Evolution of Cooperation with Heterogeneous Conditional Cooperators

Conditional cooperation declines over time if heterogeneous ideal conditional agents are involved in repeated interactions. With strict assumptions of rationality and a population consisting of ideal conditional agents who strictly follow a decision rule, cooperation is not expected. However, cooper...

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Veröffentlicht in:Scientific reports 2018-03, Vol.8 (1), p.4524-7, Article 4524
Hauptverfasser: Battu, Balaraju, Pammi, V. S. Chandrasekhar, Srinivasan, Narayanan
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Sprache:eng
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