Banking crisis management in the EU: an early assessment
For well over a decade many observers had warned that the European Union was ill-prepared in case of a financial storm because its market integration far outpaced its policy integration. This situation was well known to policy-makers but it was hoped that financial crues would wait until policy inte...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Economic policy 2010-04, Vol.25 (62), p.341-373 |
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description | For well over a decade many observers had warned that the European Union was ill-prepared in case of a financial storm because its market integration far outpaced its policy integration. This situation was well known to policy-makers but it was hoped that financial crues would wait until policy integration occurred. The reality turned out differently, however. We assess the management of the 2007-2009 banking cnsis within the EU against this backdrop. In a nutshell, we find that Europe has done better than could have been expected on the basis of existing arrangements. The two federal institutions acted swiftly, the European Central Bank by providing ample liquidity and the European Commission by enforcing competition discipline flexibly. However, there was no institutional innovation in the form of an EU-financed bail-out of transnational financial institutions or a genuine EU financial stress test. Supervisory responsibilities remained entirely with individual countries and coordination problems were managed through a combination of ad-hoc, discretionary cooperation and reliance on EU rules and procedures. It is not possible, however, to determine whether this relatively satisfactory situation is due to the fact that ad-hoc coordination was fundamentally sufficient or because no complex case of crossborder bank failure occurred. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00243.x |
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This situation was well known to policy-makers but it was hoped that financial crues would wait until policy integration occurred. The reality turned out differently, however. We assess the management of the 2007-2009 banking cnsis within the EU against this backdrop. In a nutshell, we find that Europe has done better than could have been expected on the basis of existing arrangements. The two federal institutions acted swiftly, the European Central Bank by providing ample liquidity and the European Commission by enforcing competition discipline flexibly. However, there was no institutional innovation in the form of an EU-financed bail-out of transnational financial institutions or a genuine EU financial stress test. Supervisory responsibilities remained entirely with individual countries and coordination problems were managed through a combination of ad-hoc, discretionary cooperation and reliance on EU rules and procedures. It is not possible, however, to determine whether this relatively satisfactory situation is due to the fact that ad-hoc coordination was fundamentally sufficient or because no complex case of crossborder bank failure occurred.</description><subject>Bank assets</subject><subject>Bank capital</subject><subject>Bank failures</subject><subject>Bank liquidity</subject><subject>Bank markets</subject><subject>Banking</subject><subject>Banking crises</subject><subject>Banking industry</subject><subject>Banking policy</subject><subject>Banks</subject><subject>Central banks</subject><subject>Cooperation</subject><subject>Crisis management</subject><subject>Economic and Monetary Union</subject><subject>Economic conditions</subject><subject>Economic crisis</subject><subject>Economic policy</subject><subject>Euro Zone</subject><subject>Europe</subject><subject>European Central Bank</subject><subject>European Commission</subject><subject>European Union</subject><subject>Financial crisis</subject><subject>Financial institutions</subject><subject>Monetary policy</subject><subject>Policy analysis</subject><subject>Policy making</subject><subject>Stabilization policy</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Transnationalism</subject><issn>0266-4658</issn><issn>1468-0327</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2010</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkc1OAjEUhRujiYg-gknjxtXg7f_UnRJAE6IbiQmbppQOzgAz2g4JvL0zYli4wW6a9HznnpsehDCBHmnOXdEjXKYJMKp6FJpXAMpZb3uCOgfhFHWASplwKdJzdBFjAQCScNZB6aMtl3m5wC7kMY94bUu78Gtf1jgvcf3h8WByj22JvQ2rHbYx-hhb-RKdZXYV_dXv3UWT4eCt_5SMX0fP_Ydx4gRTdeIyKjQTFuY0o0q4THJOuNV2nkpwttmYC5bOtFMwAy8EzzzMLAfirXDgGeui2_3cz1B9bXyszTqPzq9WtvTVJhpNFNWKMn2UVE0Qo0Lx4ySXoIAQ9Q-SaiGJatNv_pBFtQll8zWGaEG1Jrodl-4hF6oYg8_MZ8jXNuwMAdPWaQrTtmba1kxbp_mp02wb6_XeWsS6CgcfB9mw0OYnez2Ptd8edBuWRiqmhHl_GZlRmvb1dDg1nH0D6lOpAA</recordid><startdate>20100401</startdate><enddate>20100401</enddate><creator>Pisani-Ferry, Jean</creator><creator>Sapir, André</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><general>Blackwell Publishing</general><general>Oxford University Press</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>7U1</scope><scope>7U2</scope><scope>C1K</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20100401</creationdate><title>Banking crisis management in the EU: an early assessment</title><author>Pisani-Ferry, Jean ; 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This situation was well known to policy-makers but it was hoped that financial crues would wait until policy integration occurred. The reality turned out differently, however. We assess the management of the 2007-2009 banking cnsis within the EU against this backdrop. In a nutshell, we find that Europe has done better than could have been expected on the basis of existing arrangements. The two federal institutions acted swiftly, the European Central Bank by providing ample liquidity and the European Commission by enforcing competition discipline flexibly. However, there was no institutional innovation in the form of an EU-financed bail-out of transnational financial institutions or a genuine EU financial stress test. Supervisory responsibilities remained entirely with individual countries and coordination problems were managed through a combination of ad-hoc, discretionary cooperation and reliance on EU rules and procedures. 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source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current); PAIS Index; Business Source Complete |
subjects | Bank assets Bank capital Bank failures Bank liquidity Bank markets Banking Banking crises Banking industry Banking policy Banks Central banks Cooperation Crisis management Economic and Monetary Union Economic conditions Economic crisis Economic policy Euro Zone Europe European Central Bank European Commission European Union Financial crisis Financial institutions Monetary policy Policy analysis Policy making Stabilization policy Studies Transnationalism |
title | Banking crisis management in the EU: an early assessment |
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