Error cascades in observational learning: An experiment on the Chinos game
The paper reports an experimental study based on a variant of the popular Chinos game, which is used as a simple but paradigmatic instance of observational learning. There are three players, arranged in sequence, each of which wins a fixed price if she manages to guess the total number of coins lyin...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Games and economic behavior 2011-09, Vol.73 (1), p.136-146 |
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| container_title | Games and economic behavior |
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| creator | Feri, Francesco Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. Ponti, Giovanni Vega-Redondo, Fernando |
| description | The paper reports an experimental study based on a variant of the popular Chinos game, which is used as a simple but paradigmatic instance of observational learning. There are three players, arranged in sequence,
each of which wins a fixed price if she manages to guess the total number of coins lying in everybodyʼs hands. Our evidence shows that, despite the remarkable frequency of equilibrium outcomes, deviations from optimal play are also significant. And when such deviations occur, we find that, for any given player position, the probability of a mistake is increasing in the probability of a mistake of her predecessors. This is what we call an
error cascade, which we measure by evaluating the (heterogeneous) Quantal Response Equilibrium which better suits our data. We also check the robustness of our findings when we allow for belief heterogeneity by applying
Kübler and Weizsäckerʼs (2004) cognitive frame of
limited depth of reasoning. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.003 |
| format | Article |
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error cascade, which we measure by evaluating the (heterogeneous) Quantal Response Equilibrium which better suits our data. We also check the robustness of our findings when we allow for belief heterogeneity by applying
Kübler and Weizsäckerʼs (2004) cognitive frame of
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error cascade, which we measure by evaluating the (heterogeneous) Quantal Response Equilibrium which better suits our data. We also check the robustness of our findings when we allow for belief heterogeneity by applying
Kübler and Weizsäckerʼs (2004) cognitive frame of
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each of which wins a fixed price if she manages to guess the total number of coins lying in everybodyʼs hands. Our evidence shows that, despite the remarkable frequency of equilibrium outcomes, deviations from optimal play are also significant. And when such deviations occur, we find that, for any given player position, the probability of a mistake is increasing in the probability of a mistake of her predecessors. This is what we call an
error cascade, which we measure by evaluating the (heterogeneous) Quantal Response Equilibrium which better suits our data. We also check the robustness of our findings when we allow for belief heterogeneity by applying
Kübler and Weizsäckerʼs (2004) cognitive frame of
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| ispartof | Games and economic behavior, 2011-09, Vol.73 (1), p.136-146 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Equilibrium models Equilibrium theory Error Error cascades Errors Experimental economics Game theory Games of strategy Learning Positional learning Positional learning Error cascades Probability Studies |
| title | Error cascades in observational learning: An experiment on the Chinos game |
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