Effectiveness of a financial incentive to physicians for timely follow-up after hospital discharge: a population-based time series analysis

Timely follow-up after hospital discharge may decrease readmission to hospital. Financial incentives to improve follow-up have been introduced in the United States and Canada, but it is unknown whether they are effective. Our objective was to evaluate the impact of an incentive program on timely phy...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Canadian Medical Association journal (CMAJ) 2017-10, Vol.189 (39), p.E1224-E1229
Hauptverfasser: Lapointe-Shaw, Lauren, Mamdani, Muhammad, Luo, Jin, Austin, Peter C, Ivers, Noah M, Redelmeier, Donald A, Bell, Chaim M
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page E1229
container_issue 39
container_start_page E1224
container_title Canadian Medical Association journal (CMAJ)
container_volume 189
creator Lapointe-Shaw, Lauren
Mamdani, Muhammad
Luo, Jin
Austin, Peter C
Ivers, Noah M
Redelmeier, Donald A
Bell, Chaim M
description Timely follow-up after hospital discharge may decrease readmission to hospital. Financial incentives to improve follow-up have been introduced in the United States and Canada, but it is unknown whether they are effective. Our objective was to evaluate the impact of an incentive program on timely physician follow-up after hospital discharge. We conducted an interventional time series analysis of all medical and surgical patients who were discharged home from hospital between Apr. 1, 2002, and Jan. 30, 2015, in Ontario, Canada. The intervention was a supplemental billing code for physician follow-up within 14 days of discharge from hospital, introduced in 2006. The primary outcome was an outpatient visit within 14 days of discharge. Secondary outcomes were 7-day follow-up and a composite of emergency department visits, nonelective hospital readmission and death within 14 days. We included 8 008 934 patient discharge records. The incentive code was claimed in 31% of eligible visits by 51% of eligible physicians, and cost $17.5 million over the study period. There was no change in the average monthly rate of outcomes in the year before the incentive was introduced compared with the year following introduction: 14-day follow-up (66.5% v. 67.0%, overall = 0.5), 7-day follow-up (44.9% v. 44.9%, overall = 0.5) and composite outcome (16.7% v. 16.9%, overall = 0.2). Despite uptake by physicians, a financial incentive did not alter follow-up after hospital discharge. This lack of effect may be explained by features of the incentive or by extra-physician barriers to follow-up. These barriers should be considered by policymakers before introducing similar initiatives.
doi_str_mv 10.1503/cmaj.170092
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>gale_pubme</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_pubmedcentral_primary_oai_pubmedcentral_nih_gov_5628034</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><galeid>A507950328</galeid><sourcerecordid>A507950328</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c640t-554328b30a735571a0163f8621f43cf38d6141f75da8c1133fb646433f6344683</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqVk01v1DAQhiMEokvhxB1ZVEIglMVfcRIOSFVVoFIFEh9ny-vYG68cO7WTwv4G_jROt5QN2gv2YSzPM689Hk-WPUVwiQpI3shObJaohLDG97IFolWVY4Lr-9kCVhjmpKbsKHsU4wamQXD5MDvCVV1CzOAi-3WutZKDuVZOxQi8BgJo44STRlhgnFRucoLBg77dRpO2XQTaBzCYTtltWlrrf-RjD4QeVACtj70ZUmxjomxFWKu3SbL3_WjFYLzLVyKq5iYaRBWMikA4YZN0fJw90MJG9eTWHmff359_O_uYX37-cHF2eplLRuGQFwUluFoRKEpSFCUSEDGiK4aRpkRqUjUMUaTLohGVRIgQvWKU0WQZoZRV5Dh7t9Ptx1WnminFICzvg-lE2HIvDJ97nGn52l_zguEKEpoEXt4KBH81qjjwLiWrrBVO-TFylJ6cYlyXZUJP_kE3fgwp4RuqhKhiNf5LrYVV3Djt07lyEuWnBSzrVGY83Ts_QK1T5dIlvVPapO0Z__wAL3tzxfeh5QEozUZ1Rh5UfTULSMygfg5rMcbIL75--Q_205x9sce2Stihjd6O06eJc_D1DpTBxxiUvqscgnzqCD51BN91RKKf7Rf7jv3TAuQ3ZnAC0w</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Open Access Repository</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1947018692</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Effectiveness of a financial incentive to physicians for timely follow-up after hospital discharge: a population-based time series analysis</title><source>MEDLINE</source><source>DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals</source><source>PubMed Central</source><source>Alma/SFX Local Collection</source><source>Journals@Ovid Complete</source><creator>Lapointe-Shaw, Lauren ; Mamdani, Muhammad ; Luo, Jin ; Austin, Peter C ; Ivers, Noah M ; Redelmeier, Donald A ; Bell, Chaim M</creator><creatorcontrib>Lapointe-Shaw, Lauren ; Mamdani, Muhammad ; Luo, Jin ; Austin, Peter C ; Ivers, Noah M ; Redelmeier, Donald A ; Bell, Chaim M</creatorcontrib><description>Timely follow-up after hospital discharge may decrease readmission to hospital. Financial incentives to improve follow-up have been introduced in the United States and Canada, but it is unknown whether they are effective. Our objective was to evaluate the impact of an incentive program on timely physician follow-up after hospital discharge. We conducted an interventional time series analysis of all medical and surgical patients who were discharged home from hospital between Apr. 1, 2002, and Jan. 30, 2015, in Ontario, Canada. The intervention was a supplemental billing code for physician follow-up within 14 days of discharge from hospital, introduced in 2006. The primary outcome was an outpatient visit within 14 days of discharge. Secondary outcomes were 7-day follow-up and a composite of emergency department visits, nonelective hospital readmission and death within 14 days. We included 8 008 934 patient discharge records. The incentive code was claimed in 31% of eligible visits by 51% of eligible physicians, and cost $17.5 million over the study period. There was no change in the average monthly rate of outcomes in the year before the incentive was introduced compared with the year following introduction: 14-day follow-up (66.5% v. 67.0%, overall = 0.5), 7-day follow-up (44.9% v. 44.9%, overall = 0.5) and composite outcome (16.7% v. 16.9%, overall = 0.2). Despite uptake by physicians, a financial incentive did not alter follow-up after hospital discharge. This lack of effect may be explained by features of the incentive or by extra-physician barriers to follow-up. These barriers should be considered by policymakers before introducing similar initiatives.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0820-3946</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1488-2329</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1503/cmaj.170092</identifier><identifier>PMID: 28970260</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Canada: Joule Inc</publisher><subject>Adolescent ; Adult ; Aged ; Algorithms ; Analysis ; Child ; Child, Preschool ; Codes ; Communication ; Continuity of care ; Continuity of Patient Care ; Economic incentives ; Female ; Health care policy ; Hospital admission and discharge ; Hospitalization ; Hospitals ; Humans ; Incentives ; Infant ; Infant, Newborn ; Interrupted Time Series Analysis ; Long term health care ; Male ; Medicare ; Middle Aged ; Monetary incentives ; Ontario ; Outcome Assessment (Health Care) ; Patient Discharge ; Patient Readmission ; Patients ; Physician Incentive Plans ; Physicians ; Population ; Practice Patterns, Physicians ; Primary care ; Retrospective Studies ; Statistical analysis ; Statistics ; Time series ; Young Adult</subject><ispartof>Canadian Medical Association journal (CMAJ), 2017-10, Vol.189 (39), p.E1224-E1229</ispartof><rights>2017 Canadian Medical Association or its licensors.</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2017 Joule Inc.</rights><rights>Copyright Joule Inc Oct 2, 2017</rights><rights>2017 Joule Inc. or its licensors 2017</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c640t-554328b30a735571a0163f8621f43cf38d6141f75da8c1133fb646433f6344683</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5628034/pdf/$$EPDF$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5628034/$$EHTML$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>230,314,723,776,780,860,881,27901,27902,53766,53768</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28970260$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Lapointe-Shaw, Lauren</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Mamdani, Muhammad</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Luo, Jin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Austin, Peter C</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ivers, Noah M</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Redelmeier, Donald A</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Bell, Chaim M</creatorcontrib><title>Effectiveness of a financial incentive to physicians for timely follow-up after hospital discharge: a population-based time series analysis</title><title>Canadian Medical Association journal (CMAJ)</title><addtitle>CMAJ</addtitle><description>Timely follow-up after hospital discharge may decrease readmission to hospital. Financial incentives to improve follow-up have been introduced in the United States and Canada, but it is unknown whether they are effective. Our objective was to evaluate the impact of an incentive program on timely physician follow-up after hospital discharge. We conducted an interventional time series analysis of all medical and surgical patients who were discharged home from hospital between Apr. 1, 2002, and Jan. 30, 2015, in Ontario, Canada. The intervention was a supplemental billing code for physician follow-up within 14 days of discharge from hospital, introduced in 2006. The primary outcome was an outpatient visit within 14 days of discharge. Secondary outcomes were 7-day follow-up and a composite of emergency department visits, nonelective hospital readmission and death within 14 days. We included 8 008 934 patient discharge records. The incentive code was claimed in 31% of eligible visits by 51% of eligible physicians, and cost $17.5 million over the study period. There was no change in the average monthly rate of outcomes in the year before the incentive was introduced compared with the year following introduction: 14-day follow-up (66.5% v. 67.0%, overall = 0.5), 7-day follow-up (44.9% v. 44.9%, overall = 0.5) and composite outcome (16.7% v. 16.9%, overall = 0.2). Despite uptake by physicians, a financial incentive did not alter follow-up after hospital discharge. This lack of effect may be explained by features of the incentive or by extra-physician barriers to follow-up. These barriers should be considered by policymakers before introducing similar initiatives.</description><subject>Adolescent</subject><subject>Adult</subject><subject>Aged</subject><subject>Algorithms</subject><subject>Analysis</subject><subject>Child</subject><subject>Child, Preschool</subject><subject>Codes</subject><subject>Communication</subject><subject>Continuity of care</subject><subject>Continuity of Patient Care</subject><subject>Economic incentives</subject><subject>Female</subject><subject>Health care policy</subject><subject>Hospital admission and discharge</subject><subject>Hospitalization</subject><subject>Hospitals</subject><subject>Humans</subject><subject>Incentives</subject><subject>Infant</subject><subject>Infant, Newborn</subject><subject>Interrupted Time Series Analysis</subject><subject>Long term health care</subject><subject>Male</subject><subject>Medicare</subject><subject>Middle Aged</subject><subject>Monetary incentives</subject><subject>Ontario</subject><subject>Outcome Assessment (Health Care)</subject><subject>Patient Discharge</subject><subject>Patient Readmission</subject><subject>Patients</subject><subject>Physician Incentive Plans</subject><subject>Physicians</subject><subject>Population</subject><subject>Practice Patterns, Physicians</subject><subject>Primary care</subject><subject>Retrospective Studies</subject><subject>Statistical analysis</subject><subject>Statistics</subject><subject>Time series</subject><subject>Young Adult</subject><issn>0820-3946</issn><issn>1488-2329</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2017</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>EIF</sourceid><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNqVk01v1DAQhiMEokvhxB1ZVEIglMVfcRIOSFVVoFIFEh9ny-vYG68cO7WTwv4G_jROt5QN2gv2YSzPM689Hk-WPUVwiQpI3shObJaohLDG97IFolWVY4Lr-9kCVhjmpKbsKHsU4wamQXD5MDvCVV1CzOAi-3WutZKDuVZOxQi8BgJo44STRlhgnFRucoLBg77dRpO2XQTaBzCYTtltWlrrf-RjD4QeVACtj70ZUmxjomxFWKu3SbL3_WjFYLzLVyKq5iYaRBWMikA4YZN0fJw90MJG9eTWHmff359_O_uYX37-cHF2eplLRuGQFwUluFoRKEpSFCUSEDGiK4aRpkRqUjUMUaTLohGVRIgQvWKU0WQZoZRV5Dh7t9Ptx1WnminFICzvg-lE2HIvDJ97nGn52l_zguEKEpoEXt4KBH81qjjwLiWrrBVO-TFylJ6cYlyXZUJP_kE3fgwp4RuqhKhiNf5LrYVV3Djt07lyEuWnBSzrVGY83Ts_QK1T5dIlvVPapO0Z__wAL3tzxfeh5QEozUZ1Rh5UfTULSMygfg5rMcbIL75--Q_205x9sce2Stihjd6O06eJc_D1DpTBxxiUvqscgnzqCD51BN91RKKf7Rf7jv3TAuQ3ZnAC0w</recordid><startdate>20171002</startdate><enddate>20171002</enddate><creator>Lapointe-Shaw, Lauren</creator><creator>Mamdani, Muhammad</creator><creator>Luo, Jin</creator><creator>Austin, Peter C</creator><creator>Ivers, Noah M</creator><creator>Redelmeier, Donald A</creator><creator>Bell, Chaim M</creator><general>Joule Inc</general><general>CMA Impact, Inc</general><scope>CGR</scope><scope>CUY</scope><scope>CVF</scope><scope>ECM</scope><scope>EIF</scope><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>ISN</scope><scope>ISR</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>4T-</scope><scope>4U-</scope><scope>7RV</scope><scope>7X7</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>88E</scope><scope>88G</scope><scope>88I</scope><scope>8AF</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FQ</scope><scope>8FV</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AN0</scope><scope>ASE</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FPQ</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>HCIFZ</scope><scope>K6X</scope><scope>K9.</scope><scope>KB0</scope><scope>M0S</scope><scope>M0T</scope><scope>M1P</scope><scope>M2M</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>M2P</scope><scope>M3G</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>NAPCQ</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>PSYQQ</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><scope>7X8</scope><scope>5PM</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20171002</creationdate><title>Effectiveness of a financial incentive to physicians for timely follow-up after hospital discharge: a population-based time series analysis</title><author>Lapointe-Shaw, Lauren ; Mamdani, Muhammad ; Luo, Jin ; Austin, Peter C ; Ivers, Noah M ; Redelmeier, Donald A ; Bell, Chaim M</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c640t-554328b30a735571a0163f8621f43cf38d6141f75da8c1133fb646433f6344683</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2017</creationdate><topic>Adolescent</topic><topic>Adult</topic><topic>Aged</topic><topic>Algorithms</topic><topic>Analysis</topic><topic>Child</topic><topic>Child, Preschool</topic><topic>Codes</topic><topic>Communication</topic><topic>Continuity of care</topic><topic>Continuity of Patient Care</topic><topic>Economic incentives</topic><topic>Female</topic><topic>Health care policy</topic><topic>Hospital admission and discharge</topic><topic>Hospitalization</topic><topic>Hospitals</topic><topic>Humans</topic><topic>Incentives</topic><topic>Infant</topic><topic>Infant, Newborn</topic><topic>Interrupted Time Series Analysis</topic><topic>Long term health care</topic><topic>Male</topic><topic>Medicare</topic><topic>Middle Aged</topic><topic>Monetary incentives</topic><topic>Ontario</topic><topic>Outcome Assessment (Health Care)</topic><topic>Patient Discharge</topic><topic>Patient Readmission</topic><topic>Patients</topic><topic>Physician Incentive Plans</topic><topic>Physicians</topic><topic>Population</topic><topic>Practice Patterns, Physicians</topic><topic>Primary care</topic><topic>Retrospective Studies</topic><topic>Statistical analysis</topic><topic>Statistics</topic><topic>Time series</topic><topic>Young Adult</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Lapointe-Shaw, Lauren</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Mamdani, Muhammad</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Luo, Jin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Austin, Peter C</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ivers, Noah M</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Redelmeier, Donald A</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Bell, Chaim M</creatorcontrib><collection>Medline</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE (Ovid)</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Gale In Context: Canada</collection><collection>Gale In Context: Science</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>Docstoc</collection><collection>University Readers</collection><collection>Nursing &amp; Allied Health Database</collection><collection>Health &amp; Medical Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Medical Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Psychology Database (Alumni)</collection><collection>Science Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>STEM Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Canadian Business &amp; Current Affairs Database</collection><collection>Canadian Business &amp; Current Affairs Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>British Nursing Database</collection><collection>British Nursing Index</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>British Nursing Index (BNI) (1985 to Present)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>SciTech Premium Collection</collection><collection>British Nursing Index</collection><collection>ProQuest Health &amp; Medical Complete (Alumni)</collection><collection>Nursing &amp; Allied Health Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Health &amp; Medical Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database</collection><collection>Medical Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Psychology</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Science Database</collection><collection>CBCA Reference &amp; Current Events</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>Nursing &amp; Allied Health Premium</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>ProQuest One Psychology</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><collection>PubMed Central (Full Participant titles)</collection><jtitle>Canadian Medical Association journal (CMAJ)</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Lapointe-Shaw, Lauren</au><au>Mamdani, Muhammad</au><au>Luo, Jin</au><au>Austin, Peter C</au><au>Ivers, Noah M</au><au>Redelmeier, Donald A</au><au>Bell, Chaim M</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Effectiveness of a financial incentive to physicians for timely follow-up after hospital discharge: a population-based time series analysis</atitle><jtitle>Canadian Medical Association journal (CMAJ)</jtitle><addtitle>CMAJ</addtitle><date>2017-10-02</date><risdate>2017</risdate><volume>189</volume><issue>39</issue><spage>E1224</spage><epage>E1229</epage><pages>E1224-E1229</pages><issn>0820-3946</issn><eissn>1488-2329</eissn><abstract>Timely follow-up after hospital discharge may decrease readmission to hospital. Financial incentives to improve follow-up have been introduced in the United States and Canada, but it is unknown whether they are effective. Our objective was to evaluate the impact of an incentive program on timely physician follow-up after hospital discharge. We conducted an interventional time series analysis of all medical and surgical patients who were discharged home from hospital between Apr. 1, 2002, and Jan. 30, 2015, in Ontario, Canada. The intervention was a supplemental billing code for physician follow-up within 14 days of discharge from hospital, introduced in 2006. The primary outcome was an outpatient visit within 14 days of discharge. Secondary outcomes were 7-day follow-up and a composite of emergency department visits, nonelective hospital readmission and death within 14 days. We included 8 008 934 patient discharge records. The incentive code was claimed in 31% of eligible visits by 51% of eligible physicians, and cost $17.5 million over the study period. There was no change in the average monthly rate of outcomes in the year before the incentive was introduced compared with the year following introduction: 14-day follow-up (66.5% v. 67.0%, overall = 0.5), 7-day follow-up (44.9% v. 44.9%, overall = 0.5) and composite outcome (16.7% v. 16.9%, overall = 0.2). Despite uptake by physicians, a financial incentive did not alter follow-up after hospital discharge. This lack of effect may be explained by features of the incentive or by extra-physician barriers to follow-up. These barriers should be considered by policymakers before introducing similar initiatives.</abstract><cop>Canada</cop><pub>Joule Inc</pub><pmid>28970260</pmid><doi>10.1503/cmaj.170092</doi><tpages>6</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0820-3946
ispartof Canadian Medical Association journal (CMAJ), 2017-10, Vol.189 (39), p.E1224-E1229
issn 0820-3946
1488-2329
language eng
recordid cdi_pubmedcentral_primary_oai_pubmedcentral_nih_gov_5628034
source MEDLINE; DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals; PubMed Central; Alma/SFX Local Collection; Journals@Ovid Complete
subjects Adolescent
Adult
Aged
Algorithms
Analysis
Child
Child, Preschool
Codes
Communication
Continuity of care
Continuity of Patient Care
Economic incentives
Female
Health care policy
Hospital admission and discharge
Hospitalization
Hospitals
Humans
Incentives
Infant
Infant, Newborn
Interrupted Time Series Analysis
Long term health care
Male
Medicare
Middle Aged
Monetary incentives
Ontario
Outcome Assessment (Health Care)
Patient Discharge
Patient Readmission
Patients
Physician Incentive Plans
Physicians
Population
Practice Patterns, Physicians
Primary care
Retrospective Studies
Statistical analysis
Statistics
Time series
Young Adult
title Effectiveness of a financial incentive to physicians for timely follow-up after hospital discharge: a population-based time series analysis
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-08T14%3A56%3A19IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-gale_pubme&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Effectiveness%20of%20a%20financial%20incentive%20to%20physicians%20for%20timely%20follow-up%20after%20hospital%20discharge:%20a%20population-based%20time%20series%20analysis&rft.jtitle=Canadian%20Medical%20Association%20journal%20(CMAJ)&rft.au=Lapointe-Shaw,%20Lauren&rft.date=2017-10-02&rft.volume=189&rft.issue=39&rft.spage=E1224&rft.epage=E1229&rft.pages=E1224-E1229&rft.issn=0820-3946&rft.eissn=1488-2329&rft_id=info:doi/10.1503/cmaj.170092&rft_dat=%3Cgale_pubme%3EA507950328%3C/gale_pubme%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1947018692&rft_id=info:pmid/28970260&rft_galeid=A507950328&rfr_iscdi=true