Structured Investment Vehicles: The Unintended Consequence of Financial Innovation
Twenty years ago, structured investment vehicles (SIV) did not exist. During the two decades since their inception, SIVs grew to more than $400 billion in assets and represented about five percent of the U.S. corporate debt market. By the end of 2008, SIV assets had become virtually extinct. There a...
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description | Twenty years ago, structured investment vehicles (SIV) did not exist. During the two decades since their inception, SIVs grew to more than $400 billion in assets and represented about five percent of the U.S. corporate debt market. By the end of 2008, SIV assets had become virtually extinct. There are currently no remaining SIV assets that are not in bankruptcy or rating agency enforcement. In essence, SIVs are unregulated companies that engage in the banking business. Without deposit insurance, SIVs became subject to the rapid loss of funding that is generally known as a run on the bank. In an atmosphere of deception, people possessing a false sense of confidence bought houses they could not afford. The banks lent them the money and sold the mortgages to SIVs, which returned the cash to the banks to support more borrowing. This pattern was given further impetus in the presence of lower interest rates, resulting in significant market distortion. Regulators watched and did nothing. In the future, financial market participants must examine the incentive implications of financial innovation. In this case, financial engineering unleashed adverse incentives of which unregulated nonbank entities took advantage. |
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During the two decades since their inception, SIVs grew to more than $400 billion in assets and represented about five percent of the U.S. corporate debt market. By the end of 2008, SIV assets had become virtually extinct. There are currently no remaining SIV assets that are not in bankruptcy or rating agency enforcement. In essence, SIVs are unregulated companies that engage in the banking business. Without deposit insurance, SIVs became subject to the rapid loss of funding that is generally known as a run on the bank. In an atmosphere of deception, people possessing a false sense of confidence bought houses they could not afford. The banks lent them the money and sold the mortgages to SIVs, which returned the cash to the banks to support more borrowing. This pattern was given further impetus in the presence of lower interest rates, resulting in significant market distortion. Regulators watched and did nothing. In the future, financial market participants must examine the incentive implications of financial innovation. In this case, financial engineering unleashed adverse incentives of which unregulated nonbank entities took advantage.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0894-3958</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Riverwoods: CCH INCORPORATED</publisher><subject>Balance sheets ; Banking industry ; Bankruptcy ; Capital requirements ; Corporate debt ; Credit ratings ; Economic crisis ; Equity ; Funding ; Inventory ; LIBOR ; Lines of credit ; Loans ; Rating services ; Regional banks ; Regulation of financial institutions ; Regulatory agencies ; Securities markets ; Structured investment vehicles ; Subprime lending</subject><ispartof>Bank Accounting & Finance, 2009-10, p.29</ispartof><rights>Copyright CCH INCORPORATED Oct/Nov 2009</rights><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>312,780,784,791</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Ehrlich, Michael</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Anandarajan, Asokan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chou, Benjamin</creatorcontrib><title>Structured Investment Vehicles: The Unintended Consequence of Financial Innovation</title><title>Bank Accounting & Finance</title><description>Twenty years ago, structured investment vehicles (SIV) did not exist. 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During the two decades since their inception, SIVs grew to more than $400 billion in assets and represented about five percent of the U.S. corporate debt market. By the end of 2008, SIV assets had become virtually extinct. There are currently no remaining SIV assets that are not in bankruptcy or rating agency enforcement. In essence, SIVs are unregulated companies that engage in the banking business. Without deposit insurance, SIVs became subject to the rapid loss of funding that is generally known as a run on the bank. In an atmosphere of deception, people possessing a false sense of confidence bought houses they could not afford. The banks lent them the money and sold the mortgages to SIVs, which returned the cash to the banks to support more borrowing. This pattern was given further impetus in the presence of lower interest rates, resulting in significant market distortion. Regulators watched and did nothing. 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subjects | Balance sheets Banking industry Bankruptcy Capital requirements Corporate debt Credit ratings Economic crisis Equity Funding Inventory LIBOR Lines of credit Loans Rating services Regional banks Regulation of financial institutions Regulatory agencies Securities markets Structured investment vehicles Subprime lending |
title | Structured Investment Vehicles: The Unintended Consequence of Financial Innovation |
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