Counterparty effects on capital structure decision in incomplete market

This paper builds a static contingent-claim model that allows for examining the optimal capital structure with the joint arguments of counterparty default risk and market incompleteness. A first-passage-time model with jump default barrier is adopted to capture the counterparty effects on the pricin...

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Veröffentlicht in:Economic modelling 2011-09, Vol.28 (5), p.2181-2189
Hauptverfasser: Chen, Chang-Chih, Shyu, So-De, Yang, Chih-Yuan
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container_title Economic modelling
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creator Chen, Chang-Chih
Shyu, So-De
Yang, Chih-Yuan
description This paper builds a static contingent-claim model that allows for examining the optimal capital structure with the joint arguments of counterparty default risk and market incompleteness. A first-passage-time model with jump default barrier is adopted to capture the counterparty effects on the pricing of defaultable claims. Following the framework of Jarrow and Yu (2001), the jump in primary firm's bankruptcy barrier is designed as the loss on capital resulted from secondary firm's bankruptcy. The relevance of market incompleteness in the context of claim-pricing is considered using “good-deal asset price bound” method by Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000). We show that the effects of counterparty's default clearly diminish the uses of debt, which indirectly explains the so-called under-leveraged puzzle. We further find that counterparty effects on capital structure are sensitive to market incompleteness and firm's characteristics, such as tax rate and bankruptcy cost rate. ► Jointly consider the counterparty default risk and market incompleteness. ► A first-passage-time model with jump default barrier. ► The jump in primary firm's bankruptcy barrier is due to secondary firm's bankruptcy. ► The effects of counterparty's default indirectly explain the under-leveraged puzzle.
doi_str_mv 10.1016/j.econmod.2011.04.011
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subjects Asset pricing
Bankruptcy
Capital formation
Capital structure
Corporate finance
Counterparty effect
Counterparty effect Market incompleteness Optimal capital structure
Default
Economic models
Financial management
Financing methods
Firm value
Market incompleteness
Optimal capital structure
Stock prices
Studies
title Counterparty effects on capital structure decision in incomplete market
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