Rivalry and superior dispatch: an analysis of competing courts in medieval and early modern England
In most areas, economists look to competition to align incentives, but not so with courts. Many believe that competition enables plaintiff forum shopping, but Adam Smith praised rivalry among courts. This article describes the courts when the common law developed. In many areas of law, courts were m...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Public choice 2011-06, Vol.147 (3/4), p.497-524 |
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| creator | Stringham, Edward Peter Zywicki, Todd J. |
| description | In most areas, economists look to competition to align incentives, but not so with courts. Many believe that competition enables plaintiff forum shopping, but Adam Smith praised rivalry among courts. This article describes the courts when the common law developed. In many areas of law, courts were monopolized and imposed decisions on unwilling participants. In other areas, however, large degrees of competition and consent were present. In many areas, local, hundred, manorial, county, ecclesiastical, law merchant, chancery, and common law courts competed for customers. When parties had a choice, courts needed to provide a forum that was ex ante value maximizing. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11127-010-9739-x |
| format | Article |
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Many believe that competition enables plaintiff forum shopping, but Adam Smith praised rivalry among courts. This article describes the courts when the common law developed. In many areas of law, courts were monopolized and imposed decisions on unwilling participants. In other areas, however, large degrees of competition and consent were present. In many areas, local, hundred, manorial, county, ecclesiastical, law merchant, chancery, and common law courts competed for customers. 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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; SpringerNature Journals; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Political Science Complete |
| subjects | Bureaucracy Chancery courts Common Law Competition Consent Contract law Contracts Courts Courts of law Early modern history Ecclesiastical Law Economic competition Economic history Economics Economics and Finance Economists England History History of law Hypotheses Incentives Judges Jurisdiction Law Law enforcement LITERATURE SURVEY Medieval history Merchants Middle Ages Monopolies Plaintiffs Political economy Political Science Public Finance Rivalry Studies United Kingdom |
| title | Rivalry and superior dispatch: an analysis of competing courts in medieval and early modern England |
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