Internal and external discipline following securities class actions
Companies are sometimes accused of misleading the market. The SEC can punish this with enforcement actions. Alternatively, shareholders can seek redress through a shareholder class action (SCA). Thus, using a sample of 416 securities class actions, this paper shows that SCAs are a catalyst to promot...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of financial intermediation 2012, Vol.21 (1), p.151-179 |
|---|---|
| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 179 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 1 |
| container_start_page | 151 |
| container_title | Journal of financial intermediation |
| container_volume | 21 |
| creator | Humphery-Jenner, Mark L. |
| description | Companies are sometimes accused of misleading the market. The SEC can punish this with enforcement actions. Alternatively, shareholders can seek redress through a shareholder class action (SCA). Thus, using a sample of 416 securities class actions, this paper shows that SCAs are a catalyst to promote disciplinary takeovers, CEO turnover and pay-cuts, and harm CEOs’ future job-prospects. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jfi.2011.09.001 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_918756918</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>S1042957311000386</els_id><sourcerecordid>2517749431</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c462t-1d78f40beecbe422939aca5a7ab964a3aea6d88e047d21765ba28a01dec811323</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kE1PxCAQhonRxHX1B3hrvHhqBUppiSez8WOTTbzombAwNTQsrND68e-lWU8evDBM8ryTmQehS4Irggm_GaqhtxXFhFRYVBiTI7QgWPASs7Y-nv-MlqJp61N0ltKQAcIZW6DV2o8QvXKF8qaAr9_G2KTt3lkPRR-cC5_WvxUJ9BTtaCEV2qmUCqVHG3w6Rye9cgkufusSvT7cv6yeys3z43p1tyk143QsiWm7nuEtgN4Co1TUQmnVqFZtBWeqVqC46TrIGxtKWt5sFe0UJgZ0R0hN6yW6Pszdx_A-QRrlLq8JzikPYUpSkK5teH4zefWHHMI0H5Yh3HCeqRkiB0jHkFKEXu6j3an4LQmWs1Q5yCxVzlIlFjI7y5nbQwbynR8WosyewGswNoIepQn2n_QPHYt_iA</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>905665698</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Internal and external discipline following securities class actions</title><source>Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals</source><creator>Humphery-Jenner, Mark L.</creator><creatorcontrib>Humphery-Jenner, Mark L.</creatorcontrib><description>Companies are sometimes accused of misleading the market. The SEC can punish this with enforcement actions. Alternatively, shareholders can seek redress through a shareholder class action (SCA). Thus, using a sample of 416 securities class actions, this paper shows that SCAs are a catalyst to promote disciplinary takeovers, CEO turnover and pay-cuts, and harm CEOs’ future job-prospects.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1042-9573</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1096-0473</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2011.09.001</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>San Diego: Elsevier Inc</publisher><subject>Acquisitions & mergers ; Analysis ; Auctions ; Business ethics ; Capital market ; Chief executive officers ; Class action lawsuits ; Corporate governance ; Disclosure ; Enterprises ; Ethics ; Fraud ; Governance ; Managerial turnover ; Securities class actions ; Securities issues ; Securities law ; Securities markets ; Stockholders ; Studies ; Take-overs ; Takeovers</subject><ispartof>Journal of financial intermediation, 2012, Vol.21 (1), p.151-179</ispartof><rights>2011 Elsevier Inc.</rights><rights>Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c462t-1d78f40beecbe422939aca5a7ab964a3aea6d88e047d21765ba28a01dec811323</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c462t-1d78f40beecbe422939aca5a7ab964a3aea6d88e047d21765ba28a01dec811323</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957311000386$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,3536,4009,27902,27903,27904,65309</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Humphery-Jenner, Mark L.</creatorcontrib><title>Internal and external discipline following securities class actions</title><title>Journal of financial intermediation</title><description>Companies are sometimes accused of misleading the market. The SEC can punish this with enforcement actions. Alternatively, shareholders can seek redress through a shareholder class action (SCA). Thus, using a sample of 416 securities class actions, this paper shows that SCAs are a catalyst to promote disciplinary takeovers, CEO turnover and pay-cuts, and harm CEOs’ future job-prospects.</description><subject>Acquisitions & mergers</subject><subject>Analysis</subject><subject>Auctions</subject><subject>Business ethics</subject><subject>Capital market</subject><subject>Chief executive officers</subject><subject>Class action lawsuits</subject><subject>Corporate governance</subject><subject>Disclosure</subject><subject>Enterprises</subject><subject>Ethics</subject><subject>Fraud</subject><subject>Governance</subject><subject>Managerial turnover</subject><subject>Securities class actions</subject><subject>Securities issues</subject><subject>Securities law</subject><subject>Securities markets</subject><subject>Stockholders</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Take-overs</subject><subject>Takeovers</subject><issn>1042-9573</issn><issn>1096-0473</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2012</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kE1PxCAQhonRxHX1B3hrvHhqBUppiSez8WOTTbzombAwNTQsrND68e-lWU8evDBM8ryTmQehS4Irggm_GaqhtxXFhFRYVBiTI7QgWPASs7Y-nv-MlqJp61N0ltKQAcIZW6DV2o8QvXKF8qaAr9_G2KTt3lkPRR-cC5_WvxUJ9BTtaCEV2qmUCqVHG3w6Rye9cgkufusSvT7cv6yeys3z43p1tyk143QsiWm7nuEtgN4Co1TUQmnVqFZtBWeqVqC46TrIGxtKWt5sFe0UJgZ0R0hN6yW6Pszdx_A-QRrlLq8JzikPYUpSkK5teH4zefWHHMI0H5Yh3HCeqRkiB0jHkFKEXu6j3an4LQmWs1Q5yCxVzlIlFjI7y5nbQwbynR8WosyewGswNoIepQn2n_QPHYt_iA</recordid><startdate>2012</startdate><enddate>2012</enddate><creator>Humphery-Jenner, Mark L.</creator><general>Elsevier Inc</general><general>Elsevier BV</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>2012</creationdate><title>Internal and external discipline following securities class actions</title><author>Humphery-Jenner, Mark L.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c462t-1d78f40beecbe422939aca5a7ab964a3aea6d88e047d21765ba28a01dec811323</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2012</creationdate><topic>Acquisitions & mergers</topic><topic>Analysis</topic><topic>Auctions</topic><topic>Business ethics</topic><topic>Capital market</topic><topic>Chief executive officers</topic><topic>Class action lawsuits</topic><topic>Corporate governance</topic><topic>Disclosure</topic><topic>Enterprises</topic><topic>Ethics</topic><topic>Fraud</topic><topic>Governance</topic><topic>Managerial turnover</topic><topic>Securities class actions</topic><topic>Securities issues</topic><topic>Securities law</topic><topic>Securities markets</topic><topic>Stockholders</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Take-overs</topic><topic>Takeovers</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Humphery-Jenner, Mark L.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of financial intermediation</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Humphery-Jenner, Mark L.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Internal and external discipline following securities class actions</atitle><jtitle>Journal of financial intermediation</jtitle><date>2012</date><risdate>2012</risdate><volume>21</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>151</spage><epage>179</epage><pages>151-179</pages><issn>1042-9573</issn><eissn>1096-0473</eissn><abstract>Companies are sometimes accused of misleading the market. The SEC can punish this with enforcement actions. Alternatively, shareholders can seek redress through a shareholder class action (SCA). Thus, using a sample of 416 securities class actions, this paper shows that SCAs are a catalyst to promote disciplinary takeovers, CEO turnover and pay-cuts, and harm CEOs’ future job-prospects.</abstract><cop>San Diego</cop><pub>Elsevier Inc</pub><doi>10.1016/j.jfi.2011.09.001</doi><tpages>29</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1042-9573 |
| ispartof | Journal of financial intermediation, 2012, Vol.21 (1), p.151-179 |
| issn | 1042-9573 1096-0473 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_918756918 |
| source | Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Acquisitions & mergers Analysis Auctions Business ethics Capital market Chief executive officers Class action lawsuits Corporate governance Disclosure Enterprises Ethics Fraud Governance Managerial turnover Securities class actions Securities issues Securities law Securities markets Stockholders Studies Take-overs Takeovers |
| title | Internal and external discipline following securities class actions |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-24T07%3A18%3A52IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Internal%20and%20external%20discipline%20following%20securities%20class%20actions&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20financial%20intermediation&rft.au=Humphery-Jenner,%20Mark%20L.&rft.date=2012&rft.volume=21&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=151&rft.epage=179&rft.pages=151-179&rft.issn=1042-9573&rft.eissn=1096-0473&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/j.jfi.2011.09.001&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2517749431%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=905665698&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_els_id=S1042957311000386&rfr_iscdi=true |