Contingent Effects of Municipal and County TELs on Special District Usage in the United States

This research examines the joint effects of the tax and expenditure limits states impose on municipal and county governments on the structure of local government in 500 randomly selected U.S. counties. Understanding the contingent effects of these limitations is critical to assessing the consequence...

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Veröffentlicht in:Publius 2011-10, Vol.41 (4), p.709-733
Hauptverfasser: Carr, Jered B., Farmer, Jayce
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creator Carr, Jered B.
Farmer, Jayce
description This research examines the joint effects of the tax and expenditure limits states impose on municipal and county governments on the structure of local government in 500 randomly selected U.S. counties. Understanding the contingent effects of these limitations is critical to assessing the consequences of TELs on the structure of local government in communities and the "circumvention" arguments common in this literature. We find evidence of a circumvention effect for restrictive limits on county governments, but not for the limits states place on municipal governments. Also, our findings indicate that the effect of increasing the limits on either government is to mitigate any circumvention effects created by limitations on the other. Our findings indicate that the circumvention question is more complex than previous works suggest.
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source PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Jstor Complete Legacy; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current)
subjects Appropriations and expenditures
Central-local government relations
Counties
County government
County governments
Data analysis
Districts
Economic aspects
Effects
Evaluation
Expenditures
Expenditures, Public
Governance
Government
Government officials
Intergovernmental tax relations
Local Government
Local politics
Modeling
Municipal governments
Municipal taxes
Political freedom
Property taxes
Public expenditure
Public expenditures
Public policy
Regulation
State structure
State taxation
Strategic planning
Tax expenditures
Tax policy
Taxation
Taxes
U.S.A
United States
United States of America
title Contingent Effects of Municipal and County TELs on Special District Usage in the United States
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