Accidental politicians: How randomly selected legislators can improve parliament efficiency
We study a prototypical model of a Parliament with two Parties or two Political Coalitions and we show how the introduction of a variable percentage of randomly selected independent legislators can increase the global efficiency of a Legislature, in terms of both the number of laws passed and the av...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Physica A 2011-10, Vol.390 (21-22), p.3944-3954 |
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| container_end_page | 3954 |
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| container_issue | 21-22 |
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| container_title | Physica A |
| container_volume | 390 |
| creator | Pluchino, Alessandro Garofalo, Cesare Rapisarda, Andrea Spagano, Salvatore Caserta, Maurizio |
| description | We study a prototypical model of a Parliament with two Parties or two Political Coalitions and we show how the introduction of a variable percentage of randomly selected independent legislators can increase the global efficiency of a Legislature, in terms of both the number of laws passed and the average social welfare obtained. We also analytically find an “efficiency golden rule” which allows to fix the optimal number of legislators to be selected at random after that regular elections have established the relative proportion of the two Parties or Coalitions. These results are in line with both the ancient Greek democratic system and the recent discovery that the adoption of random strategies can improve the efficiency of hierarchical organizations.
► We study a prototypical model of a Parliament with two Parties/Coalitions. ► We introduce a variable percentage of randomly selected independent legislators. ► We show that global efficiency increases with independent legislators. ► We analytically find an “efficiency golden rule”. ► The “efficiency golden rule” predicts the optimal number of independent legislator. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.physa.2011.06.028 |
| format | Article |
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| source | Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete |
| subjects | Accidents Agent based models Associations Complex systems Laws Mathematical analysis Optimization Organizations Sociophysics Statistical mechanics Strategy |
| title | Accidental politicians: How randomly selected legislators can improve parliament efficiency |
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