Making sense of feelings
Abstract Internal feeling states such as pain, hunger, and thirst are widely assumed to be drivers of behaviours essential for homeostasis and animal survival. Call this the ‘causal assumption’. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the causal assumption is incompatible with the standard view of...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Neuroscience of consciousness 2024-09, Vol.2024 (1), p.niae034 |
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description | Abstract
Internal feeling states such as pain, hunger, and thirst are widely assumed to be drivers of behaviours essential for homeostasis and animal survival. Call this the ‘causal assumption’. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the causal assumption is incompatible with the standard view of motor action in neuroscience. While there is a well-known explanatory gap between neural activity and feelings, there is also a disjuncture in the reverse direction—what role, if any, do feelings play in animals if not to cause behaviour? To deny that feelings cause behaviours might thus seem to presage epiphenomenalism—the idea that subjective experiences, including feelings, are inert, emergent and, on some views, non-physical properties of brain processes. Since epiphenomenalism is antagonistic to fundamental commitments of evolutionary biology, the view developed here challenges the standard view about the function of feelings without denying that feelings have a function. Instead, we introduce the ‘sense making sense’ hypothesis—the idea that the function of subjective experience is not to cause behaviour, but to explain, in a restricted but still useful sense of ‘explanation’. A plausible framework is derived that integrates commonly accepted neural computations to blend motor control, feelings, and explanatory processes to make sense of the way feelings are integrated into our sense of how and why we do and what we do. |
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Internal feeling states such as pain, hunger, and thirst are widely assumed to be drivers of behaviours essential for homeostasis and animal survival. Call this the ‘causal assumption’. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the causal assumption is incompatible with the standard view of motor action in neuroscience. While there is a well-known explanatory gap between neural activity and feelings, there is also a disjuncture in the reverse direction—what role, if any, do feelings play in animals if not to cause behaviour? To deny that feelings cause behaviours might thus seem to presage epiphenomenalism—the idea that subjective experiences, including feelings, are inert, emergent and, on some views, non-physical properties of brain processes. Since epiphenomenalism is antagonistic to fundamental commitments of evolutionary biology, the view developed here challenges the standard view about the function of feelings without denying that feelings have a function. Instead, we introduce the ‘sense making sense’ hypothesis—the idea that the function of subjective experience is not to cause behaviour, but to explain, in a restricted but still useful sense of ‘explanation’. A plausible framework is derived that integrates commonly accepted neural computations to blend motor control, feelings, and explanatory processes to make sense of the way feelings are integrated into our sense of how and why we do and what we do.</description><identifier>ISSN: 2057-2107</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 2057-2107</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae034</identifier><identifier>PMID: 39301415</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>UK: Oxford University Press</publisher><subject>Rapid Communication</subject><ispartof>Neuroscience of consciousness, 2024-09, Vol.2024 (1), p.niae034</ispartof><rights>The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press. 2024</rights><rights>The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c298t-e2ef3101eaaf61b9f25c0777431538acf0e0a079cc1b6eba5e6e1e71f1d4dc283</cites><orcidid>0000-0002-1150-3848</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11412240/pdf/$$EPDF$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$Hfree_for_read</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11412240/$$EHTML$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$Hfree_for_read</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>230,314,727,780,784,864,885,1604,27924,27925,53791,53793</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/39301415$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Key, Brian</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Brown, Deborah J</creatorcontrib><title>Making sense of feelings</title><title>Neuroscience of consciousness</title><addtitle>Neurosci Conscious</addtitle><description>Abstract
Internal feeling states such as pain, hunger, and thirst are widely assumed to be drivers of behaviours essential for homeostasis and animal survival. Call this the ‘causal assumption’. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the causal assumption is incompatible with the standard view of motor action in neuroscience. While there is a well-known explanatory gap between neural activity and feelings, there is also a disjuncture in the reverse direction—what role, if any, do feelings play in animals if not to cause behaviour? To deny that feelings cause behaviours might thus seem to presage epiphenomenalism—the idea that subjective experiences, including feelings, are inert, emergent and, on some views, non-physical properties of brain processes. Since epiphenomenalism is antagonistic to fundamental commitments of evolutionary biology, the view developed here challenges the standard view about the function of feelings without denying that feelings have a function. Instead, we introduce the ‘sense making sense’ hypothesis—the idea that the function of subjective experience is not to cause behaviour, but to explain, in a restricted but still useful sense of ‘explanation’. A plausible framework is derived that integrates commonly accepted neural computations to blend motor control, feelings, and explanatory processes to make sense of the way feelings are integrated into our sense of how and why we do and what we do.</description><subject>Rapid Communication</subject><issn>2057-2107</issn><issn>2057-2107</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>TOX</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kM1LAzEQxYMottRePHmSXgQR1s4ku5vuSaT4BRUveg7ZdFJXt0nd7Ar-90ZaS714mmHmx5s3j7FjhEuEQoydGbtKE4h0j_U5ZDLhCHJ_p--xYQhvAIB5hijTQ9YThQBMMeuzk0f9XrnFKJALNPJ2ZInqOAhH7MDqOtBwUwfs5fbmeXqfzJ7uHqbXs8TwYtImxMkKBCStbY5lYXlmQEqZCszERBsLBBpkYQyWOZU6o5yQJFqcp3PDJ2LArta6q65c0tyQaxtdq1VTLXXzpbyu1N-Nq17Vwn8qjA9wnkJUON8oNP6jo9CqZRUM1bV25Lugoj2JOY-_R_RijZrGh9CQ3d5BUD9xKmfUJs4In-4626K_4UXgbA34bvWf0DewxXy0</recordid><startdate>20240919</startdate><enddate>20240919</enddate><creator>Key, Brian</creator><creator>Brown, Deborah J</creator><general>Oxford University Press</general><scope>TOX</scope><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7X8</scope><scope>5PM</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1150-3848</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20240919</creationdate><title>Making sense of feelings</title><author>Key, Brian ; Brown, Deborah J</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c298t-e2ef3101eaaf61b9f25c0777431538acf0e0a079cc1b6eba5e6e1e71f1d4dc283</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><topic>Rapid Communication</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Key, Brian</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Brown, Deborah J</creatorcontrib><collection>Access via Oxford University Press (Open Access Collection)</collection><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><collection>PubMed Central (Full Participant titles)</collection><jtitle>Neuroscience of consciousness</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Key, Brian</au><au>Brown, Deborah J</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Making sense of feelings</atitle><jtitle>Neuroscience of consciousness</jtitle><addtitle>Neurosci Conscious</addtitle><date>2024-09-19</date><risdate>2024</risdate><volume>2024</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>niae034</spage><pages>niae034-</pages><issn>2057-2107</issn><eissn>2057-2107</eissn><abstract>Abstract
Internal feeling states such as pain, hunger, and thirst are widely assumed to be drivers of behaviours essential for homeostasis and animal survival. Call this the ‘causal assumption’. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the causal assumption is incompatible with the standard view of motor action in neuroscience. While there is a well-known explanatory gap between neural activity and feelings, there is also a disjuncture in the reverse direction—what role, if any, do feelings play in animals if not to cause behaviour? To deny that feelings cause behaviours might thus seem to presage epiphenomenalism—the idea that subjective experiences, including feelings, are inert, emergent and, on some views, non-physical properties of brain processes. Since epiphenomenalism is antagonistic to fundamental commitments of evolutionary biology, the view developed here challenges the standard view about the function of feelings without denying that feelings have a function. Instead, we introduce the ‘sense making sense’ hypothesis—the idea that the function of subjective experience is not to cause behaviour, but to explain, in a restricted but still useful sense of ‘explanation’. A plausible framework is derived that integrates commonly accepted neural computations to blend motor control, feelings, and explanatory processes to make sense of the way feelings are integrated into our sense of how and why we do and what we do.</abstract><cop>UK</cop><pub>Oxford University Press</pub><pmid>39301415</pmid><doi>10.1093/nc/niae034</doi><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1150-3848</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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subjects | Rapid Communication |
title | Making sense of feelings |
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