What Meaning Means for Same and Different: Analogical Reasoning in Humans (Homo sapiens), Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta)
Thus far, language- and token-trained apes (e.g., D. Premack, 1976 ; R. K. R. Thompson, D. L. Oden, & S. T. Boysen, 1997 ) have provided the best evidence that nonhuman animals can solve, complete, and construct analogies, thus implicating symbolic representation as the mechanism enabling the ph...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of comparative psychology (1983) 2008-05, Vol.122 (2), p.176-185 |
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| container_title | Journal of comparative psychology (1983) |
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| creator | Flemming, Timothy M Beran, Michael J Thompson, Roger K. R Kleider, Heather M Washburn, David A |
| description | Thus far, language- and token-trained apes (e.g.,
D. Premack, 1976
;
R. K. R. Thompson, D. L. Oden, & S. T. Boysen, 1997
) have provided the best evidence that nonhuman animals can solve, complete, and construct analogies, thus implicating symbolic representation as the mechanism enabling the phenomenon. In this study, the authors examined the role of stimulus meaning in the analogical reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Humans (
Homo sapiens
), chimpanzees (
Pan troglodytes
), and rhesus monkeys (
Macaca mulatta
) completed the same relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks with both meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. This discrimination of relations-between-relations serves as the basis for analogical reasoning. Meaningfulness facilitated the acquisition of analogical matching for human participants, whereas individual differences among the chimpanzees suggest that meaning can either enable or hinder their ability to complete analogies. Rhesus monkeys did not succeed in the RMTS task regardless of stimulus meaning, suggesting that their ability to reason analogically, if present at all, may be dependent on a dimension other than the representational value of stimuli. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1037/0735-7036.122.2.176 |
| format | Article |
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D. Premack, 1976
;
R. K. R. Thompson, D. L. Oden, & S. T. Boysen, 1997
) have provided the best evidence that nonhuman animals can solve, complete, and construct analogies, thus implicating symbolic representation as the mechanism enabling the phenomenon. In this study, the authors examined the role of stimulus meaning in the analogical reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Humans (
Homo sapiens
), chimpanzees (
Pan troglodytes
), and rhesus monkeys (
Macaca mulatta
) completed the same relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks with both meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. This discrimination of relations-between-relations serves as the basis for analogical reasoning. Meaningfulness facilitated the acquisition of analogical matching for human participants, whereas individual differences among the chimpanzees suggest that meaning can either enable or hinder their ability to complete analogies. Rhesus monkeys did not succeed in the RMTS task regardless of stimulus meaning, suggesting that their ability to reason analogically, if present at all, may be dependent on a dimension other than the representational value of stimuli.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0735-7036</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1939-2087</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1037/0735-7036.122.2.176</identifier><identifier>PMID: 18489233</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>United States: American Psychological Association</publisher><subject>Adult ; Analogy ; Animal behavior ; Animal cognition ; Animals ; Aptitude ; Chimpanzees ; Comparative studies ; Discrimination Learning ; Female ; Human ; Human subjects ; Humans ; Individual Differences ; Macaca mulatta - psychology ; Male ; Matching to Sample ; Monkeys ; Monkeys & apes ; Pan troglodytes - psychology ; Pattern Recognition, Visual ; Problem Solving ; Reasoning ; Species Differences ; Species Specificity ; Symbolism</subject><ispartof>Journal of comparative psychology (1983), 2008-05, Vol.122 (2), p.176-185</ispartof><rights>2008 American Psychological Association</rights><rights>PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved.</rights><rights>Copyright American Psychological Association May 2008</rights><rights>2008, American Psychological Association</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-a487t-7fb732c4779959ec643a8621448bb4f2edef6098b80c946246464ab7e36301c73</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>230,314,780,784,885,27923,27924</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18489233$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Flemming, Timothy M</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Beran, Michael J</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Thompson, Roger K. R</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kleider, Heather M</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Washburn, David A</creatorcontrib><title>What Meaning Means for Same and Different: Analogical Reasoning in Humans (Homo sapiens), Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta)</title><title>Journal of comparative psychology (1983)</title><addtitle>J Comp Psychol</addtitle><description>Thus far, language- and token-trained apes (e.g.,
D. Premack, 1976
;
R. K. R. Thompson, D. L. Oden, & S. T. Boysen, 1997
) have provided the best evidence that nonhuman animals can solve, complete, and construct analogies, thus implicating symbolic representation as the mechanism enabling the phenomenon. In this study, the authors examined the role of stimulus meaning in the analogical reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Humans (
Homo sapiens
), chimpanzees (
Pan troglodytes
), and rhesus monkeys (
Macaca mulatta
) completed the same relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks with both meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. This discrimination of relations-between-relations serves as the basis for analogical reasoning. Meaningfulness facilitated the acquisition of analogical matching for human participants, whereas individual differences among the chimpanzees suggest that meaning can either enable or hinder their ability to complete analogies. Rhesus monkeys did not succeed in the RMTS task regardless of stimulus meaning, suggesting that their ability to reason analogically, if present at all, may be dependent on a dimension other than the representational value of stimuli.</description><subject>Adult</subject><subject>Analogy</subject><subject>Animal behavior</subject><subject>Animal cognition</subject><subject>Animals</subject><subject>Aptitude</subject><subject>Chimpanzees</subject><subject>Comparative studies</subject><subject>Discrimination Learning</subject><subject>Female</subject><subject>Human</subject><subject>Human subjects</subject><subject>Humans</subject><subject>Individual Differences</subject><subject>Macaca mulatta - psychology</subject><subject>Male</subject><subject>Matching to Sample</subject><subject>Monkeys</subject><subject>Monkeys & apes</subject><subject>Pan troglodytes - psychology</subject><subject>Pattern Recognition, Visual</subject><subject>Problem Solving</subject><subject>Reasoning</subject><subject>Species Differences</subject><subject>Species Specificity</subject><subject>Symbolism</subject><issn>0735-7036</issn><issn>1939-2087</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2008</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>EIF</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kV1LwzAUhoMobk5_gSBFUPCiNV9NmhtB5idMvFDxMqRZunX0y6QV9u9N3ZjTC0kgF3nOe87hAeAYwQhBwi8hJ3HIIWERwjjCEeJsBwyRICLEMOG7YLghBuDAuQWEkCHK98EAJTQRmJAhuHifqzZ4MqrKq9n364KstsGLKk2gqmlwk2eZsaZqD8FepgpnjtbvCLzd3b6OH8LJ8_3j-HoSKprwNuRZygnWlHMhYmE0o0QlDCNKkzSlGTZTkzEokjSBWlCGKfNHpdwQRiDSnIzA1Sq36dLSTLVvbVUhG5uXyi5lrXL5-6fK53JWf0qKoe_DfMD5OsDWH51xrSxzp01RqMrUnZMcckZYHHvw9A-4qDtb-eUk6-ft738Q9hpE7Bf1EFlB2tbOWZNtxkVQ9rJkr0L2KqSXJbH0snzVyfamPzVrOx44WwGqUbJxS61sm-vCOKnrcivoC6PUmRY</recordid><startdate>20080501</startdate><enddate>20080501</enddate><creator>Flemming, Timothy M</creator><creator>Beran, Michael J</creator><creator>Thompson, Roger K. R</creator><creator>Kleider, Heather M</creator><creator>Washburn, David A</creator><general>American Psychological Association</general><scope>CGR</scope><scope>CUY</scope><scope>CVF</scope><scope>ECM</scope><scope>EIF</scope><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7RZ</scope><scope>PSYQQ</scope><scope>7X8</scope><scope>5PM</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20080501</creationdate><title>What Meaning Means for Same and Different</title><author>Flemming, Timothy M ; Beran, Michael J ; Thompson, Roger K. R ; Kleider, Heather M ; Washburn, David A</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-a487t-7fb732c4779959ec643a8621448bb4f2edef6098b80c946246464ab7e36301c73</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2008</creationdate><topic>Adult</topic><topic>Analogy</topic><topic>Animal behavior</topic><topic>Animal cognition</topic><topic>Animals</topic><topic>Aptitude</topic><topic>Chimpanzees</topic><topic>Comparative studies</topic><topic>Discrimination Learning</topic><topic>Female</topic><topic>Human</topic><topic>Human subjects</topic><topic>Humans</topic><topic>Individual Differences</topic><topic>Macaca mulatta - psychology</topic><topic>Male</topic><topic>Matching to Sample</topic><topic>Monkeys</topic><topic>Monkeys & apes</topic><topic>Pan troglodytes - psychology</topic><topic>Pattern Recognition, Visual</topic><topic>Problem Solving</topic><topic>Reasoning</topic><topic>Species Differences</topic><topic>Species Specificity</topic><topic>Symbolism</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Flemming, Timothy M</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Beran, Michael J</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Thompson, Roger K. R</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kleider, Heather M</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Washburn, David A</creatorcontrib><collection>Medline</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE (Ovid)</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>APA PsycArticles®</collection><collection>ProQuest One Psychology</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><collection>PubMed Central (Full Participant titles)</collection><jtitle>Journal of comparative psychology (1983)</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Flemming, Timothy M</au><au>Beran, Michael J</au><au>Thompson, Roger K. R</au><au>Kleider, Heather M</au><au>Washburn, David A</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>What Meaning Means for Same and Different: Analogical Reasoning in Humans (Homo sapiens), Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta)</atitle><jtitle>Journal of comparative psychology (1983)</jtitle><addtitle>J Comp Psychol</addtitle><date>2008-05-01</date><risdate>2008</risdate><volume>122</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>176</spage><epage>185</epage><pages>176-185</pages><issn>0735-7036</issn><eissn>1939-2087</eissn><abstract>Thus far, language- and token-trained apes (e.g.,
D. Premack, 1976
;
R. K. R. Thompson, D. L. Oden, & S. T. Boysen, 1997
) have provided the best evidence that nonhuman animals can solve, complete, and construct analogies, thus implicating symbolic representation as the mechanism enabling the phenomenon. In this study, the authors examined the role of stimulus meaning in the analogical reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Humans (
Homo sapiens
), chimpanzees (
Pan troglodytes
), and rhesus monkeys (
Macaca mulatta
) completed the same relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks with both meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. This discrimination of relations-between-relations serves as the basis for analogical reasoning. Meaningfulness facilitated the acquisition of analogical matching for human participants, whereas individual differences among the chimpanzees suggest that meaning can either enable or hinder their ability to complete analogies. Rhesus monkeys did not succeed in the RMTS task regardless of stimulus meaning, suggesting that their ability to reason analogically, if present at all, may be dependent on a dimension other than the representational value of stimuli.</abstract><cop>United States</cop><pub>American Psychological Association</pub><pmid>18489233</pmid><doi>10.1037/0735-7036.122.2.176</doi><tpages>10</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | Journal of comparative psychology (1983), 2008-05, Vol.122 (2), p.176-185 |
| issn | 0735-7036 1939-2087 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_pubmedcentral_primary_oai_pubmedcentral_nih_gov_4206216 |
| source | MEDLINE; EBSCOhost APA PsycARTICLES |
| subjects | Adult Analogy Animal behavior Animal cognition Animals Aptitude Chimpanzees Comparative studies Discrimination Learning Female Human Human subjects Humans Individual Differences Macaca mulatta - psychology Male Matching to Sample Monkeys Monkeys & apes Pan troglodytes - psychology Pattern Recognition, Visual Problem Solving Reasoning Species Differences Species Specificity Symbolism |
| title | What Meaning Means for Same and Different: Analogical Reasoning in Humans (Homo sapiens), Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta) |
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