Congestion pricing, slot sales and slot trading in aviation
This paper studies the regulation of an airline duopoly on a congested airport. Regulation should then address two market failures: uninternalized congestion, and overpricing due to market power. We find that first-best charges are differentiated over airlines if asymmetric, and completely drive out...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Transportation research. Part B: methodological 2010-03, Vol.44 (3), p.320-329 |
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| container_title | Transportation research. Part B: methodological |
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| creator | Verhoef, Erik T. |
| description | This paper studies the regulation of an airline duopoly on a congested airport. Regulation should then address two market failures: uninternalized congestion, and overpricing due to market power. We find that first-best charges are differentiated over airlines if asymmetric, and completely drive out the least efficient airline from the market. This is not generally the case for an undifferentiated charge, which is found to be a weighted average of first-best charge rules for the two airlines, and is less-than-optimally efficient because of its inability to differentiate between them. Tradable slots may yield the first-best outcome if the congestion externality is relatively important and the market power distortion relatively unimportant, but may be less efficient than non-intervention when the reverse is true. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.trb.2009.07.002 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0191-2615 |
| ispartof | Transportation research. Part B: methodological, 2010-03, Vol.44 (3), p.320-329 |
| issn | 0191-2615 1879-2367 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_918039221 |
| source | RePEc; ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
| subjects | Airport congestion Airport congestion Congestion pricing Slot trading Tradable permits Second-best Charge Commercial aircraft Commercial planes Congestion Congestion pricing Control Distortion Markets Second-best Slot trading Tradable permits Transportation |
| title | Congestion pricing, slot sales and slot trading in aviation |
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