The demand for insurance and rationale for a mandate: evidence from workers' compensation insurance
Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premi...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | The American economic review 2022-05, Vol.112 (5), p.1621-1668 |
|---|---|
| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 1668 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 5 |
| container_start_page | 1621 |
| container_title | The American economic review |
| container_volume | 112 |
| creator | Cabral, Marika |
| description | Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure-such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities-may not justify a mandate in this setting. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1257/aer.20190261 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_pubme</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_pubmedcentral_primary_oai_pubmedcentral_nih_gov_10881117</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2930476966</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c352t-dc9e1cf97d48e13e9ee2c478800e280a0b27c092f4a7818b46082a2a7bb7a21b3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpVkE1PwzAMhiMEYuPjxhn1yIEOOw1NckJo4ktC4jLOkZu6UNS1I-mQ-Pd0jA04WbYfvbYeIU4QJigv9QVxmEhACzLHHTFGq1SqrcFdMQYAmRpp5EgcxPgGqx71vhhlJjMq0_lYqNkrJyXPqS2TqgtJ3cZloNZzspoE6uuupYa_d5SsMOr5SOxV1EQ-_qmH4vn2Zja9Tx-f7h6m14-pzy5ln5beMvrK6lIZxowts_RKGwPA0gBBIbUHKytF2qApVA5GkiRdFJokFtmhuFrnLpbFnEvPbR-ocYtQzyl8uo5q93_T1q_upftwCMYgoh4Szn4SQve-5Ni7eR09Nw213C2jkzYDpXOb5wN6vkZ96GIMXG3vILiVaTeYdhvTA37697ctvFE7AMkaYN-1dfxNM5ArzK2B7AtLDINc</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Open Access Repository</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2930476966</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>The demand for insurance and rationale for a mandate: evidence from workers' compensation insurance</title><source>EBSCOhost Business Source Complete</source><source>Access via American Economic Association</source><creator>Cabral, Marika</creator><creatorcontrib>Cabral, Marika</creatorcontrib><description>Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure-such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities-may not justify a mandate in this setting.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0002-8282</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1944-7981</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190261</identifier><identifier>PMID: 38384376</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>United States</publisher><subject>2006-2011 ; Marktversagen ; Nachfrage ; Pflichtversicherung ; Teilstaat ; Unfallversicherung ; USA</subject><ispartof>The American economic review, 2022-05, Vol.112 (5), p.1621-1668</ispartof><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c352t-dc9e1cf97d48e13e9ee2c478800e280a0b27c092f4a7818b46082a2a7bb7a21b3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c352t-dc9e1cf97d48e13e9ee2c478800e280a0b27c092f4a7818b46082a2a7bb7a21b3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>230,314,780,784,885,3748,27924,27925</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/38384376$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Cabral, Marika</creatorcontrib><title>The demand for insurance and rationale for a mandate: evidence from workers' compensation insurance</title><title>The American economic review</title><addtitle>Am Econ Rev</addtitle><description>Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure-such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities-may not justify a mandate in this setting.</description><subject>2006-2011</subject><subject>Marktversagen</subject><subject>Nachfrage</subject><subject>Pflichtversicherung</subject><subject>Teilstaat</subject><subject>Unfallversicherung</subject><subject>USA</subject><issn>0002-8282</issn><issn>1944-7981</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2022</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNpVkE1PwzAMhiMEYuPjxhn1yIEOOw1NckJo4ktC4jLOkZu6UNS1I-mQ-Pd0jA04WbYfvbYeIU4QJigv9QVxmEhACzLHHTFGq1SqrcFdMQYAmRpp5EgcxPgGqx71vhhlJjMq0_lYqNkrJyXPqS2TqgtJ3cZloNZzspoE6uuupYa_d5SsMOr5SOxV1EQ-_qmH4vn2Zja9Tx-f7h6m14-pzy5ln5beMvrK6lIZxowts_RKGwPA0gBBIbUHKytF2qApVA5GkiRdFJokFtmhuFrnLpbFnEvPbR-ocYtQzyl8uo5q93_T1q_upftwCMYgoh4Szn4SQve-5Ni7eR09Nw213C2jkzYDpXOb5wN6vkZ96GIMXG3vILiVaTeYdhvTA37697ctvFE7AMkaYN-1dfxNM5ArzK2B7AtLDINc</recordid><startdate>20220501</startdate><enddate>20220501</enddate><creator>Cabral, Marika</creator><scope>OQ6</scope><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7X8</scope><scope>5PM</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20220501</creationdate><title>The demand for insurance and rationale for a mandate</title><author>Cabral, Marika</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c352t-dc9e1cf97d48e13e9ee2c478800e280a0b27c092f4a7818b46082a2a7bb7a21b3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2022</creationdate><topic>2006-2011</topic><topic>Marktversagen</topic><topic>Nachfrage</topic><topic>Pflichtversicherung</topic><topic>Teilstaat</topic><topic>Unfallversicherung</topic><topic>USA</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Cabral, Marika</creatorcontrib><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><collection>PubMed Central (Full Participant titles)</collection><jtitle>The American economic review</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Cabral, Marika</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The demand for insurance and rationale for a mandate: evidence from workers' compensation insurance</atitle><jtitle>The American economic review</jtitle><addtitle>Am Econ Rev</addtitle><date>2022-05-01</date><risdate>2022</risdate><volume>112</volume><issue>5</issue><spage>1621</spage><epage>1668</epage><pages>1621-1668</pages><issn>0002-8282</issn><eissn>1944-7981</eissn><abstract>Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure-such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities-may not justify a mandate in this setting.</abstract><cop>United States</cop><pmid>38384376</pmid><doi>10.1257/aer.20190261</doi><tpages>48</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0002-8282 |
| ispartof | The American economic review, 2022-05, Vol.112 (5), p.1621-1668 |
| issn | 0002-8282 1944-7981 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_pubmedcentral_primary_oai_pubmedcentral_nih_gov_10881117 |
| source | EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; Access via American Economic Association |
| subjects | 2006-2011 Marktversagen Nachfrage Pflichtversicherung Teilstaat Unfallversicherung USA |
| title | The demand for insurance and rationale for a mandate: evidence from workers' compensation insurance |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-25T15%3A58%3A29IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_pubme&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=The%20demand%20for%20insurance%20and%20rationale%20for%20a%20mandate:%20evidence%20from%20workers'%20compensation%20insurance&rft.jtitle=The%20American%20economic%20review&rft.au=Cabral,%20Marika&rft.date=2022-05-01&rft.volume=112&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=1621&rft.epage=1668&rft.pages=1621-1668&rft.issn=0002-8282&rft.eissn=1944-7981&rft_id=info:doi/10.1257/aer.20190261&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_pubme%3E2930476966%3C/proquest_pubme%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2930476966&rft_id=info:pmid/38384376&rfr_iscdi=true |