Moral Hazard, Targeting and Contract Duration in Agri‐Environmental Policy

This article extends the multi‐period agri‐environmental contract model of Fraser (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 55, (2004) pp. 525–540) to include a more realistic specification of the inter‐temporal penalties for non‐compliance, and therefore of the inter‐temporal moral hazard problem in...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of agricultural economics 2012-02, Vol.63 (1), p.56-64
1. Verfasser:	Fraser, Rob
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agrarian policy Agri-environmental policy Compliance contract duration Contracts D86 Environmental policy Farmers issues and policy Moral hazard Q18 Q58 targeting
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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