Contingent Effects of Municipal and County TELs on Special District Usage in the United States
This research examines the joint effects of the tax and expenditure limits states impose on municipal and county governments on the structure of local government in 500 randomly selected U.S. counties. Understanding the contingent effects of these limitations is critical to assessing the consequence...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Publius 2011-10, Vol.41 (4), p.709-733 |
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description | This research examines the joint effects of the tax and expenditure limits states impose on municipal and county governments on the structure of local government in 500 randomly selected U.S. counties. Understanding the contingent effects of these limitations is critical to assessing the consequences of TELs on the structure of local government in communities and the "circumvention" arguments common in this literature. We find evidence of a circumvention effect for restrictive limits on county governments, but not for the limits states place on municipal governments. Also, our findings indicate that the effect of increasing the limits on either government is to mitigate any circumvention effects created by limitations on the other. Our findings indicate that the circumvention question is more complex than previous works suggest. |
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Understanding the contingent effects of these limitations is critical to assessing the consequences of TELs on the structure of local government in communities and the "circumvention" arguments common in this literature. We find evidence of a circumvention effect for restrictive limits on county governments, but not for the limits states place on municipal governments. Also, our findings indicate that the effect of increasing the limits on either government is to mitigate any circumvention effects created by limitations on the other. 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Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of CSF Associates: Publius, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com 2011</rights><rights>Copyright Oxford Publishing Limited(England) Oct 2011</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c457t-2397c85b148550533788439994d98d121b6ff25ac7139ee96ea6078d1c1c31263</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c457t-2397c85b148550533788439994d98d121b6ff25ac7139ee96ea6078d1c1c31263</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23015097$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/23015097$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,778,782,801,1581,27852,27853,27911,27912,58004,58237</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Carr, Jered B.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Farmer, Jayce</creatorcontrib><title>Contingent Effects of Municipal and County TELs on Special District Usage in the United States</title><title>Publius</title><addtitle>Publius</addtitle><description>This research examines the joint effects of the tax and expenditure limits states impose on municipal and county governments on the structure of local government in 500 randomly selected U.S. counties. Understanding the contingent effects of these limitations is critical to assessing the consequences of TELs on the structure of local government in communities and the "circumvention" arguments common in this literature. We find evidence of a circumvention effect for restrictive limits on county governments, but not for the limits states place on municipal governments. Also, our findings indicate that the effect of increasing the limits on either government is to mitigate any circumvention effects created by limitations on the other. Our findings indicate that the circumvention question is more complex than previous works suggest.</description><subject>Appropriations and expenditures</subject><subject>Central-local government relations</subject><subject>Counties</subject><subject>County government</subject><subject>County governments</subject><subject>Data analysis</subject><subject>Districts</subject><subject>Economic aspects</subject><subject>Effects</subject><subject>Evaluation</subject><subject>Expenditures</subject><subject>Expenditures, Public</subject><subject>Governance</subject><subject>Government</subject><subject>Government officials</subject><subject>Intergovernmental tax relations</subject><subject>Local Government</subject><subject>Local politics</subject><subject>Modeling</subject><subject>Municipal governments</subject><subject>Municipal taxes</subject><subject>Political freedom</subject><subject>Property taxes</subject><subject>Public expenditure</subject><subject>Public expenditures</subject><subject>Public policy</subject><subject>Regulation</subject><subject>State structure</subject><subject>State taxation</subject><subject>Strategic planning</subject><subject>Tax expenditures</subject><subject>Tax policy</subject><subject>Taxation</subject><subject>Taxes</subject><subject>U.S.A</subject><subject>United States</subject><subject>United States of America</subject><issn>0048-5950</issn><issn>1747-7107</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2011</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkT1vFDEYhC0EEsdBS4dk0QDFJv5cr8toc3xIh1Ik12L5fO8ePm3sxfZK5N_j00YUFKRyMc871swg9JaSC0o0v5zm_ejnfDmdEuH0GVpRJVSjKFHP0YoQ0TVSS_ISvcr5RAjhulMr9KOPofhwhFDwZhjAlYzjgL_PwTs_2RHbcMB9nEN5wHebbRUDvp3A-Spd-1ySdwXvsj0C9gGXn4B3wRc44NtiC-TX6MVgxwxvHt812n3e3PVfm-3Nl2_91bZxQqrSMK6V6-Seik5KIjlXXSe41locdHegjO7bYWDSOkW5BtAt2JaoqjjqOGUtX6MPi--U4q8ZcjH3PjsYRxsgztnoVjDBq_fTJJOKCCZ1JT_-l6S1RC2EVrKi7_9BT3FOoSY2ndaM1VRnv2aBjnYE44OrzcPv4uI4whFM7aO_MVdMnXPTGnSNLhbepZhzgsFMyd_b9FB_NufFzePiZlm8HnxaDuI8Pc2-W9hTLjH9pRknVBKt-B8rnrVH</recordid><startdate>201110</startdate><enddate>201110</enddate><creator>Carr, Jered B.</creator><creator>Farmer, Jayce</creator><general>Oxford University Press</general><general>Oxford Publishing Limited (England)</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201110</creationdate><title>Contingent Effects of Municipal and County TELs on Special District Usage in the United States</title><author>Carr, Jered B. ; Farmer, Jayce</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c457t-2397c85b148550533788439994d98d121b6ff25ac7139ee96ea6078d1c1c31263</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2011</creationdate><topic>Appropriations and expenditures</topic><topic>Central-local government relations</topic><topic>Counties</topic><topic>County government</topic><topic>County governments</topic><topic>Data analysis</topic><topic>Districts</topic><topic>Economic aspects</topic><topic>Effects</topic><topic>Evaluation</topic><topic>Expenditures</topic><topic>Expenditures, Public</topic><topic>Governance</topic><topic>Government</topic><topic>Government officials</topic><topic>Intergovernmental tax relations</topic><topic>Local Government</topic><topic>Local politics</topic><topic>Modeling</topic><topic>Municipal governments</topic><topic>Municipal taxes</topic><topic>Political freedom</topic><topic>Property taxes</topic><topic>Public expenditure</topic><topic>Public expenditures</topic><topic>Public policy</topic><topic>Regulation</topic><topic>State structure</topic><topic>State taxation</topic><topic>Strategic planning</topic><topic>Tax expenditures</topic><topic>Tax policy</topic><topic>Taxation</topic><topic>Taxes</topic><topic>U.S.A</topic><topic>United States</topic><topic>United States of America</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Carr, Jered B.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Farmer, Jayce</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Publius</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Carr, Jered B.</au><au>Farmer, Jayce</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Contingent Effects of Municipal and County TELs on Special District Usage in the United States</atitle><jtitle>Publius</jtitle><addtitle>Publius</addtitle><date>2011-10</date><risdate>2011</risdate><volume>41</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>709</spage><epage>733</epage><pages>709-733</pages><issn>0048-5950</issn><eissn>1747-7107</eissn><coden>PBLSAB</coden><abstract>This research examines the joint effects of the tax and expenditure limits states impose on municipal and county governments on the structure of local government in 500 randomly selected U.S. counties. Understanding the contingent effects of these limitations is critical to assessing the consequences of TELs on the structure of local government in communities and the "circumvention" arguments common in this literature. We find evidence of a circumvention effect for restrictive limits on county governments, but not for the limits states place on municipal governments. Also, our findings indicate that the effect of increasing the limits on either government is to mitigate any circumvention effects created by limitations on the other. Our findings indicate that the circumvention question is more complex than previous works suggest.</abstract><cop>Oxford</cop><pub>Oxford University Press</pub><doi>10.1093/publius/pjr031</doi><tpages>25</tpages></addata></record> |
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source | PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Jstor Complete Legacy; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current) |
subjects | Appropriations and expenditures Central-local government relations Counties County government County governments Data analysis Districts Economic aspects Effects Evaluation Expenditures Expenditures, Public Governance Government Government officials Intergovernmental tax relations Local Government Local politics Modeling Municipal governments Municipal taxes Political freedom Property taxes Public expenditure Public expenditures Public policy Regulation State structure State taxation Strategic planning Tax expenditures Tax policy Taxation Taxes U.S.A United States United States of America |
title | Contingent Effects of Municipal and County TELs on Special District Usage in the United States |
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