Entry regulation and the effect of public reporting: Evidence from Home Health Compare
Economic theory suggests that competition and information are complementary tools for promoting health care quality. The existing empirical literature has documented this effect only in the context of competition among existing firms. Extending this literature, we examine competition driven by the e...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Health economics 2019-04, Vol.28 (4), p.492-516 |
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| container_title | Health economics |
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| creator | Wu, Bingxiao Jung, Jeah Kim, Hyunjee Polsky, Daniel |
| description | Economic theory suggests that competition and information are complementary tools for promoting health care quality. The existing empirical literature has documented this effect only in the context of competition among existing firms. Extending this literature, we examine competition driven by the entry of new firms into the home health care industry. In particular, we use the certificate of need (CON) law as a proxy for the entry of firms to avoid potential endogeneity of entry. We find that home health agencies in non‐CON states improved quality under public reporting significantly more than agencies in CON states. Because home health care is a labor‐intensive and capital‐light industry, the state CON law is a major barrier for new firms to enter. Our findings suggest that policymakers may jointly consider information disclosure and entry regulation to achieve better quality in home health care. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1002/hec.3859 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Health economics, 2019-04, Vol.28 (4), p.492-516 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; PAIS Index; Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA) |
| subjects | Capital certificate of need Certificates of need Companies Competition Disclosure Economic theory Health care industry Health economics Health education Health promotion Home health care home health care quality information disclosure Law Medicare Policy making Prospective payment systems Quality of care Regulation |
| title | Entry regulation and the effect of public reporting: Evidence from Home Health Compare |
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