Ambiguous act equilibria
A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies is used to study the effect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of “independent strategies” as well as of “common priors” are amended to render them applicable to games in which players lack probabilis...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Games and economic behavior 2011-03, Vol.71 (2), p.246-260 |
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| container_title | Games and economic behavior |
| container_volume | 71 |
| creator | Bade, Sophie |
| description | A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies is used to study the effect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of “independent strategies” as well as of “common priors” are amended to render them applicable to games in which players lack probabilistic sophistication. Within this framework the equilibrium predictions of two-player games with ambiguity-averse and with ambiguity-neutral players are observationally equivalent. This equivalence result does not extend to the case of games with more than two players. A translation of the concept of equilibrium in beliefs to the context of ambiguity aversion yields substantially different predictions – even for the case with just two players. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.006 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Games and economic behavior, 2011-03, Vol.71 (2), p.246-260 |
| issn | 0899-8256 1090-2473 |
| language | eng |
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| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Ambiguity Equilibrium Equilibrium models Equilibrium theory Forecasting Game theory Games of strategy Nash equilibrium Studies Uncertainty Uncertainty aversion Uncertainty aversion Nash equilibrium Ambiguity |
| title | Ambiguous act equilibria |
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