Effectiveness of a financial incentive to physicians for timely follow-up after hospital discharge: a population-based time series analysis
Timely follow-up after hospital discharge may decrease readmission to hospital. Financial incentives to improve follow-up have been introduced in the United States and Canada, but it is unknown whether they are effective. Our objective was to evaluate the impact of an incentive program on timely phy...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Canadian Medical Association journal (CMAJ) 2017-10, Vol.189 (39), p.E1224-E1229 |
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creator | Lapointe-Shaw, Lauren Mamdani, Muhammad Luo, Jin Austin, Peter C Ivers, Noah M Redelmeier, Donald A Bell, Chaim M |
description | Timely follow-up after hospital discharge may decrease readmission to hospital. Financial incentives to improve follow-up have been introduced in the United States and Canada, but it is unknown whether they are effective. Our objective was to evaluate the impact of an incentive program on timely physician follow-up after hospital discharge.
We conducted an interventional time series analysis of all medical and surgical patients who were discharged home from hospital between Apr. 1, 2002, and Jan. 30, 2015, in Ontario, Canada. The intervention was a supplemental billing code for physician follow-up within 14 days of discharge from hospital, introduced in 2006. The primary outcome was an outpatient visit within 14 days of discharge. Secondary outcomes were 7-day follow-up and a composite of emergency department visits, nonelective hospital readmission and death within 14 days.
We included 8 008 934 patient discharge records. The incentive code was claimed in 31% of eligible visits by 51% of eligible physicians, and cost $17.5 million over the study period. There was no change in the average monthly rate of outcomes in the year before the incentive was introduced compared with the year following introduction: 14-day follow-up (66.5% v. 67.0%, overall
= 0.5), 7-day follow-up (44.9% v. 44.9%, overall
= 0.5) and composite outcome (16.7% v. 16.9%, overall
= 0.2).
Despite uptake by physicians, a financial incentive did not alter follow-up after hospital discharge. This lack of effect may be explained by features of the incentive or by extra-physician barriers to follow-up. These barriers should be considered by policymakers before introducing similar initiatives. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1503/cmaj.170092 |
format | Article |
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We conducted an interventional time series analysis of all medical and surgical patients who were discharged home from hospital between Apr. 1, 2002, and Jan. 30, 2015, in Ontario, Canada. The intervention was a supplemental billing code for physician follow-up within 14 days of discharge from hospital, introduced in 2006. The primary outcome was an outpatient visit within 14 days of discharge. Secondary outcomes were 7-day follow-up and a composite of emergency department visits, nonelective hospital readmission and death within 14 days.
We included 8 008 934 patient discharge records. The incentive code was claimed in 31% of eligible visits by 51% of eligible physicians, and cost $17.5 million over the study period. There was no change in the average monthly rate of outcomes in the year before the incentive was introduced compared with the year following introduction: 14-day follow-up (66.5% v. 67.0%, overall
= 0.5), 7-day follow-up (44.9% v. 44.9%, overall
= 0.5) and composite outcome (16.7% v. 16.9%, overall
= 0.2).
Despite uptake by physicians, a financial incentive did not alter follow-up after hospital discharge. This lack of effect may be explained by features of the incentive or by extra-physician barriers to follow-up. These barriers should be considered by policymakers before introducing similar initiatives.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0820-3946</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1488-2329</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1503/cmaj.170092</identifier><identifier>PMID: 28970260</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Canada: Joule Inc</publisher><subject>Adolescent ; Adult ; Aged ; Algorithms ; Analysis ; Child ; Child, Preschool ; Codes ; Communication ; Continuity of care ; Continuity of Patient Care ; Economic incentives ; Female ; Health care policy ; Hospital admission and discharge ; Hospitalization ; Hospitals ; Humans ; Incentives ; Infant ; Infant, Newborn ; Interrupted Time Series Analysis ; Long term health care ; Male ; Medicare ; Middle Aged ; Monetary incentives ; Ontario ; Outcome Assessment (Health Care) ; Patient Discharge ; Patient Readmission ; Patients ; Physician Incentive Plans ; Physicians ; Population ; Practice Patterns, Physicians ; Primary care ; Retrospective Studies ; Statistical analysis ; Statistics ; Time series ; Young Adult</subject><ispartof>Canadian Medical Association journal (CMAJ), 2017-10, Vol.189 (39), p.E1224-E1229</ispartof><rights>2017 Canadian Medical Association or its licensors.</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2017 Joule Inc.</rights><rights>Copyright Joule Inc Oct 2, 2017</rights><rights>2017 Joule Inc. or its licensors 2017</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c640t-554328b30a735571a0163f8621f43cf38d6141f75da8c1133fb646433f6344683</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5628034/pdf/$$EPDF$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5628034/$$EHTML$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>230,314,723,776,780,860,881,27901,27902,53766,53768</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28970260$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Lapointe-Shaw, Lauren</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Mamdani, Muhammad</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Luo, Jin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Austin, Peter C</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ivers, Noah M</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Redelmeier, Donald A</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Bell, Chaim M</creatorcontrib><title>Effectiveness of a financial incentive to physicians for timely follow-up after hospital discharge: a population-based time series analysis</title><title>Canadian Medical Association journal (CMAJ)</title><addtitle>CMAJ</addtitle><description>Timely follow-up after hospital discharge may decrease readmission to hospital. Financial incentives to improve follow-up have been introduced in the United States and Canada, but it is unknown whether they are effective. Our objective was to evaluate the impact of an incentive program on timely physician follow-up after hospital discharge.
We conducted an interventional time series analysis of all medical and surgical patients who were discharged home from hospital between Apr. 1, 2002, and Jan. 30, 2015, in Ontario, Canada. The intervention was a supplemental billing code for physician follow-up within 14 days of discharge from hospital, introduced in 2006. The primary outcome was an outpatient visit within 14 days of discharge. Secondary outcomes were 7-day follow-up and a composite of emergency department visits, nonelective hospital readmission and death within 14 days.
We included 8 008 934 patient discharge records. The incentive code was claimed in 31% of eligible visits by 51% of eligible physicians, and cost $17.5 million over the study period. There was no change in the average monthly rate of outcomes in the year before the incentive was introduced compared with the year following introduction: 14-day follow-up (66.5% v. 67.0%, overall
= 0.5), 7-day follow-up (44.9% v. 44.9%, overall
= 0.5) and composite outcome (16.7% v. 16.9%, overall
= 0.2).
Despite uptake by physicians, a financial incentive did not alter follow-up after hospital discharge. This lack of effect may be explained by features of the incentive or by extra-physician barriers to follow-up. These barriers should be considered by policymakers before introducing similar initiatives.</description><subject>Adolescent</subject><subject>Adult</subject><subject>Aged</subject><subject>Algorithms</subject><subject>Analysis</subject><subject>Child</subject><subject>Child, Preschool</subject><subject>Codes</subject><subject>Communication</subject><subject>Continuity of care</subject><subject>Continuity of Patient Care</subject><subject>Economic incentives</subject><subject>Female</subject><subject>Health care policy</subject><subject>Hospital admission and discharge</subject><subject>Hospitalization</subject><subject>Hospitals</subject><subject>Humans</subject><subject>Incentives</subject><subject>Infant</subject><subject>Infant, Newborn</subject><subject>Interrupted Time Series Analysis</subject><subject>Long term health care</subject><subject>Male</subject><subject>Medicare</subject><subject>Middle Aged</subject><subject>Monetary incentives</subject><subject>Ontario</subject><subject>Outcome Assessment (Health Care)</subject><subject>Patient Discharge</subject><subject>Patient Readmission</subject><subject>Patients</subject><subject>Physician Incentive Plans</subject><subject>Physicians</subject><subject>Population</subject><subject>Practice Patterns, Physicians</subject><subject>Primary care</subject><subject>Retrospective Studies</subject><subject>Statistical analysis</subject><subject>Statistics</subject><subject>Time series</subject><subject>Young 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Association journal (CMAJ)</jtitle><addtitle>CMAJ</addtitle><date>2017-10-02</date><risdate>2017</risdate><volume>189</volume><issue>39</issue><spage>E1224</spage><epage>E1229</epage><pages>E1224-E1229</pages><issn>0820-3946</issn><eissn>1488-2329</eissn><abstract>Timely follow-up after hospital discharge may decrease readmission to hospital. Financial incentives to improve follow-up have been introduced in the United States and Canada, but it is unknown whether they are effective. Our objective was to evaluate the impact of an incentive program on timely physician follow-up after hospital discharge.
We conducted an interventional time series analysis of all medical and surgical patients who were discharged home from hospital between Apr. 1, 2002, and Jan. 30, 2015, in Ontario, Canada. The intervention was a supplemental billing code for physician follow-up within 14 days of discharge from hospital, introduced in 2006. The primary outcome was an outpatient visit within 14 days of discharge. Secondary outcomes were 7-day follow-up and a composite of emergency department visits, nonelective hospital readmission and death within 14 days.
We included 8 008 934 patient discharge records. The incentive code was claimed in 31% of eligible visits by 51% of eligible physicians, and cost $17.5 million over the study period. There was no change in the average monthly rate of outcomes in the year before the incentive was introduced compared with the year following introduction: 14-day follow-up (66.5% v. 67.0%, overall
= 0.5), 7-day follow-up (44.9% v. 44.9%, overall
= 0.5) and composite outcome (16.7% v. 16.9%, overall
= 0.2).
Despite uptake by physicians, a financial incentive did not alter follow-up after hospital discharge. This lack of effect may be explained by features of the incentive or by extra-physician barriers to follow-up. These barriers should be considered by policymakers before introducing similar initiatives.</abstract><cop>Canada</cop><pub>Joule Inc</pub><pmid>28970260</pmid><doi>10.1503/cmaj.170092</doi><tpages>6</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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subjects | Adolescent Adult Aged Algorithms Analysis Child Child, Preschool Codes Communication Continuity of care Continuity of Patient Care Economic incentives Female Health care policy Hospital admission and discharge Hospitalization Hospitals Humans Incentives Infant Infant, Newborn Interrupted Time Series Analysis Long term health care Male Medicare Middle Aged Monetary incentives Ontario Outcome Assessment (Health Care) Patient Discharge Patient Readmission Patients Physician Incentive Plans Physicians Population Practice Patterns, Physicians Primary care Retrospective Studies Statistical analysis Statistics Time series Young Adult |
title | Effectiveness of a financial incentive to physicians for timely follow-up after hospital discharge: a population-based time series analysis |
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