Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness

When truth conflicts with efficiency, can verbal communication destroy efficiency? Or are lies or vagueness used to hide inconvenient truths? We consider a sequential 2-player public good game in which the leader has private information about the value of the public good. This value can be low, high...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Games and economic behavior 2011-09, Vol.73 (1), p.244-261
Hauptverfasser:	Serra-Garcia, Marta, van Damme, Eric, Potters, Jan
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Communication Communication economics Communication Efficiency Lying Public goods Communication research Deceit Economic efficiency Efficiency Game theory Lying Public good Public goods Studies Verbal behaviour Verbal communication
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