Long-term care of the disabled elderly: do children increase caregiving by spouses?
Do adult children affect the care elderly parents provide each other? We develop two models in which the anticipated behavior of adult children provides incentives for nondisabled elderly parents to increase care for their disabled spouses. The “demonstration effect” postulates that adult children l...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Review of economics of the household 2009-09, Vol.7 (3), p.323-339 |
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| container_title | Review of economics of the household |
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| creator | Pezzin, Liliana E. Pollak, Robert A. Schone, Barbara S. |
| description | Do adult children affect the care elderly parents provide each other? We develop two models in which the anticipated behavior of adult children provides incentives for nondisabled elderly parents to increase care for their disabled spouses. The “demonstration effect” postulates that adult children learn from a parent’s example that family caregiving is appropriate behavior. The “punishment effect” postulates that adult children may punish parents who fail to provide spousal care by not providing future care for the nondisabled spouse if and when necessary. Thus, joint children act as a commitment mechanism, increasing the probability that elderly parents will provide care for their disabled spouses. We argue that stepchildren provide weaker incentives for spousal care because the attachment of a stepchild to a stepparent is likely to be weaker than the attachment of children to parents in a traditional nuclear family. Using data from the HRS, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that joint children provide stronger incentives than stepchildren for nondisabled elderly parents to provide care for their disabled spouse. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11150-009-9057-6 |
| format | Article |
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We develop two models in which the anticipated behavior of adult children provides incentives for nondisabled elderly parents to increase care for their disabled spouses. The “demonstration effect” postulates that adult children learn from a parent’s example that family caregiving is appropriate behavior. The “punishment effect” postulates that adult children may punish parents who fail to provide spousal care by not providing future care for the nondisabled spouse if and when necessary. Thus, joint children act as a commitment mechanism, increasing the probability that elderly parents will provide care for their disabled spouses. We argue that stepchildren provide weaker incentives for spousal care because the attachment of a stepchild to a stepparent is likely to be weaker than the attachment of children to parents in a traditional nuclear family. Using data from the HRS, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that joint children provide stronger incentives than stepchildren for nondisabled elderly parents to provide care for their disabled spouse.</description><subject>Adult children</subject><subject>Altruism</subject><subject>Attachment</subject><subject>Caregivers</subject><subject>Couples</subject><subject>Disability</subject><subject>Economic analysis</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Economic statistics</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Economics and Finance</subject><subject>Families & family life</subject><subject>Health economics</subject><subject>Households</subject><subject>Husbands</subject><subject>Incentives</subject><subject>Labor Economics</subject><subject>Long term health care</subject><subject>Microeconomics</subject><subject>Norms</subject><subject>Parents & parenting</subject><subject>Population Economics</subject><subject>Social Sciences</subject><subject>Stepfamilies</subject><subject>Studies</subject><issn>1569-5239</issn><issn>1573-7152</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2009</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>BHHNA</sourceid><recordid>eNp1kU9vEzEQxS1ERUvhA3BBFicupmM7Xq85UKGKP5UicQDOlteebFxt7GBvKuXb45BSoBKnsTS_98ZPj5AXHN5wAH1ROecKGIBhBpRm3SNyxpWWTHMlHh_enWFKSHNKntZ6AyBUz-EJORWw0FIqfUa-LnMa2YxlQ70rSPOKzmukIVY3TBgoTgHLtH9LQ6Z-HadQMNGYfEFX8ZdkjLcxjXTY07rNu4r18hk5Wbmp4vO7eU6-f_zw7eozW375dH31fsm8MnpmwUMHyLV0onc8gPNucHIBw-BAc-i0cEoEMEaCUUH2WknVDYvAW7qAKy3Pybuj73Y3bDB4THNxk92WuHFlb7OL9t9Nims75lsr-s6Akc3g9Z1ByT92WGe7idXjNLmELYrlvVRKcakP6KsH6E3eldTiWSG44FovVIP4EfIl11pwdf8XDvbQmD02Zltj9tCY7Zrm5d8h7hW_K2qAOAK1rdKI5c_l_7v-BNyIoNE</recordid><startdate>20090901</startdate><enddate>20090901</enddate><creator>Pezzin, Liliana E.</creator><creator>Pollak, Robert A.</creator><creator>Schone, Barbara S.</creator><general>Springer US</general><general>Springer Nature B.V</general><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7U4</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>88C</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>BHHNA</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWI</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>HEHIP</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M0T</scope><scope>M2R</scope><scope>M2S</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><scope>WZK</scope><scope>7X8</scope><scope>5PM</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20090901</creationdate><title>Long-term care of the disabled elderly: do children increase caregiving by spouses?</title><author>Pezzin, Liliana E. ; 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We develop two models in which the anticipated behavior of adult children provides incentives for nondisabled elderly parents to increase care for their disabled spouses. The “demonstration effect” postulates that adult children learn from a parent’s example that family caregiving is appropriate behavior. The “punishment effect” postulates that adult children may punish parents who fail to provide spousal care by not providing future care for the nondisabled spouse if and when necessary. Thus, joint children act as a commitment mechanism, increasing the probability that elderly parents will provide care for their disabled spouses. We argue that stepchildren provide weaker incentives for spousal care because the attachment of a stepchild to a stepparent is likely to be weaker than the attachment of children to parents in a traditional nuclear family. 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| source | Springer Nature - Complete Springer Journals; Business Source Complete; Sociological Abstracts |
| subjects | Adult children Altruism Attachment Caregivers Couples Disability Economic analysis Economic models Economic statistics Economic theory Economics Economics and Finance Families & family life Health economics Households Husbands Incentives Labor Economics Long term health care Microeconomics Norms Parents & parenting Population Economics Social Sciences Stepfamilies Studies |
| title | Long-term care of the disabled elderly: do children increase caregiving by spouses? |
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