On 1-convexity and nucleolus of co-insurance games
The insurance situation in which an enormous risk is insured by a number of insurance companies is modeled through a cooperative TU game, the so-called co-insurance game, first introduced in Fragnelli and Marina (2004). In this paper we present certain conditions on the parameters of the model that...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Insurance, mathematics & economics mathematics & economics, 2011-03, Vol.48 (2), p.217-225 |
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| container_title | Insurance, mathematics & economics |
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| creator | Driessen, Theo S.H. Fragnelli, Vito Katsev, Ilya V. Khmelnitskaya, Anna B. |
| description | The insurance situation in which an enormous risk is insured by a number of insurance companies is modeled through a cooperative TU game, the so-called co-insurance game, first introduced in
Fragnelli and Marina (2004). In this paper we present certain conditions on the parameters of the model that guarantee the 1-convexity property of co-insurance games which in turn ensures the nonemptiness of the core and the linearity of the nucleolus as a function of the variable premium. Further we reveal conditions when a co-insurance game is representable in the form of a veto-removed game and present an efficient final algorithm for computing the nucleolus of a veto-removed game. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2010.10.009 |
| format | Article |
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| language | eng |
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| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Algorithms Cooperative game Core Game theory Games Insurance Insurance companies Insurance premiums Insurance situation Insurance situation Cooperative game Core Nucleolus Linear models Mathematical finance Nucleolus Risk management Studies |
| title | On 1-convexity and nucleolus of co-insurance games |
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