De Gaulle's Peace Program for Vietnam: The Kennedy Years

This article examines the Kennedy administration’s rejection of French President Charles de Gaulle’s critique of American intervention in Vietnam. In discussions with their American counterparts, de Gaulle and his officials consistently touched on four major themes from his first meeting with Kennedy in May 1961 until Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963: recognition of the principle of Vietnamese self‐determination, the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, acceptance of controlled neutrality for Southeast Asia, and the necessity of dealing with mainland China directly. Kennedy rejected all elements of this platform. He was highly sceptical of neutrality, which he viewed as a stalking horse for communism, and believed that the United States needed to show resolve in Southeast Asia or risk jeopardizing its prestige with allies across the globe. The manner in which Kennedy’s New Frontiersmen framed their rejection of de Gaulle’s position on Vietnam reflected long‐standing American cultural antipathy toward Europe, France, in particular. At no point did the Kennedy administration recognize the Gaullist position on Vietnam as a legitimate expression of relevant French experience nor did it believe that France was capable of acting as an honest broker and negotiating a real truce between North and South. As a result, the Kennedy administration missed out on a perfect opportunity to disengage from a grim and distant conflict late in the summer of 1963, when de Gaulle had the resources and the will to broker peace.