankheit</subject><subject>Leistungsentgelt</subject><subject>Schule</subject><subject>Schüler</subject><issn>1542-4766</issn><issn>1542-4774</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>TOX</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kUuLFDEUhQtRnHF05V6yEkHaybPStVF6Ch8DDYqj65BK3ZpOW5W0ebQ0-ONNU2OrGzdJLvnuOZd7quopwa8IbtjlFkBfbvcHzOW96pwIThdcSn7_9K7rs-pRjFuMKaaNfFidMUpqIog8r3622qGrHEBnE3SK6DPocTygK0CftO3R2n4D1IKPb9BN7mKyKSfrSwukHwAOXTsDLtk9RKRdX7qjz8GUajV5d4tuzMb7Ea36yTobU3HwISLrULuxTj-uHgx6jPDk7r6ovr57-6X9sFh_fH_drtYLIzBNC9Z1mhuulwNreinEsjEdGGm46Hsmu3ISCv1QE8YpxqwsxXBuaAeYDIPEhl1Ur2fdXe4m6I8TBz2qXbCTDgfltVX__ji7Ubd-ryQWTAheBF7cCQT_PUNMarLRwDhqBz5HRZmsJaOsXhb05Yya4GMMMJxsCFbHvNQxLzXnVehnf092Yn8HVAA0A2B82eAfsbphdS3Ikhbk-Yz4vPuv2S-XWqxy</recordid><startdate>20200201</startdate><enddate>20200201</enddate><creator>Luo, Renfu</creator><creator>Miller, Grant</creator><creator>Rozelle, Scott</creator><creator>Sylvia, Sean</creator><creator>Vera-Hernández, Marcos</creator><general>Oxford University Press</general><scope>TOX</scope><scope>OQ6</scope><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7X8</scope><scope>5PM</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20200201</creationdate><title>Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like Ceos? Substitution Between Incentives and Resources Among School Administrators in China</title><author>Luo, Renfu ; Miller, Grant ; Rozelle, Scott ; Sylvia, Sean ; Vera-Hernández, Marcos</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c502t-3bba4c4a8f39d75589cbec7c45dd37b5dd12edf61342003109c44c2be01ff70c3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>2011-2012</topic><topic>China</topic><topic>Führungskräfte</topic><topic>Krankheit</topic><topic>Leistungsentgelt</topic><topic>Schule</topic><topic>Schüler</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Luo, Renfu</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Miller, Grant</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rozelle, Scott</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sylvia, Sean</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Vera-Hernández, Marcos</creatorcontrib><collection>Oxford Journals Open Access Collection</collection><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><collection>PubMed Central (Full Participant titles)</collection><jtitle>Journal of the European Economic Association</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Luo, Renfu</au><au>Miller, Grant</au><au>Rozelle, Scott</au><au>Sylvia, Sean</au><au>Vera-Hernández, Marcos</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like Ceos? Substitution Between Incentives and Resources Among School Administrators in China</atitle><jtitle>Journal of the European Economic Association</jtitle><addtitle>J Eur Econ Assoc</addtitle><date>2020-02-01</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>18</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>165</spage><epage>201</epage><pages>165-201</pages><issn>1542-4766</issn><eissn>1542-4774</eissn><abstract>Abstract
Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China, we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia—as well as complementarity between incentives and orthogonally assigned discretionary resources. Large (but not small) incentives and unrestricted grants both reduced anemia, but incentives were more cost-effective. Although unrestricted grants and small incentives do not interact, grants fully crowd-out the effect of larger incentives. Our findings suggest that performance incentives can be effective in bureaucratic environments, but they are not complementary to discretionary resources.</abstract><cop>United States</cop><pub>Oxford University Press</pub><pmid>32161517</pmid><doi>10.1093/jeea/jvy047</doi><tpages>37</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | Journal of the European Economic Association, 2020-02, Vol.18 (1), p.165-201 |
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| source | EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current) |
| subjects | 2011-2012 China Führungskräfte Krankheit Leistungsentgelt Schule Schüler |
| title | Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like Ceos? Substitution Between Incentives and Resources Among School Administrators in China |
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