When Cheap is Costly: Rent Decline, Regime Survival and State Reform in Mubarak's Egypt (1990-2009)
It has been held that external rents significantly affect the formation of state institutional capacities as constant flows of rents tend to weaken the capacity to regulate, monitor and restructure the economy. This gives rise to the formulation of a question in reverse: would a steady and consisten...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Middle Eastern studies 2011-03, Vol.47 (2), p.295-313 |
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| creator | Ahmed Adly, Amr Ismail |
| description | It has been held that external rents significantly affect the formation of state institutional capacities as constant flows of rents tend to weaken the capacity to regulate, monitor and restructure the economy. This gives rise to the formulation of a question in reverse: would a steady and consistent decline in rents instigate state capacity building? This study argues that the impact of rent decline on capacity building is politically mediated by the institutional features of the ruling regime which determine the extent to which dwindling rents adversely affect the incumbents' chances of political survival. In Mubarak's Egypt, the ruling incumbents could survive with less rent by resorting to more repression and curtailing political participation and could thus evade the cost of state reform. In that setting, cheap regime survival proved to be quite costly for the overall economy. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1080/00263206.2011.542310 |
| format | Article |
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This gives rise to the formulation of a question in reverse: would a steady and consistent decline in rents instigate state capacity building? This study argues that the impact of rent decline on capacity building is politically mediated by the institutional features of the ruling regime which determine the extent to which dwindling rents adversely affect the incumbents' chances of political survival. In Mubarak's Egypt, the ruling incumbents could survive with less rent by resorting to more repression and curtailing political participation and could thus evade the cost of state reform. 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regimes</subject><subject>Politics</subject><subject>Reform</subject><subject>Rent-seeking</subject><subject>Rents</subject><subject>Revolution</subject><subject>State</subject><subject>State 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| identifier | ISSN: 0026-3206 |
| ispartof | Middle Eastern studies, 2011-03, Vol.47 (2), p.295-313 |
| issn | 0026-3206 1743-7881 |
| language | eng |
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| source | PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Community capacity building Constituents Costs Economic change Economic decline Economic reform Economic rent Egypt Government and politics Governmental reform Gross domestic product Impact analysis Incumbents International economics Labor protests Middle Eastern studies Mubarak, Hosni Mubarak, Muhammad Hosni Political leaders Political participation Political power Political protests Political regimes Politics Reform Rent-seeking Rents Revolution State State capacity |
| title | When Cheap is Costly: Rent Decline, Regime Survival and State Reform in Mubarak's Egypt (1990-2009) |
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