The Russian Naval Infantry

According to most Russian accounts, the Naval Infantry has lost the capability to conduct brigade-level amphibious assaults and is only capable of executing battalionlevel amphibious assaults. (Large seafaring equipment such as landing docks, hovercraft, and other specialized equipment are manned an...

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Veröffentlicht in:Marine Corps Gazette 2018-11, Vol.102 (11), p.63-68
1. Verfasser: Bartles, Charles K
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description According to most Russian accounts, the Naval Infantry has lost the capability to conduct brigade-level amphibious assaults and is only capable of executing battalionlevel amphibious assaults. (Large seafaring equipment such as landing docks, hovercraft, and other specialized equipment are manned and operated by the Russian Navy.) The practice of using the Ground Forces" equipment for amphibious operations may seem odd to those familiar with U.S. amphibious operations (when comparing the Naval Infantry to the Marine Corps and the Ground Forces to the U.S. Army) but not so for the Russians. Because of the geography of Russia, which has many wide, slowmoving, and shallow rivers, most Russian Ground Forces vehicles have some amphibious capability and/or can ford water.7 The Russia Federation is currently experimenting with three new chassis, the heavy-tracked Armata chassis, the Kurganets-25 medium-tracked chassis, and the Bumerang wheeled chassis. [...]the Ivan Gren class is by no means a suitable replacement for the forthcoming UDKs, but it can provide some much needed tactical and nontactical heavy lift capability.13 Small Landing Craft In addition to large landing ships such as the BDK, UDK, and AWS, Russia is also interested in smaller landing craft. The boat is equipped with two 14.5mm machine guns and eight Igla-M anti-aircraft missiles. Because of the complex air cavity system, which is reportedly somewhat troublesome, and the boat's inability to transfer heavy loads while underway from a UDK, only five Dyugon class ships were commissioned between 2010 and 2015, with no plans for future production.13 The Russian Navy is now considering a successor to the Dyugon class, the A223, which can take full advantage of a UDK.
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subjects Armed forces
Aviation
Coasts
Defense
Helicopters
Military policy
Military strategy
War
title The Russian Naval Infantry
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