Biased imitation in coupled evolutionary games in interdependent networks
We explore the evolutionary dynamics of two games—the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game—played within distinct networks (layers) of interdependent networks. In these networks imitation and interaction between individuals of opposite layers is established through interlinks. We explore a...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Scientific reports 2014-03, Vol.4 (1), p.4436-4436, Article 4436 |
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| creator | Santos, M. D. Dorogovtsev, S. N. Mendes, J. F. F. |
| description | We explore the evolutionary dynamics of two games—the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game—played within distinct networks (layers) of interdependent networks. In these networks imitation and interaction between individuals of opposite layers is established through interlinks. We explore an update rule in which revision of strategies is a
biased imitation process
: individuals imitate neighbors from the same layer with probability
p
and neighbors from the second layer with complementary probability 1 −
p
. We demonstrate that a small decrease of
p
from
p
= 1 (which corresponds to forbidding strategy transfer between layers) is sufficient to promote cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma subpopulation. This, on the other hand, is detrimental for cooperation in the Snowdrift Game subpopulation. We provide results of extensive computer simulations for the case in which layers are modelled as regular random networks and support this study with analytical results for coupled well-mixed populations. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1038/srep04436 |
| format | Article |
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biased imitation process
: individuals imitate neighbors from the same layer with probability
p
and neighbors from the second layer with complementary probability 1 −
p
. We demonstrate that a small decrease of
p
from
p
= 1 (which corresponds to forbidding strategy transfer between layers) is sufficient to promote cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma subpopulation. This, on the other hand, is detrimental for cooperation in the Snowdrift Game subpopulation. We provide results of extensive computer simulations for the case in which layers are modelled as regular random networks and support this study with analytical results for coupled well-mixed populations.</description><identifier>ISSN: 2045-2322</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 2045-2322</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1038/srep04436</identifier><identifier>PMID: 24658580</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>London: Nature Publishing Group UK</publisher><subject>639/766/530/2801 ; 639/766/530/2804 ; Computer Simulation ; Cooperative Behavior ; Game Theory ; Humanities and Social Sciences ; Humans ; Imitative Behavior ; Interpersonal Relations ; Models, Psychological ; Models, Statistical ; multidisciplinary ; Probability ; Science</subject><ispartof>Scientific reports, 2014-03, Vol.4 (1), p.4436-4436, Article 4436</ispartof><rights>The Author(s) 2014</rights><rights>Copyright © 2014, Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved 2014 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c516t-35d43212113f9d5af0c69c31c52bace033fe113e31cbe3e2bf933274c0cf5f6b3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c516t-35d43212113f9d5af0c69c31c52bace033fe113e31cbe3e2bf933274c0cf5f6b3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3963071/pdf/$$EPDF$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$Hfree_for_read</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3963071/$$EHTML$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$Hfree_for_read</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>230,314,723,776,780,860,881,27901,27902,41096,42165,51551,53766,53768</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24658580$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Santos, M. D.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Dorogovtsev, S. N.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Mendes, J. F. F.</creatorcontrib><title>Biased imitation in coupled evolutionary games in interdependent networks</title><title>Scientific reports</title><addtitle>Sci Rep</addtitle><addtitle>Sci Rep</addtitle><description>We explore the evolutionary dynamics of two games—the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game—played within distinct networks (layers) of interdependent networks. In these networks imitation and interaction between individuals of opposite layers is established through interlinks. We explore an update rule in which revision of strategies is a
biased imitation process
: individuals imitate neighbors from the same layer with probability
p
and neighbors from the second layer with complementary probability 1 −
p
. We demonstrate that a small decrease of
p
from
p
= 1 (which corresponds to forbidding strategy transfer between layers) is sufficient to promote cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma subpopulation. This, on the other hand, is detrimental for cooperation in the Snowdrift Game subpopulation. We provide results of extensive computer simulations for the case in which layers are modelled as regular random networks and support this study with analytical results for coupled well-mixed populations.</description><subject>639/766/530/2801</subject><subject>639/766/530/2804</subject><subject>Computer Simulation</subject><subject>Cooperative Behavior</subject><subject>Game Theory</subject><subject>Humanities and Social Sciences</subject><subject>Humans</subject><subject>Imitative Behavior</subject><subject>Interpersonal Relations</subject><subject>Models, Psychological</subject><subject>Models, Statistical</subject><subject>multidisciplinary</subject><subject>Probability</subject><subject>Science</subject><issn>2045-2322</issn><issn>2045-2322</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2014</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>C6C</sourceid><sourceid>EIF</sourceid><recordid>eNptkF1LwzAYhYMobsxd-AeklypU89F0642gw4_BwBu9Dmn6Zma2SU3aif_ejM2hYG4Sznk4ORyETgm-IphNr4OHFmcZyw_QkOKMp5RRevjrPUDjEFY4Hk6LjBTHaECznE_5FA_R_M7IAFViGtPJzjibGJso17d1FGHt6n4jSv-VLGUDYeMa24GvoAVbge0SC92n8-_hBB1pWQcY7-4Ren24f5k9pYvnx_nsdpEqTvIuZbzKGCWUEKaLikuNVV4oRhSnpVSAGdMQPYhKCQxoqQvG6CRTWGmu85KN0M02t-3LBioVO3hZi9abJtYUThrx17HmTSzdWrAiZ3hCYsD5LsC7jx5CJxoTFNS1tOD6IAgnmBCS5UVEL7ao8i7EofX-G4LFZn2xXz-yZ7977cmfrSNwuQVCtOwSvFi53tu41T9p346bkGc</recordid><startdate>20140324</startdate><enddate>20140324</enddate><creator>Santos, M. D.</creator><creator>Dorogovtsev, S. N.</creator><creator>Mendes, J. F. F.</creator><general>Nature Publishing Group UK</general><general>Nature Publishing Group</general><scope>C6C</scope><scope>CGR</scope><scope>CUY</scope><scope>CVF</scope><scope>ECM</scope><scope>EIF</scope><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7X8</scope><scope>5PM</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20140324</creationdate><title>Biased imitation in coupled evolutionary games in interdependent networks</title><author>Santos, M. D. ; Dorogovtsev, S. N. ; Mendes, J. F. F.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c516t-35d43212113f9d5af0c69c31c52bace033fe113e31cbe3e2bf933274c0cf5f6b3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2014</creationdate><topic>639/766/530/2801</topic><topic>639/766/530/2804</topic><topic>Computer Simulation</topic><topic>Cooperative Behavior</topic><topic>Game Theory</topic><topic>Humanities and Social Sciences</topic><topic>Humans</topic><topic>Imitative Behavior</topic><topic>Interpersonal Relations</topic><topic>Models, Psychological</topic><topic>Models, Statistical</topic><topic>multidisciplinary</topic><topic>Probability</topic><topic>Science</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Santos, M. D.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Dorogovtsev, S. N.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Mendes, J. F. F.</creatorcontrib><collection>Springer Nature OA Free Journals</collection><collection>Medline</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE (Ovid)</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><collection>PubMed Central (Full Participant titles)</collection><jtitle>Scientific reports</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Santos, M. D.</au><au>Dorogovtsev, S. N.</au><au>Mendes, J. F. F.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Biased imitation in coupled evolutionary games in interdependent networks</atitle><jtitle>Scientific reports</jtitle><stitle>Sci Rep</stitle><addtitle>Sci Rep</addtitle><date>2014-03-24</date><risdate>2014</risdate><volume>4</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>4436</spage><epage>4436</epage><pages>4436-4436</pages><artnum>4436</artnum><issn>2045-2322</issn><eissn>2045-2322</eissn><abstract>We explore the evolutionary dynamics of two games—the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game—played within distinct networks (layers) of interdependent networks. In these networks imitation and interaction between individuals of opposite layers is established through interlinks. We explore an update rule in which revision of strategies is a
biased imitation process
: individuals imitate neighbors from the same layer with probability
p
and neighbors from the second layer with complementary probability 1 −
p
. We demonstrate that a small decrease of
p
from
p
= 1 (which corresponds to forbidding strategy transfer between layers) is sufficient to promote cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma subpopulation. This, on the other hand, is detrimental for cooperation in the Snowdrift Game subpopulation. We provide results of extensive computer simulations for the case in which layers are modelled as regular random networks and support this study with analytical results for coupled well-mixed populations.</abstract><cop>London</cop><pub>Nature Publishing Group UK</pub><pmid>24658580</pmid><doi>10.1038/srep04436</doi><tpages>1</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| subjects | 639/766/530/2801 639/766/530/2804 Computer Simulation Cooperative Behavior Game Theory Humanities and Social Sciences Humans Imitative Behavior Interpersonal Relations Models, Psychological Models, Statistical multidisciplinary Probability Science |
| title | Biased imitation in coupled evolutionary games in interdependent networks |
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