CITIZENSHIP AND GROWTH

At independence, citizenship laws were revised: most former French colonies initially stuck with jus soli; former British and Portuguese colonies tended to switch to jus sanguinis, driven by ethnic considerations. Because many countries were artificially formed without consideration for local ethnic...

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Veröffentlicht in:Finance & Development 2019-03, Vol.56 (1), p.42-45
Hauptverfasser: Imam, Patrick Amir, Kpodar, Kangni
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description At independence, citizenship laws were revised: most former French colonies initially stuck with jus soli; former British and Portuguese colonies tended to switch to jus sanguinis, driven by ethnic considerations. Because many countries were artificially formed without consideration for local ethnic diversity, leading to political instability, jus sanguinis was thought to bolster national identity. Conversely, when a nonnational group plays a disproportionately significant role in economic life, its lack of protection by the state is a source of concern. Because of their vulnerability, influential minorities are motivated to influence the political process and may resort to bribes, which encourages corruption and weakens institutions. In these cases, jus soli expands the labor market in a way that jus sanguinis law does not-potentially broadening the labor pool and boosting the economy's efficiency. Per capita income in countries that switched to jus sanguinis was lower in 2014 (by about 46 percent) than it would have been if they had kept jus soli after independence, our results suggest. [...]our research found that in jus sanguinis countries, the income gap with jus soli countries could be reduced by easier access to citizenship through marriage and naturalization.
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source Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals; Alma/SFX Local Collection
subjects 19th century
Citizenship
Colonies & territories
Constitutional law
Corruption
Economic development
Economic life
Human rights
Immigrants
Labor market
Minority & ethnic groups
National identity
Noncitizens
Per capita
Public sector
title CITIZENSHIP AND GROWTH
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