Coarse matching with incomplete information

We study two-sided markets with heterogeneous, privately informed agents who gain from being matched with better partners from the other side. Our main results quantify the relative attractiveness of a coarse matching scheme consisting of two classes of agents on each side, in terms of matching surp...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economic theory 2011-05, Vol.47 (1), p.75-104
Hauptverfasser:	Hoppe, Heidrun C., Moldovanu, Benny, Ozdenoren, Emre
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agency Agency theory Auctions Capital costs Causal covariation Comparative analysis Distribution functions Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory Imperfect information Information economics Market structure Mechanism design Men Microeconomics Production costs Public Finance Random variables Research Article Revenue Social and Behav. Sciences Studies Surplus Total revenue Total surplus Transaction costs Welfare measurement
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