Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions
We study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. The sellers compete by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets. Upon observing auction designs, potential bidders decide which auctions to...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The American economic review 2011-08, Vol.101 (5), p.1806-1841 |
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| container_end_page | 1841 |
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| container_title | The American economic review |
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| creator | Gorbenko, Alexander S. Malenko, Andrey |
| description | We study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. The sellers compete by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets. Upon observing auction designs, potential bidders decide which auctions to enter. We characterize all symmetric equilibria and show that there always exist equilibria in which auctions are in standard securities or their combinations. In large markets the unique equilibrium is auctions in pure cash. We extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1257/aer.101.5.1806 |
| format | Article |
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We extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0002-8282</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1944-7981</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.5.1806</identifier><identifier>CODEN: AENRAA</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Nashville: American Economic Association</publisher><subject>Accountability ; Advisors ; Auction markets ; Auctions ; Bidding ; Bids ; Call options ; Cash ; Competition ; Costs ; Decision making ; Design ; Due diligence ; Economic competition ; Equilibrium ; Financial securities ; Government ; Livestock auctions ; Oil & gas royalties ; Oil and gas leases ; Payments ; Prices ; Put & call options ; Reservation price ; Securities industry ; Securities issues ; Security prices ; Sellers surplus ; Spectrum allocation ; Studies ; U.S.A</subject><ispartof>The American economic review, 2011-08, Vol.101 (5), p.1806-1841</ispartof><rights>Copyright© 2011 American Economic Association</rights><rights>Copyright American Economic Association Aug 2011</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c423t-970256b1300cfaa7cde2f8b78907211015885794a513e52f626c0b46bec6c77a3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c423t-970256b1300cfaa7cde2f8b78907211015885794a513e52f626c0b46bec6c77a3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23045623$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/23045623$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,799,3734,27903,27904,57996,58229</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Gorbenko, Alexander S.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Malenko, Andrey</creatorcontrib><title>Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions</title><title>The American economic review</title><description>We study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. The sellers compete by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets. Upon observing auction designs, potential bidders decide which auctions to enter. We characterize all symmetric equilibria and show that there always exist equilibria in which auctions are in standard securities or their combinations. In large markets the unique equilibrium is auctions in pure cash. We extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options.</description><subject>Accountability</subject><subject>Advisors</subject><subject>Auction markets</subject><subject>Auctions</subject><subject>Bidding</subject><subject>Bids</subject><subject>Call options</subject><subject>Cash</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Costs</subject><subject>Decision making</subject><subject>Design</subject><subject>Due diligence</subject><subject>Economic competition</subject><subject>Equilibrium</subject><subject>Financial securities</subject><subject>Government</subject><subject>Livestock auctions</subject><subject>Oil & gas royalties</subject><subject>Oil and gas leases</subject><subject>Payments</subject><subject>Prices</subject><subject>Put & call options</subject><subject>Reservation price</subject><subject>Securities industry</subject><subject>Securities issues</subject><subject>Security prices</subject><subject>Sellers surplus</subject><subject>Spectrum allocation</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>U.S.A</subject><issn>0002-8282</issn><issn>1944-7981</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2011</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNpdkM1LxDAQxYMouK5evQnFi6fWyeSzx2VxVVjwoJ5DGlPpsm3WpD3435uy4sHTvGF-b3g8Qq4pVBSFurc-VhRoJSqqQZ6QBa05L1Wt6SlZAACWGjWek4uUdjDvVC0IrEN_8GM3dmEobB-Gz-LV7_c-pqIbsnRTzDefitXkZiZdkrPW7pO_-p1L8r55eFs_lduXx-f1als6jmwsawUoZEMZgGutVe7DY6sbpWtQSHNMobVQNbeCMi-wlSgdNFw23kmnlGVLcnf8e4jha_JpNH2XXI5mBx-mZHSNNWeKi0ze_iN3YYpDDme0ZlyhVDxD1RFyMaQUfWsOsett_DYUzFyfyfVlTY0wc33ZcHM07NIY4h-NDLiQyNgPffZqfw</recordid><startdate>20110801</startdate><enddate>20110801</enddate><creator>Gorbenko, Alexander S.</creator><creator>Malenko, Andrey</creator><general>American Economic Association</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7X7</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>88C</scope><scope>88E</scope><scope>88J</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>K9.</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M0S</scope><scope>M0T</scope><scope>M1P</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>M2R</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20110801</creationdate><title>Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions</title><author>Gorbenko, Alexander S. ; Malenko, Andrey</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c423t-970256b1300cfaa7cde2f8b78907211015885794a513e52f626c0b46bec6c77a3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2011</creationdate><topic>Accountability</topic><topic>Advisors</topic><topic>Auction markets</topic><topic>Auctions</topic><topic>Bidding</topic><topic>Bids</topic><topic>Call options</topic><topic>Cash</topic><topic>Competition</topic><topic>Costs</topic><topic>Decision making</topic><topic>Design</topic><topic>Due diligence</topic><topic>Economic competition</topic><topic>Equilibrium</topic><topic>Financial securities</topic><topic>Government</topic><topic>Livestock auctions</topic><topic>Oil & gas royalties</topic><topic>Oil and gas leases</topic><topic>Payments</topic><topic>Prices</topic><topic>Put & call options</topic><topic>Reservation price</topic><topic>Securities industry</topic><topic>Securities issues</topic><topic>Security prices</topic><topic>Sellers surplus</topic><topic>Spectrum allocation</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>U.S.A</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Gorbenko, Alexander S.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Malenko, Andrey</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>Health & Medical Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database (Alumni)</collection><collection>Medical Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Social Science Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Social Science Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Health & Medical Complete (Alumni)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>Health & Medical Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database</collection><collection>Medical Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Social Science Database</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>The American economic review</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Gorbenko, Alexander S.</au><au>Malenko, Andrey</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions</atitle><jtitle>The American economic review</jtitle><date>2011-08-01</date><risdate>2011</risdate><volume>101</volume><issue>5</issue><spage>1806</spage><epage>1841</epage><pages>1806-1841</pages><issn>0002-8282</issn><eissn>1944-7981</eissn><coden>AENRAA</coden><abstract>We study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. The sellers compete by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets. Upon observing auction designs, potential bidders decide which auctions to enter. We characterize all symmetric equilibria and show that there always exist equilibria in which auctions are in standard securities or their combinations. In large markets the unique equilibrium is auctions in pure cash. We extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options.</abstract><cop>Nashville</cop><pub>American Economic Association</pub><doi>10.1257/aer.101.5.1806</doi><tpages>36</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0002-8282 |
| ispartof | The American economic review, 2011-08, Vol.101 (5), p.1806-1841 |
| issn | 0002-8282 1944-7981 |
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| source | EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; Jstor Complete Legacy; American Economic Association Web |
| subjects | Accountability Advisors Auction markets Auctions Bidding Bids Call options Cash Competition Costs Decision making Design Due diligence Economic competition Equilibrium Financial securities Government Livestock auctions Oil & gas royalties Oil and gas leases Payments Prices Put & call options Reservation price Securities industry Securities issues Security prices Sellers surplus Spectrum allocation Studies U.S.A |
| title | Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions |
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