Kinds of access: different methods for report reveal different kinds of metacognitive access
In experimental investigations of consciousness, participants are asked to reflect upon their own experiences by issuing reports about them in different ways. For this reason, a participant needs some access to the content of her own conscious experience in order to report. In such experiments, the...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological sciences 2012-05, Vol.367 (1594), p.1287-1296 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 1296 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 1594 |
| container_start_page | 1287 |
| container_title | Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological sciences |
| container_volume | 367 |
| creator | Overgaard, Morten Sandberg, Kristian |
| description | In experimental investigations of consciousness, participants are asked to reflect upon their own experiences by issuing reports about them in different ways. For this reason, a participant needs some access to the content of her own conscious experience in order to report. In such experiments, the reports typically consist of some variety of ratings of confidence or direct descriptions of one's own experiences. Whereas different methods of reporting are typically used interchangeably, recent experiments indicate that different results are obtained with different kinds of reporting. We argue that there is not only a theoretical, but also an empirical difference between different methods of reporting. We hypothesize that differences in the sensitivity of different scales may reveal that different types of access are used to issue direct reports about experiences and metacognitive reports about the classification process. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1098/rstb.2011.0425 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_pubme</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_pubmed_primary_22492747</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>23250356</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>23250356</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c659t-25732f26fa7cfbd1657548d01476f87904544c770876eeb1f3f2c5caea9484363</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kUtvEzEUhS0EoqGwZQeaHasJfnvMAgkqWhCVeJXHAslyHLt1MhkH2xM1_Ho8TBpaIVhdWee7597rA8BDBKcIyuZpTHk2xRChKaSY3QITRAWqsRTwNphAyXHdUMIPwL2UFhBCyQS9Cw4wphILKibg-1vfzVMVXKWNsSk9q-beORttl6uVzRehiC7EKtp1iLmUjdXtNWZ51V5gbcJ557Pf2J3ZfXDH6TbZB7t6CD4fvzo7el2fvjt5c_TitDacyVxjJgh2mDstjJvNEWeC0WYOyyncNUJCyig1QsBGcGtnyBGHDTPaakmH68gheD76rvvZys5NWSzqVq2jX-m4VUF7dVPp_IU6DxtFCCqeTTF4sjOI4UdvU1Yrn4xtW93Z0CclJZEIsoYVcjqSJoaUonX7KQiqIRE1JKKGRNSQSGl4fH23PX4VQQHICMSwLZ8UjLd5qxahj115_tt2-b-uj5_OXm4IFx4xSRVsCIKcQCzVT78erYqofEq9Vb-Rm_Z_T3s0TlukHOKfGwhmkLAhgHrUfcr2cq_ruFRcEMHUl4aqE_aNvP_wFZa2X3RQ1eo</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Open Access Repository</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>993910585</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Kinds of access: different methods for report reveal different kinds of metacognitive access</title><source>MEDLINE</source><source>JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing</source><source>PubMed Central</source><creator>Overgaard, Morten ; Sandberg, Kristian</creator><creatorcontrib>Overgaard, Morten ; Sandberg, Kristian</creatorcontrib><description>In experimental investigations of consciousness, participants are asked to reflect upon their own experiences by issuing reports about them in different ways. For this reason, a participant needs some access to the content of her own conscious experience in order to report. In such experiments, the reports typically consist of some variety of ratings of confidence or direct descriptions of one's own experiences. Whereas different methods of reporting are typically used interchangeably, recent experiments indicate that different results are obtained with different kinds of reporting. We argue that there is not only a theoretical, but also an empirical difference between different methods of reporting. We hypothesize that differences in the sensitivity of different scales may reveal that different types of access are used to issue direct reports about experiences and metacognitive reports about the classification process.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0962-8436</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1471-2970</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2011.0425</identifier><identifier>PMID: 22492747</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>England: The Royal Society</publisher><subject>Awareness ; Cognition ; Cognitive processes ; Consciousness ; Dienes ; Estimate reliability ; Humans ; Introspection ; Introversion (Psychology) ; Metacognition ; Subliminal Perception ; Unconscious mind ; Vision ; Visual perception</subject><ispartof>Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological sciences, 2012-05, Vol.367 (1594), p.1287-1296</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2012 The Royal Society</rights><rights>This journal is © 2012 The Royal Society</rights><rights>This journal is © 2012 The Royal Society 2012</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c659t-25732f26fa7cfbd1657548d01476f87904544c770876eeb1f3f2c5caea9484363</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c659t-25732f26fa7cfbd1657548d01476f87904544c770876eeb1f3f2c5caea9484363</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23250356$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/23250356$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>230,314,727,780,784,803,885,27924,27925,53791,53793,58017,58250</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22492747$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Overgaard, Morten</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sandberg, Kristian</creatorcontrib><title>Kinds of access: different methods for report reveal different kinds of metacognitive access</title><title>Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological sciences</title><addtitle>Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B</addtitle><addtitle>Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B</addtitle><description>In experimental investigations of consciousness, participants are asked to reflect upon their own experiences by issuing reports about them in different ways. For this reason, a participant needs some access to the content of her own conscious experience in order to report. In such experiments, the reports typically consist of some variety of ratings of confidence or direct descriptions of one's own experiences. Whereas different methods of reporting are typically used interchangeably, recent experiments indicate that different results are obtained with different kinds of reporting. We argue that there is not only a theoretical, but also an empirical difference between different methods of reporting. We hypothesize that differences in the sensitivity of different scales may reveal that different types of access are used to issue direct reports about experiences and metacognitive reports about the classification process.</description><subject>Awareness</subject><subject>Cognition</subject><subject>Cognitive processes</subject><subject>Consciousness</subject><subject>Dienes</subject><subject>Estimate reliability</subject><subject>Humans</subject><subject>Introspection</subject><subject>Introversion (Psychology)</subject><subject>Metacognition</subject><subject>Subliminal Perception</subject><subject>Unconscious mind</subject><subject>Vision</subject><subject>Visual perception</subject><issn>0962-8436</issn><issn>1471-2970</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2012</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>EIF</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kUtvEzEUhS0EoqGwZQeaHasJfnvMAgkqWhCVeJXHAslyHLt1MhkH2xM1_Ho8TBpaIVhdWee7597rA8BDBKcIyuZpTHk2xRChKaSY3QITRAWqsRTwNphAyXHdUMIPwL2UFhBCyQS9Cw4wphILKibg-1vfzVMVXKWNsSk9q-beORttl6uVzRehiC7EKtp1iLmUjdXtNWZ51V5gbcJ557Pf2J3ZfXDH6TbZB7t6CD4fvzo7el2fvjt5c_TitDacyVxjJgh2mDstjJvNEWeC0WYOyyncNUJCyig1QsBGcGtnyBGHDTPaakmH68gheD76rvvZys5NWSzqVq2jX-m4VUF7dVPp_IU6DxtFCCqeTTF4sjOI4UdvU1Yrn4xtW93Z0CclJZEIsoYVcjqSJoaUonX7KQiqIRE1JKKGRNSQSGl4fH23PX4VQQHICMSwLZ8UjLd5qxahj115_tt2-b-uj5_OXm4IFx4xSRVsCIKcQCzVT78erYqofEq9Vb-Rm_Z_T3s0TlukHOKfGwhmkLAhgHrUfcr2cq_ruFRcEMHUl4aqE_aNvP_wFZa2X3RQ1eo</recordid><startdate>20120519</startdate><enddate>20120519</enddate><creator>Overgaard, Morten</creator><creator>Sandberg, Kristian</creator><general>The Royal Society</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>CGR</scope><scope>CUY</scope><scope>CVF</scope><scope>ECM</scope><scope>EIF</scope><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7X8</scope><scope>5PM</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20120519</creationdate><title>Kinds of access: different methods for report reveal different kinds of metacognitive access</title><author>Overgaard, Morten ; Sandberg, Kristian</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c659t-25732f26fa7cfbd1657548d01476f87904544c770876eeb1f3f2c5caea9484363</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2012</creationdate><topic>Awareness</topic><topic>Cognition</topic><topic>Cognitive processes</topic><topic>Consciousness</topic><topic>Dienes</topic><topic>Estimate reliability</topic><topic>Humans</topic><topic>Introspection</topic><topic>Introversion (Psychology)</topic><topic>Metacognition</topic><topic>Subliminal Perception</topic><topic>Unconscious mind</topic><topic>Vision</topic><topic>Visual perception</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Overgaard, Morten</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sandberg, Kristian</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>Medline</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE (Ovid)</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><collection>PubMed Central (Full Participant titles)</collection><jtitle>Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological sciences</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Overgaard, Morten</au><au>Sandberg, Kristian</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Kinds of access: different methods for report reveal different kinds of metacognitive access</atitle><jtitle>Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological sciences</jtitle><stitle>Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B</stitle><addtitle>Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B</addtitle><date>2012-05-19</date><risdate>2012</risdate><volume>367</volume><issue>1594</issue><spage>1287</spage><epage>1296</epage><pages>1287-1296</pages><issn>0962-8436</issn><eissn>1471-2970</eissn><abstract>In experimental investigations of consciousness, participants are asked to reflect upon their own experiences by issuing reports about them in different ways. For this reason, a participant needs some access to the content of her own conscious experience in order to report. In such experiments, the reports typically consist of some variety of ratings of confidence or direct descriptions of one's own experiences. Whereas different methods of reporting are typically used interchangeably, recent experiments indicate that different results are obtained with different kinds of reporting. We argue that there is not only a theoretical, but also an empirical difference between different methods of reporting. We hypothesize that differences in the sensitivity of different scales may reveal that different types of access are used to issue direct reports about experiences and metacognitive reports about the classification process.</abstract><cop>England</cop><pub>The Royal Society</pub><pmid>22492747</pmid><doi>10.1098/rstb.2011.0425</doi><tpages>10</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0962-8436 |
| ispartof | Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological sciences, 2012-05, Vol.367 (1594), p.1287-1296 |
| issn | 0962-8436 1471-2970 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_pubmed_primary_22492747 |
| source | MEDLINE; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; PubMed Central |
| subjects | Awareness Cognition Cognitive processes Consciousness Dienes Estimate reliability Humans Introspection Introversion (Psychology) Metacognition Subliminal Perception Unconscious mind Vision Visual perception |
| title | Kinds of access: different methods for report reveal different kinds of metacognitive access |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-27T13%3A32%3A23IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_pubme&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Kinds%20of%20access:%20different%20methods%20for%20report%20reveal%20different%20kinds%20of%20metacognitive%20access&rft.jtitle=Philosophical%20transactions%20of%20the%20Royal%20Society%20of%20London.%20Series%20B.%20Biological%20sciences&rft.au=Overgaard,%20Morten&rft.date=2012-05-19&rft.volume=367&rft.issue=1594&rft.spage=1287&rft.epage=1296&rft.pages=1287-1296&rft.issn=0962-8436&rft.eissn=1471-2970&rft_id=info:doi/10.1098/rstb.2011.0425&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_pubme%3E23250356%3C/jstor_pubme%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=993910585&rft_id=info:pmid/22492747&rft_jstor_id=23250356&rfr_iscdi=true |