Realistic expectations for audit committees
The Business Roundtable (BRT) fully supports SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt's statement that "qualified, committed, independent, and tough-minded audit committees represent the most reliable guardians of the public interest." Specifically, the BRT believes that the audit committee should...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Directors & boards 1999-12, Vol.23 (2), p.29 |
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| creator | Barnette, Cu |
| description | The Business Roundtable (BRT) fully supports SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt's statement that "qualified, committed, independent, and tough-minded audit committees represent the most reliable guardians of the public interest." Specifically, the BRT believes that the audit committee should provide oversight to the "process," but not be responsible for implementing day-to-day suggestions generated by the internal and external auditors for improvements in the system of internal controls. It appears that the SEC may view audit committees' roles as much more "hands-on-financial controls" than is really feasible or appropriate for outside directors. |
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Specifically, the BRT believes that the audit committee should provide oversight to the "process," but not be responsible for implementing day-to-day suggestions generated by the internal and external auditors for improvements in the system of internal controls. 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Specifically, the BRT believes that the audit committee should provide oversight to the "process," but not be responsible for implementing day-to-day suggestions generated by the internal and external auditors for improvements in the system of internal controls. It appears that the SEC may view audit committees' roles as much more "hands-on-financial controls" than is really feasible or appropriate for outside directors.</abstract><cop>Philadelphia</cop><pub>Directors and Boards</pub></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0364-9156 |
| ispartof | Directors & boards, 1999-12, Vol.23 (2), p.29 |
| issn | 0364-9156 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_reports_215824941 |
| source | EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Accounting Accounting and auditing Audit committees Audits Boards of directors Chief executive officers Committees Compliance Corporate directors Corporate governance Corporate profiles Directors Financial analysis Financial reporting Financial statements Guidebooks Internal auditors Internal controls Investor relations Laws, regulations and rules Management Methods Proxy statements Regulation of financial institutions Roles Term limitations |
| title | Realistic expectations for audit committees |
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