Payments

[...]the U.S. Supreme Court weighs in on what constitutes bank fraud under the united States Criminal Code when funds in a customer's bank account are fraudulently transferred out of the account but the bank itself does not suffer a loss. The Supreme Court rejected Shaw's arguments.64 The...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Business Lawyer 2017-09, Vol.72 (4), p.1097-1118
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description [...]the U.S. Supreme Court weighs in on what constitutes bank fraud under the united States Criminal Code when funds in a customer's bank account are fraudulently transferred out of the account but the bank itself does not suffer a loss. The Supreme Court rejected Shaw's arguments.64 The Court stated that the bank fraud statute covers schemes to deprive a bank of money in a customer's deposit account because the bank does have property rights in the bank accounts of its customers.65 The Court noted that when a customer deposits funds, the bank ordinarily becomes the owner of the funds, which the bank has a right to use as a source of loans that help the bank earn profits.66 Hence, for purposes of the bank fraud statute, a scheme fraudulently to obtain funds from a bank depositor's account normally is also a scheme fraudulently to obtain property from a "financial institution," at least where, as here, the defendant knew that the bank held the deposits, the funds obtained came from the deposit account, and the defendant misled the bank in order to obtain those funds, even if Shaw may not have intended to cause the bank financial harm.67 Customer-Bank Agreement In Majestic Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc.,68 the payor bank avoided liability for unauthorized checks drawn on its customer's business checking account by a provision in its customer's "Master Services" account agreement that made the customer responsible for unauthorized account transactions if the customer did not avail itself of a fraud prevention service that was offered by the bank and designed to discover or prevent the type of unauthorized activity that occurred. Because the customer was eligible for the bank's "Positive Pay" service, which was designed to discover and allow the customer to prevent out of sequence checks, raised checks, and checks not issued by the customer, the bank was able to shift the risk of loss to its customer based on the loss prevention language of the Master Services agreement, even though it did not specifically mention the bank's "Check Positive Pay" program by name.69 The court held that the provision in question was not manifestly unreasonable and did not relieve the bank of its duties of good faith and exercising ordinary care; rather it was a permissible variation of Article 4's default rule that the drawee bank is responsible for forged checks.70 This is not the first case to give the bank a defense based on a requirement in the ban
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The Supreme Court rejected Shaw's arguments.64 The Court stated that the bank fraud statute covers schemes to deprive a bank of money in a customer's deposit account because the bank does have property rights in the bank accounts of its customers.65 The Court noted that when a customer deposits funds, the bank ordinarily becomes the owner of the funds, which the bank has a right to use as a source of loans that help the bank earn profits.66 Hence, for purposes of the bank fraud statute, a scheme fraudulently to obtain funds from a bank depositor's account normally is also a scheme fraudulently to obtain property from a "financial institution," at least where, as here, the defendant knew that the bank held the deposits, the funds obtained came from the deposit account, and the defendant misled the bank in order to obtain those funds, even if Shaw may not have intended to cause the bank financial harm.67 Customer-Bank Agreement In Majestic Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc.,68 the payor bank avoided liability for unauthorized checks drawn on its customer's business checking account by a provision in its customer's "Master Services" account agreement that made the customer responsible for unauthorized account transactions if the customer did not avail itself of a fraud prevention service that was offered by the bank and designed to discover or prevent the type of unauthorized activity that occurred. Because the customer was eligible for the bank's "Positive Pay" service, which was designed to discover and allow the customer to prevent out of sequence checks, raised checks, and checks not issued by the customer, the bank was able to shift the risk of loss to its customer based on the loss prevention language of the Master Services agreement, even though it did not specifically mention the bank's "Check Positive Pay" program by name.69 The court held that the provision in question was not manifestly unreasonable and did not relieve the bank of its duties of good faith and exercising ordinary care; rather it was a permissible variation of Article 4's default rule that the drawee bank is responsible for forged checks.70 This is not the first case to give the bank a defense based on a requirement in the bank-customer account agreement that the customer is responsible for losses that it could have avoided if it failed to use the bank's positive pay service.71 In Oguoguo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,72 a New Jersey federal district court enforced the provision in a bank's customer account agreement that cut off claims for payment of items bearing unauthorized drawer's signatures if not reported within thirty days after the account statements were made available to the customer and also cut off claims based on any future unauthorized signatures of the same wrongdoer thereafter even if reported within the thirty-day period after delivery of later monthly statements. The founder's children and grandchildren obtained the death benefit check directly from the life insurance company, opened a fictitious bank account, and deposited and collected the check. Because the church never obtained possession of the misappropriated check, the court held it had no interest in the check and therefore had no standing to assert a claim of conversion against the bank of first deposit.87 Presumably the church's remedy is to require the life insurance company to issue another death benefit check.88 In Midwest Feeders, Inc. v. Regions Bank,89 the plaintiff lender made advances to a borrower's bank account to finance its livestock business. [...]the intermediary bank, upon receiving the payment order from the originator's bank, immediately blocked the order-that is, rather than accepting the payment order by executing it (i.e., sending its own payment order to the beneficiary's bank, for the benefit of the beneficiary), the intermediary bank credited the funds to a segregated, interest-bearing account. over a decade later, the beneficiary applied to the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") for and received a license authorizing the intermediary bank to release the funds-the intermediary bank subsequently did so, but contrary to the beneficiary's expectations, it released the funds to the originator's bank.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0007-6899</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 2164-1838</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Chicago: Business Law Section of the American Bar Association</publisher><subject>Automation ; Bank technology ; Banking industry ; Breach of contract ; Charters ; Commercial law ; Consumer protection ; Credit cards ; Discovery rule ; Financial institutions ; Fraud prevention ; International banking ; Liability ; Lines of credit ; National banks ; Payment ; Prepaid debit cards ; Prepaid services ; Regulation Z ; State court decisions ; Surveys ; Survey—Uniform Commercial Code ; Transfer of funds ; Uniform Commercial Code-US</subject><ispartof>The Business Lawyer, 2017-09, Vol.72 (4), p.1097-1118</ispartof><rights>2017 by the American Bar Association</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2017 American Bar Association</rights><rights>Copyright American Bar Association Fall 2017</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26419180$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/26419180$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>312,314,780,784,791,803,58017,58250</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Klein, Carter</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Cheng, Jessie</creatorcontrib><title>Payments</title><title>The Business Lawyer</title><description>[...]the U.S. Supreme Court weighs in on what constitutes bank fraud under the united States Criminal Code when funds in a customer's bank account are fraudulently transferred out of the account but the bank itself does not suffer a loss. The Supreme Court rejected Shaw's arguments.64 The Court stated that the bank fraud statute covers schemes to deprive a bank of money in a customer's deposit account because the bank does have property rights in the bank accounts of its customers.65 The Court noted that when a customer deposits funds, the bank ordinarily becomes the owner of the funds, which the bank has a right to use as a source of loans that help the bank earn profits.66 Hence, for purposes of the bank fraud statute, a scheme fraudulently to obtain funds from a bank depositor's account normally is also a scheme fraudulently to obtain property from a "financial institution," at least where, as here, the defendant knew that the bank held the deposits, the funds obtained came from the deposit account, and the defendant misled the bank in order to obtain those funds, even if Shaw may not have intended to cause the bank financial harm.67 Customer-Bank Agreement In Majestic Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc.,68 the payor bank avoided liability for unauthorized checks drawn on its customer's business checking account by a provision in its customer's "Master Services" account agreement that made the customer responsible for unauthorized account transactions if the customer did not avail itself of a fraud prevention service that was offered by the bank and designed to discover or prevent the type of unauthorized activity that occurred. Because the customer was eligible for the bank's "Positive Pay" service, which was designed to discover and allow the customer to prevent out of sequence checks, raised checks, and checks not issued by the customer, the bank was able to shift the risk of loss to its customer based on the loss prevention language of the Master Services agreement, even though it did not specifically mention the bank's "Check Positive Pay" program by name.69 The court held that the provision in question was not manifestly unreasonable and did not relieve the bank of its duties of good faith and exercising ordinary care; rather it was a permissible variation of Article 4's default rule that the drawee bank is responsible for forged checks.70 This is not the first case to give the bank a defense based on a requirement in the bank-customer account agreement that the customer is responsible for losses that it could have avoided if it failed to use the bank's positive pay service.71 In Oguoguo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,72 a New Jersey federal district court enforced the provision in a bank's customer account agreement that cut off claims for payment of items bearing unauthorized drawer's signatures if not reported within thirty days after the account statements were made available to the customer and also cut off claims based on any future unauthorized signatures of the same wrongdoer thereafter even if reported within the thirty-day period after delivery of later monthly statements. The founder's children and grandchildren obtained the death benefit check directly from the life insurance company, opened a fictitious bank account, and deposited and collected the check. Because the church never obtained possession of the misappropriated check, the court held it had no interest in the check and therefore had no standing to assert a claim of conversion against the bank of first deposit.87 Presumably the church's remedy is to require the life insurance company to issue another death benefit check.88 In Midwest Feeders, Inc. v. Regions Bank,89 the plaintiff lender made advances to a borrower's bank account to finance its livestock business. [...]the intermediary bank, upon receiving the payment order from the originator's bank, immediately blocked the order-that is, rather than accepting the payment order by executing it (i.e., sending its own payment order to the beneficiary's bank, for the benefit of the beneficiary), the intermediary bank credited the funds to a segregated, interest-bearing account. over a decade later, the beneficiary applied to the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") for and received a license authorizing the intermediary bank to release the funds-the intermediary bank subsequently did so, but contrary to the beneficiary's expectations, it released the funds to the originator's bank.</description><subject>Automation</subject><subject>Bank technology</subject><subject>Banking industry</subject><subject>Breach of contract</subject><subject>Charters</subject><subject>Commercial law</subject><subject>Consumer protection</subject><subject>Credit cards</subject><subject>Discovery rule</subject><subject>Financial institutions</subject><subject>Fraud prevention</subject><subject>International banking</subject><subject>Liability</subject><subject>Lines of credit</subject><subject>National banks</subject><subject>Payment</subject><subject>Prepaid debit cards</subject><subject>Prepaid services</subject><subject>Regulation Z</subject><subject>State court decisions</subject><subject>Surveys</subject><subject>Survey—Uniform Commercial Code</subject><subject>Transfer of funds</subject><subject>Uniform Commercial Code-US</subject><issn>0007-6899</issn><issn>2164-1838</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2017</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>N95</sourceid><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNptzE1LAzEQBuAgCq3Vn-BFr65kkmw2OZbiFxT0oOclzc6uKftRM-mh_96VerCwDMwww_POGZsL0CoDI805m3POi0wba2fskmg7riCMnLPZuzt02Ce6Yhe1awmv_-aCfT49fqxesvXb8-tquc4aoSFlurJKedgY663A2kujN9I4rwyISnEpilza2oHSvB5pDsJLFHklOTrNCy0X7Pb4dxeH7z1SKiPuhpioBKssl5DnakR3R9S4FsvQ10OKzneBfLnMQYMtQP6-yiZUgz1G1w491mE8n_iHCT9WhV3wk4H7f4HNnkKPNDYKzVeixu2JTvnNkW8pDbHcxdC5eCiFVmDBcPkDFwdzzg</recordid><startdate>20170922</startdate><enddate>20170922</enddate><creator>Klein, Carter</creator><creator>Cheng, Jessie</creator><general>Business Law Section of the American Bar Association</general><general>American Bar Association</general><scope>N95</scope><scope>XI7</scope><scope>ILT</scope><scope>0U~</scope><scope>1-H</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>885</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ANIOZ</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRAZJ</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>L.0</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M1F</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><scope>S0X</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20170922</creationdate><title>Payments</title><author>Klein, Carter ; 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Banking Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Standard</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>Banking Information Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><collection>SIRS Editorial</collection><jtitle>The Business Lawyer</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Klein, Carter</au><au>Cheng, Jessie</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Payments</atitle><jtitle>The Business Lawyer</jtitle><date>2017-09-22</date><risdate>2017</risdate><volume>72</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>1097</spage><epage>1118</epage><pages>1097-1118</pages><issn>0007-6899</issn><eissn>2164-1838</eissn><abstract>[...]the U.S. Supreme Court weighs in on what constitutes bank fraud under the united States Criminal Code when funds in a customer's bank account are fraudulently transferred out of the account but the bank itself does not suffer a loss. The Supreme Court rejected Shaw's arguments.64 The Court stated that the bank fraud statute covers schemes to deprive a bank of money in a customer's deposit account because the bank does have property rights in the bank accounts of its customers.65 The Court noted that when a customer deposits funds, the bank ordinarily becomes the owner of the funds, which the bank has a right to use as a source of loans that help the bank earn profits.66 Hence, for purposes of the bank fraud statute, a scheme fraudulently to obtain funds from a bank depositor's account normally is also a scheme fraudulently to obtain property from a "financial institution," at least where, as here, the defendant knew that the bank held the deposits, the funds obtained came from the deposit account, and the defendant misled the bank in order to obtain those funds, even if Shaw may not have intended to cause the bank financial harm.67 Customer-Bank Agreement In Majestic Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc.,68 the payor bank avoided liability for unauthorized checks drawn on its customer's business checking account by a provision in its customer's "Master Services" account agreement that made the customer responsible for unauthorized account transactions if the customer did not avail itself of a fraud prevention service that was offered by the bank and designed to discover or prevent the type of unauthorized activity that occurred. Because the customer was eligible for the bank's "Positive Pay" service, which was designed to discover and allow the customer to prevent out of sequence checks, raised checks, and checks not issued by the customer, the bank was able to shift the risk of loss to its customer based on the loss prevention language of the Master Services agreement, even though it did not specifically mention the bank's "Check Positive Pay" program by name.69 The court held that the provision in question was not manifestly unreasonable and did not relieve the bank of its duties of good faith and exercising ordinary care; rather it was a permissible variation of Article 4's default rule that the drawee bank is responsible for forged checks.70 This is not the first case to give the bank a defense based on a requirement in the bank-customer account agreement that the customer is responsible for losses that it could have avoided if it failed to use the bank's positive pay service.71 In Oguoguo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,72 a New Jersey federal district court enforced the provision in a bank's customer account agreement that cut off claims for payment of items bearing unauthorized drawer's signatures if not reported within thirty days after the account statements were made available to the customer and also cut off claims based on any future unauthorized signatures of the same wrongdoer thereafter even if reported within the thirty-day period after delivery of later monthly statements. The founder's children and grandchildren obtained the death benefit check directly from the life insurance company, opened a fictitious bank account, and deposited and collected the check. Because the church never obtained possession of the misappropriated check, the court held it had no interest in the check and therefore had no standing to assert a claim of conversion against the bank of first deposit.87 Presumably the church's remedy is to require the life insurance company to issue another death benefit check.88 In Midwest Feeders, Inc. v. Regions Bank,89 the plaintiff lender made advances to a borrower's bank account to finance its livestock business. [...]the intermediary bank, upon receiving the payment order from the originator's bank, immediately blocked the order-that is, rather than accepting the payment order by executing it (i.e., sending its own payment order to the beneficiary's bank, for the benefit of the beneficiary), the intermediary bank credited the funds to a segregated, interest-bearing account. over a decade later, the beneficiary applied to the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") for and received a license authorizing the intermediary bank to release the funds-the intermediary bank subsequently did so, but contrary to the beneficiary's expectations, it released the funds to the originator's bank.</abstract><cop>Chicago</cop><pub>Business Law Section of the American Bar Association</pub><tpages>22</tpages></addata></record>
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issn 0007-6899
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source HeinOnline Law Journal Library; Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing
subjects Automation
Bank technology
Banking industry
Breach of contract
Charters
Commercial law
Consumer protection
Credit cards
Discovery rule
Financial institutions
Fraud prevention
International banking
Liability
Lines of credit
National banks
Payment
Prepaid debit cards
Prepaid services
Regulation Z
State court decisions
Surveys
Survey—Uniform Commercial Code
Transfer of funds
Uniform Commercial Code-US
title Payments
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