Information and Prices with Capacity Constraints
In the theoretical literature on consumer search, one conclusion is nearly universal: as buyers become better able to observe and compare prices ex ante, sellers will set lower prices in equilibrium. In this paper, I examine a standard consumer search model with one small - yet often relevant - addi...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | The American economic review 2011-06, Vol.101 (4), p.1591-1600 |
|---|---|
| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 1600 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 4 |
| container_start_page | 1591 |
| container_title | The American economic review |
| container_volume | 101 |
| creator | Lester, Benjamin |
| description | In the theoretical literature on consumer search, one conclusion is nearly universal: as buyers become better able to observe and compare prices ex ante, sellers will set lower prices in equilibrium. In this paper, I examine a standard consumer search model with one small - yet often relevant - additional restriction: I assume that sellers are capacity constrained. In this environment, I illustrate that the conventional wisdom regarding information and prices does not necessarily hold: having more informed consumers can lead to a decrease in prices, have no effect at all, or even lead to an increase in prices. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1257/aer.101.4.1591 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_882619317</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>23045912</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>23045912</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c383t-9f98a6dd9734c27b681fda5cf7772e0ee7e4cf048a428edf7c362ad3ea3dacb13</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpdkE1LAzEQhoMoWKtXb8LixdOumSTdJEdZ_CgU9KDnMM0mmNJuapIi_fduqXjwNDPM8w7DQ8g10AbYTN6jSw1QaEQDMw0nZAJaiFpqBadkQilltWKKnZOLnFf0MIOcEDoffEwbLCEOFQ599ZaCdbn6DuWz6nCLNpR91cUhl4RhKPmSnHlcZ3f1W6fk4-nxvXupF6_P8-5hUVuueKm11wrbvteSC8vkslXge5xZL6VkjjonnbCeCoWCKdd7aXnLsOcOeY92CXxK7o53tyl-7VwuZhOydes1Di7uslGKtaA5yJG8_Ueu4i4N43NGSa4UZa0YoeYI2RRzTs6bbQobTHsD1Bz0mVHf2IMR5qBvDNwcA6tcYvqjGadiXDP-A9vvbF8</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>873880264</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Information and Prices with Capacity Constraints</title><source>EBSCOhost Business Source Complete</source><source>JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing</source><source>American Economic Association</source><creator>Lester, Benjamin</creator><creatorcontrib>Lester, Benjamin</creatorcontrib><description>In the theoretical literature on consumer search, one conclusion is nearly universal: as buyers become better able to observe and compare prices ex ante, sellers will set lower prices in equilibrium. In this paper, I examine a standard consumer search model with one small - yet often relevant - additional restriction: I assume that sellers are capacity constrained. In this environment, I illustrate that the conventional wisdom regarding information and prices does not necessarily hold: having more informed consumers can lead to a decrease in prices, have no effect at all, or even lead to an increase in prices. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]</description><identifier>ISSN: 0002-8282</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1944-7981</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.4.1591</identifier><identifier>CODEN: AENRAA</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Nashville: American Economic Association</publisher><subject>Access to information ; Competition ; Consumer equilibrium ; Consumer goods ; Consumer prices ; Consumers ; Economic information ; Economic models ; Economic theory ; Elasticity of demand ; Equilibrium ; Equilibrium models ; Equilibrium prices ; Game theory ; Goods ; Imperfect competition ; Industrial organization ; Market equilibrium prices ; Market prices ; Political economy ; Price competition ; Price formation ; Price theory ; Prices ; Purchasing ; Shorter Papers ; Studies ; Willingness to pay</subject><ispartof>The American economic review, 2011-06, Vol.101 (4), p.1591-1600</ispartof><rights>Copyright© 2011 American Economic Association</rights><rights>Copyright American Economic Association Jun 2011</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c383t-9f98a6dd9734c27b681fda5cf7772e0ee7e4cf048a428edf7c362ad3ea3dacb13</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c383t-9f98a6dd9734c27b681fda5cf7772e0ee7e4cf048a428edf7c362ad3ea3dacb13</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23045912$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/23045912$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,3748,27924,27925,58017,58250</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Lester, Benjamin</creatorcontrib><title>Information and Prices with Capacity Constraints</title><title>The American economic review</title><description>In the theoretical literature on consumer search, one conclusion is nearly universal: as buyers become better able to observe and compare prices ex ante, sellers will set lower prices in equilibrium. In this paper, I examine a standard consumer search model with one small - yet often relevant - additional restriction: I assume that sellers are capacity constrained. In this environment, I illustrate that the conventional wisdom regarding information and prices does not necessarily hold: having more informed consumers can lead to a decrease in prices, have no effect at all, or even lead to an increase in prices. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]</description><subject>Access to information</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Consumer equilibrium</subject><subject>Consumer goods</subject><subject>Consumer prices</subject><subject>Consumers</subject><subject>Economic information</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Elasticity of demand</subject><subject>Equilibrium</subject><subject>Equilibrium models</subject><subject>Equilibrium prices</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Goods</subject><subject>Imperfect competition</subject><subject>Industrial organization</subject><subject>Market equilibrium prices</subject><subject>Market prices</subject><subject>Political economy</subject><subject>Price competition</subject><subject>Price formation</subject><subject>Price theory</subject><subject>Prices</subject><subject>Purchasing</subject><subject>Shorter Papers</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Willingness to pay</subject><issn>0002-8282</issn><issn>1944-7981</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2011</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNpdkE1LAzEQhoMoWKtXb8LixdOumSTdJEdZ_CgU9KDnMM0mmNJuapIi_fduqXjwNDPM8w7DQ8g10AbYTN6jSw1QaEQDMw0nZAJaiFpqBadkQilltWKKnZOLnFf0MIOcEDoffEwbLCEOFQ599ZaCdbn6DuWz6nCLNpR91cUhl4RhKPmSnHlcZ3f1W6fk4-nxvXupF6_P8-5hUVuueKm11wrbvteSC8vkslXge5xZL6VkjjonnbCeCoWCKdd7aXnLsOcOeY92CXxK7o53tyl-7VwuZhOydes1Di7uslGKtaA5yJG8_Ueu4i4N43NGSa4UZa0YoeYI2RRzTs6bbQobTHsD1Bz0mVHf2IMR5qBvDNwcA6tcYvqjGadiXDP-A9vvbF8</recordid><startdate>20110601</startdate><enddate>20110601</enddate><creator>Lester, Benjamin</creator><general>American Economic Association</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7X7</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>88C</scope><scope>88E</scope><scope>88J</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>K9.</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M0S</scope><scope>M0T</scope><scope>M1P</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>M2R</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20110601</creationdate><title>Information and Prices with Capacity Constraints</title><author>Lester, Benjamin</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c383t-9f98a6dd9734c27b681fda5cf7772e0ee7e4cf048a428edf7c362ad3ea3dacb13</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2011</creationdate><topic>Access to information</topic><topic>Competition</topic><topic>Consumer equilibrium</topic><topic>Consumer goods</topic><topic>Consumer prices</topic><topic>Consumers</topic><topic>Economic information</topic><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Elasticity of demand</topic><topic>Equilibrium</topic><topic>Equilibrium models</topic><topic>Equilibrium prices</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Goods</topic><topic>Imperfect competition</topic><topic>Industrial organization</topic><topic>Market equilibrium prices</topic><topic>Market prices</topic><topic>Political economy</topic><topic>Price competition</topic><topic>Price formation</topic><topic>Price theory</topic><topic>Prices</topic><topic>Purchasing</topic><topic>Shorter Papers</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Willingness to pay</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Lester, Benjamin</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>Access via ABI/INFORM (ProQuest)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>Health & Medical Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database (Alumni)</collection><collection>Medical Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Social Science Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Social Science Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Health & Medical Complete (Alumni)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>Health & Medical Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database</collection><collection>Medical Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Social Science Database</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>The American economic review</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Lester, Benjamin</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Information and Prices with Capacity Constraints</atitle><jtitle>The American economic review</jtitle><date>2011-06-01</date><risdate>2011</risdate><volume>101</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>1591</spage><epage>1600</epage><pages>1591-1600</pages><issn>0002-8282</issn><eissn>1944-7981</eissn><coden>AENRAA</coden><abstract>In the theoretical literature on consumer search, one conclusion is nearly universal: as buyers become better able to observe and compare prices ex ante, sellers will set lower prices in equilibrium. In this paper, I examine a standard consumer search model with one small - yet often relevant - additional restriction: I assume that sellers are capacity constrained. In this environment, I illustrate that the conventional wisdom regarding information and prices does not necessarily hold: having more informed consumers can lead to a decrease in prices, have no effect at all, or even lead to an increase in prices. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]</abstract><cop>Nashville</cop><pub>American Economic Association</pub><doi>10.1257/aer.101.4.1591</doi><tpages>10</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0002-8282 |
| ispartof | The American economic review, 2011-06, Vol.101 (4), p.1591-1600 |
| issn | 0002-8282 1944-7981 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_882619317 |
| source | EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; American Economic Association |
| subjects | Access to information Competition Consumer equilibrium Consumer goods Consumer prices Consumers Economic information Economic models Economic theory Elasticity of demand Equilibrium Equilibrium models Equilibrium prices Game theory Goods Imperfect competition Industrial organization Market equilibrium prices Market prices Political economy Price competition Price formation Price theory Prices Purchasing Shorter Papers Studies Willingness to pay |
| title | Information and Prices with Capacity Constraints |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-27T17%3A46%3A01IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Information%20and%20Prices%20with%20Capacity%20Constraints&rft.jtitle=The%20American%20economic%20review&rft.au=Lester,%20Benjamin&rft.date=2011-06-01&rft.volume=101&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=1591&rft.epage=1600&rft.pages=1591-1600&rft.issn=0002-8282&rft.eissn=1944-7981&rft.coden=AENRAA&rft_id=info:doi/10.1257/aer.101.4.1591&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E23045912%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=873880264&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=23045912&rfr_iscdi=true |