Inequality and network structure

We explore the manner in which the structure of a social network constrains the level of inequality that can be sustained among its members, based on the following considerations: (i) any distribution of value must be stable with respect to coalitional deviations, and (ii) the network structure itse...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Games and economic behavior 2011-09, Vol.73 (1), p.215-226
Hauptverfasser:	Kets, Willemien, Iyengar, Garud, Sethi, Rajiv, Bowles, Samuel
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Coalitions Cooperation Cooperative games Equilibrium models Equilibrium theory Game theory Games of strategy Inequality Inequality Networks Cooperative games Lorenz dominance Lorenz dominance Mathematical economics Networks Social networks Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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